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PREFACE 
 This study investigates the stability of South Asia, after the overt display of 
nuclear explosion by Pakistan and in India in May 1998. Since independence both the 
countries have conflictual relationship with each other on the issue of Kashmir. Both 
the countries have fought three major wars. The specific emphasis was on the analysis 
of the South Asia nuclearization. The relationships of both the countries have been 
discussed with special emphasis on India’s nuclear programme. India’s nuclear 
doctrine and the domestic politics of India in regard of the nuclear policy have been 
discussed. The study tries to explain the problem areas like arms race and 
nuclearization of two countries. It also touches upon the reasons for non-observance 
of non-proliferation treaties in vogue by the two countries. This study also includes 
the geopolitical environments of South Asia including China in the region. The study 
advocates that the South Asia in general, and India and Pakistan in particular will 
remain under the clouds of nuclear threat due to India and Pakistan, unless Kashmir 
problem is cordially solved. The intervention by the world powers especially United 
States in this regard is extremely important. Both India and Pakistan failed to resolve 
their core issue of Kashmir by bilateral talks. The study also studies the superpower 
interest in South Asia. If India and Pakistan do not resolve their dispute and busy in 
arms race, both the countries will once again indulge in any crises, which may have a 
potential to turn into a nuclear war. Therefore, this thesis is an effort to focus on the 
India’s nuclear programme and politics behind the nuclearization of South Asia.  
 The scope of the study is undoubtedly vast. The methodology used for 
collection of data and writing of thesis has been purely archival, historical and 
analytical, so that a complete record of events and their implications for the future 
could be visualized. This thesis is divided into five chapters. A large number of 
references are quoted throughout the thesis. 
 The first chapter titled, ‘Historical Background’ deals with the history of 
nuclear proliferation. The first nuclear test conducted by United States and followed 
by the other countries of the word. The efforts for controlling and eliminating these 
weapons, the horizontal dimension of proliferation of weapons, the danger of vertical 
proliferation, superpower and discriminatory nuclear order.  
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 The second chapter entitled, ‘India’s Nuclear Programme I’ deals with nuclear 
policy during early years, Nehru’s Indian nuclear policy from 1960s, Shastri phase, 
Indira Gandhi phase, Pokhran I Explosion, Internal reaction after 18 May 1974, the 
Janta Era, Morarji Desai’s views on nuclear issue, the Charan Singh Government. 
 The third chapter titled, “India’s Nuclear Programme II’ deals with Indias 
policy since 1980s, return of Indira Gandhi, the Rajiv Gandhi era, the salient feature 
of the action plans, V.P. Singh government, P.V. Narasimha Rao period, the extension 
of NPT, United Front Government, H.D. Deve Goda, I.K. Gujral, Bharatiya Janta 
Party, Atal Bihari Vapayee, A.P.J. Abdul Kalam and Rajagopala after 1998 test. 
Operation Shakti: 1998 Formulation of India’s Nuclear doctrine, the NSAB’s draft 
doctrine, Indias no first use policy, the danger of nuclear war in region (Kargil war). 
UPA government in 2004, Indo-US nuclear deal, domestic politics and the nature of 
political leadership. 
 The fourth chapter entitled, “Regional Conflicts, Nuclear Proliferation and 
Arms Control in South Asia” deals with Kargil conflict, India and Pakistan stand on 
NPT, Indo-Pak wars and crisis, the agreement on non-attack on each other’s nuclear 
installations and facilities of India and Pakistan. Joint declaration and complete 
prohibition of chemical weapons by India and Pakistan. India and Pakistan’s stand on 
CTBT, Disarmament and India’s nuclear doctrine draft and the reaction of Pakistan. 
 The fifth chapter titled, “Superpower Interest in South Asia” studies the 
importance of South Asia to superpowers. This chapter focuses on the U.S. policy 
towards South Asia and its support to Pakistan, Russia as a factor in India’s security, 
how South Asia region has undergone changes since the big powers directed their 
attention to this region.  
 The Conclusion is an attempt to evaluate the facts behind the politics of 
nuclearization in South Asia and examine the factor behind India’s nuclear policy and 
some measure to stop nuclear arms race in the region. This study also deals with the 
arms race and global nuclear politics going on in South Asia due to its strategic 
location and presence of conflictual relations in the region.  
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 The proliferation of nuclear weapons is one of the most pressing problems in 
world politics today. Now the world is a more dangerous place than ever before. In 
the history of modern world the year 1932 was marked as one of the fateful ironies of 
the brutal 20th century. The German talent was transferred to America due to Hitler’s 
anti-Jewish politics, which enriched the American scientific community and they 
gathered the best scientific talent from all over the Europe. All scientists gathered the 
knowledge outward on a grand scale in the pursuit of a weapon of mass destruction 
and succeeded in manufacturing the first ever nuclear device.1  
 In fact the first nuclear test conducted by United States under the Manhattan 
project at Alamagordo, New Mexico on 16th July 1945, proved its superiority to the 
world, with its first nuclear attack on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 6th & 9th August 
1945 respectively. USA remained the only superpower for four year. The attack by 
America on Japanese city of Hiroshima and Nagasaki brought ‘nuclear power’ to the 
attention of the world in a sudden and dramatic way. This incident started the 
beginning of efforts made by the former Soviet Union and produced its nuclear bomb 
in 1949. The Soviet nuclear test was code-named “First lighting”.2  
 The decision of Britain to develop nuclear weapons supports the realistic 
explanation of nuclear proliferation. Britain feared the possibility of US isolationism 
after the Second World War. There was a concern that America might lapse into a 
new isolationism from which it might emerge too late to benefit England.3 The first 
British device was tested in Monte Bello Island of Australia on Oct. 3, 1952.4  
 After that France had developed the Nuclear Device and even on UN General 
Assembly’s request not to proceed with a forthcoming test, the French government 
stood firm in its decision to test the device. The French representative to the UN 
declared that in the absence of a general agreement on disarmament, France would 
resist any form of discrimination against her interests and would go ahead with her 
test program. The First French test was conducted on February 13th, 1960, nearly 
1000 miles from Algiers.5  
1  Matin, Zuberi, “Nuclear Sacred Trust”, World Focus, vol. 16, No. 5, May 1995, p. 5. 
2  Matin, Zuberi, “CTBT-Testing Times”, World Focus, vol. 17, No. 2, Feb. 1996, p. 3. 
3  Burma, Shibdas, Strategic Nuclear Policy – Some issues, World Affairs, December 1995, p.15. 
4  Matin, Zuberi, n. 2, p. 3. 
5  Matin, Zuberi,  n.1, p.5. 
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 The Chinese bomb was driven largely by security considerations. Nie 
Ronngzhen pointed out that from a historical perspective the possession of Atomic 
bomb help China get rid of the heavy legacy of long being humiliated by foreign 
invasion and “imperialist bullying”. USA considered using nuclear weapons against 
China on several occasions during and after Korean war; the USA even deployed B-
29 bombers in Guam in 1951 for possible use against targets in China. The Korean 
war events in Indo-China and Taiwan straits (Quemoy-Matsu) crisis all demonstrated 
china’s insecurity in the face of US nuclear weapons and bullying.6 China has started 
its weapon program after the Second World War. The Soviet Union assisted China in 
their nuclear weaponization through their participation in uranium mining, training 
Chinese scientists and giving valuable nuclear equipment and machinery. In October 
15, 1957, Sino-Soviet New Defense Technical Accord was signed by which Chinese 
request for a prototype of a bomb was made. China exploded its first nuclear device in 
1964 at Lop Nor.7 
 After the Chinese nuclear detonation in 1964 brought a fifth member into the 
nuclear club, concern focused on how to keep nuclear weapons possession limited to 
five powers. The USA, the USSR (as it then was), Britain, France and China. To this 
end, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was drafted, signed and ratified by 
almost every state in the world, with the exception of Israel, India, Pakistan and Cuba, 
although the latter signed it about four decades later.8  
 The efforts for controlling and eliminating these weapons were started 
immediately after the Second World War. Throughout the cold war period, a number 
of treaties and agreements were signed among the independent nations to reduce 
control, restrict and abolish these weapons. But the whole cold war period witnessed a 
mad arms race between the two superpowers. Nuclear deterrence, arms control and 
disarmament were the major techniques adopted by the United States to contain 
communism and restrain Soviet hegemonic designs throughout the early cold war 
period. The issue of Nuclear Proliferation was a slowly developing force below the 
visible surface of the world politics.9  
6  Burman, Shibdas, n. 3, p.15. 
7  Matin, Zuberi,  n.1, p. 5.  
8  Saira Khan, Nuclear weapons and conflict transformation – The case of India and Pakistan, 
London and New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2009, p.28. 
9  Larsen, Jeffrey A., (ed.) Arms Control Cooperative Security in a Changing Environment, USA: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002, p.25. 
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 Initially disarmament and arms control were the existing measure for nuclear 
proliferations. The abolition of existing nuclear weapons is a measure of disarmament 
and a check on the production of new nuclear weapons is a measure of arms control. 
Non proliferation is akin to disarmament is one respect and to arms control in 
another.10  
 Non proliferation means stopping the transfer of nuclear weapons by nuclear 
powers to the non-nuclear powers. The term non-discrimination refers to a check on 
the sharing of nuclear secrets by nuclear powers with non nuclear weapons.11 Both of 
them emphasize on the prevention of the expansion of the nuclear weapons as far as 
possible, horizontally as well as vertically. The horizontal dimension refers to the 
proliferation of weapons across the world; whereas vertical proliferation describes the 
progressive development of the weapons of mass destruction 
(i)   The dangers of Horizontal Proliferations are obvious these days. There are more 
than two dozen countries that have access to one of the technologies for enriching 
uranium, but apart from nuclear weapon states, all but three are under safeguards and 
two are violating them (Iraq and N. Korea). But technical limitations will not 
safeguard us against the proliferation of biological and chemical weapons. Any 
country with chemical or biotech industry can develop these. Here, the issue of which 
of the countries have pledged no use and how this commitment is verified is of much 
greater concern.12  
(ii)   Vertical proliferation was visible during the early 50’s when the overkilling 
capacity of strategic weapon systems of the two superpowers steadily increased. After 
the end of the U.S. nuclear monopoly period both USA and Soviet Union were 
developing the second strike capability by a vigorous nuclear arms race never known 
in the history of the nations under the pretext of the cold war rivalries. Then they 
moved on to the building p of a Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) capacity in order 
to maintain the so called “delicate balance of terror”. Finally they succeeded in 
rationalizing requirement of nuclear strategy to maintain the stability of the mutual 
10  Mahendra Kumar, Theoretical Aspects of International Politics, Agra: Shivalal Agrawal and 
Comp., 1976, p. 473. 
11  Ibid., p. 473. 
12  Rebehn Michel, “Open Democracy” 
 http://www.opendemocracy.net>author last accessed on 2. April, 2010. 
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deterrence what was visible to all including of course, the nuclear weapon states, was 
the uncontrolled vertical proliferation.13  
 Therefore the dangers of Vertical Proliferation are equally stark. Nuclear 
disarmament has progressed slowly. The reduction to less than 6000 nuclear warheads 
in the US and the state of the former Soviet Union respectively, as prescribed by the 
START treaties has been verified bilaterally. Nonetheless it still allows both the US 
and Russia on “over kill” capacity many times over. Meanwhile, the concept of 
nuclear deterrence is not yet dead. Research and development programmes for nuclear 
technologies progress unsupervised in the US, France, UK, Israel, India and Pakistan 
as well as China. The effective monitoring of compliance demanded again and again 
by NGOs, have been reported in the media, most noticeably after the first Gulf War in 
1991 when western government had to face that the main export culprits were based 
on their countries. Method to contain vertical proliferation simply lags far behind 
what is needed.14 Thus it is only, through a two dimensional approach that a true non 
proliferation can be achieved. There is no end of horizontal proliferation without a 
stop to the vertical one. Some of the developing countries have repeatedly asked for 
an end to vertical proliferation in the nuclear weapon states in order to encourage 
horizontal non-proliferation. The arguments from the nuclear powers, of course is that 
vertical proliferation is needed to counter the efforts of unwanted horizontal 
proliferation. Once this is effectively stopped vertical proliferation would follow, they 
suggest.15  
 Interestingly, although the five declared nuclear states made it clear that all 
other states aspiring to possess nuclear weapons would be considered proliferators, 
and thus a dichotomy between the nuclear haves and have-nots was created, with 
respect to the incentives to proliferate, all proliferators – vertical and horizontal – 
were treated in the same way. This means that incentives or motivations to acquire 
nuclear weapons were the same for both groups of states.16  
 It become clear soon that the two superpowers were at one in imposing on the 
world a discriminatory nuclear order, allowing any amount of vertical proliferation by 
13  T.T. Poulose, “Nuclear Proliferation and South Asia” in D.D. Khanna (eds.) Strategic Environment 
in South Asia during 1980s, Calcutta: Naya Prakash, 1979, p. 220. 
14  Michael, Rebehm, n. 12. 
15  Ibid. 
16  Saira Khan, n. 8, p. 27. 
4 
 
                                                          
Chapter 1 
nuclear weapon powers and preventing horizontal proliferation by hampering the flow 
of nuclear technology even for purely peaceful purposes.17 New proliferation 
semantics have developed. The Macro proliferation refers to the proliferation among 
the state. Micro-proliferation: deals with individual terrorist group terrorizing with 
nuclear weapons. Latent and suppressed proliferation deals with nuclear options and 
nuclear capabilities which could be used when required; Balanced Proliferation: is a 
reconciled to a situation in which a limited number of countries going nuclear without 
causing any imbalance; and proliferation chain: deals with a mechanistic automatic 
action reaction phenomenon.18 
 The effects for arms control and disarmaments were made since the beginning 
of the cold war. The partial test ban treaty, concluded in 1963, was the first important 
step taken on the road to a comprehensive ban. Different approaches have been 
attempted. Since that time, among them unilateral moratoriums, trilateral negotiations, 
multilateral deliberations, treaty amendments and nuclear weapon free zones.19  
 The treaty on the non proliferation of nuclear weapons signed on July 1, 1968 
remains the bedrock of the post second world war global non proliferation regime.  
With 187 state parties, this treaty is the most widely adhered to and most successful 
multilateral arms control agreement in history. The successful conclusion, in 1968 of 
negotiations on the NPT was a landmark in the history of non-proliferation.  
 The main objectives of NPT are to stop the further spread of nuclear weapons 
states, which have given up the nuclear option, to encourage international co-
operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to pursue negotiations in good 
faith towards nuclear disarmament leading to the eventual elimination of nuclear 
weapon. The NPT got indefinite extension in 1995. It strengthened the global nuclear 
non proliferation norm. The NPT is fundamental but broader regime is complex 
system of multilateral and bilateral agreements, arrangements and mechanisms 
intended to promote and achieve a world without nuclear weapons, sooner rather than 
later. This was valid during the cold war and remains valid today. At the same time, 
17  U.S. Bajpai, India and its Neighbourhood, New Delhi: Lancer International, 1986, p. 172. 
18  T.T. Poulose, n. 13, p. 223. 
19  Shrab Kheradi, “The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-ban Treaty: A Progress Report on 
Negotiations,” Strategic Digest, April 1996, p. 453. 
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the regime is intended to provide a framework to enable the world to make effective 
use of the nuclear capability for peaceful purposes.20 
 The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was set up by unanimous 
resolutions of the United Nation in 1957 to help nations develop nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes. Allied to this role is the administration safeguards arrangement. 
This provides assurance to the international community that individual countries are 
honoring their treaty commitments to use nuclear materials and facilities exclusively 
for peaceful purposes.  The IAEA therefore undertakes regular inspections of civil 
nuclear facilities to verify the accuracy of documentation supplied to it. The agency 
checks inventories and undertakes sampling and analysis of materials. Safeguards are 
designed to deter diversion of the nuclear materials by increasing the risk of early 
detection. They are complemented by controls on the export of sensitive technology 
from the countries such as UK and USA through voluntary bodies such as the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group (NSG).21  
 All the parties to the NPT agree to accept technical safeguards measures 
applied by IAEA. All the locations are subject to regular inspection, and their records 
and the nuclear material being audited such as by surveillance cameras and 
instrumentation. The Aim of Traditional IAEA Safeguards is to deter the diversion of 
nuclear material from peaceful use by maximizing risk of early detection. At a border 
level they provide assurance to the international community that countries are 
honouring their treaty commitments to use nuclear materials and facilities exclusively 
for peaceful purposes. In this way safeguards are a service both to the international 
community and to individual states. 
 All NPT non-weapon states must accept these full-scope safeguards. In the 
five weapons states plus the non-NPT states (India, Pakistan and Israel), facility 
specific safeguards apply. IAEA inspectors regularly visit these facilities to verify 
completeness and accuracy of records. The term of the NPT cannot be enforced by 
IAEA itself nor can nations be forced to sign the treaty. In reality, as shown in Iraq 
and North Korea safeguards can be backed up by diplomatic, political and economic 
measures.22  
20  Ibid. 
21 “Safeguard to Prevent Nuclear Proliferation,” Nuclear Issues Briefing papers, Oct. 2009, 
http://www.unic.com.an/hip05.htm, last accessed on April 2010. 
22 “Safeguards to prevent Nuclear Proliferation,” Nuclear Issues briefing papers, October 2014, 
http://www.unic.com.au/nip05.htm, last accessed on 5 April, 2015. 
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 The greatest risk of nuclear weapons proliferation lies with countries which 
have not joined the NPT and which have significant unsafeguarded nuclear activities. 
India Pakistan and Israel are in this category. While safeguards apply to some of their 
activities, others remain beyond scrutiny. If a nuclear capable country does leave the 
NPT it is likely to be reported by IAEA to the United Nation Security Council just as 
if it were in breach of its safeguards agreements. 
 In fact the worldwide application of those safeguards and the substantial world 
trade in uranium for nuclear electricity made the proliferation of nuclear weapons 
much less likely. The Additional Protocol, once it is widely in force will provide 
credible assurance that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in the 
states concerned. This will be a major step forward in preventing nuclear 
proliferation. 
 By mid 2004 a total of 57 countries plus Taiwan had ratified the Additional 
Protocol. However, of 71 countries with significant nuclear activities, 25 have yet to 
bring it into force.23  
 In May 1995, NPT parties reaffirmed their commitment to a fissile materials 
cut off treaty to prohibit the production of any further fissile materials for weapons. It 
aimed to complement the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty agreed in 1996 and to 
codify commitment made by USA, UK, France and Russia to cease production of 
weapons materials, as well as putting a similar ban on China. This treaty tried to put 
more pressure on Israel, India and Pakistan to agree to international verification.  
There are also other treaties and arguments designed to reduce the risk of civil nuclear 
power’s contributing to weapons proliferation. 
 Shortly after entry into force of NPT, multilateral consultation on nuclear 
expert controls led to the establishment of two separate mechanisms for dealing with 
nuclear exports: the Zangger committee in 1971 and the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
(NSG) in 1975. 
 The Zangger Committee, also known as the Non-Proliferation Treaty Export 
Committees, was set up to consider how procedures for exports of nuclear material 
and equipment related to NPT commitments. In August 1974, the committee 
produced a trigger list of items which would require the application of IAEA 
23 Ibid. 
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safeguards if exported to a non nuclear weapon state, which was not party to the NPT. 
The trigger list is regularly updated. The Zangger committee now has 31 member 
states.  
 The NSG, also known as the London Group or London Suppliers Group, was 
set up in 1974 after India exploded its first nuclear device. The main reason for the 
groups formation was to bring in France, a major nuclear supplier nation which was 
not then party to the NPT. These main guidelines also recognized the need for 
physical protection measures in the transfer of sensitive facilities, technology and 
weapon usable materials, and strengthen retransfer provision. The NSG began with 
seven members – the USA, the former USSR, the UK, France, Germany, Canada and 
Japan but now includes 35 countries. 
 In 1968 the states which are parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) under Article VI undertook to pursue negotiation in good faith on effective 
measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to 
nuclear disarmament. Afterwards, and in many instances, including within the NPT 
review process, efforts were made to a comprehensive test ban as essential elements 
in the implementation of that article. The single multilateral negotiation body, the CD, 
has long been involved with the issue of a test ban. The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific 
experts on seismic events was established in 1976 and in 1982 and Ad Hoc working 
group on a nuclear test ban was established with a limited mandate. In1990 and in the 
following few years discussions touched upon the major issue of nuclear test ban in 
considerable detail. 
 On 10 August 1993, the conference took a landmark decision on that day, the 
CD gave its Ad Hoc committee on a Nuclear Test ban a mandate to “negotiate 
intensively a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive 
nuclear test ban treaty, which would contribute effectively to the prevention of the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects to the process of nuclear 
disarmament and therefore to the enhancement of international peace and security”. 
 The Ad Hoc committee negotiations started in Jan. 1994 to achieve an 
agreement as soon as possible. The principles and objective of Nuclear Non-
proliferation and Disarmament adopted in New York in May 1995, 175 states were 
party to the NPT decided that the completion by the CD of the negotiation on a 
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universal and internationally effectively verifiable CTBT no later than 1996 was a 
goal whose achievement was important to the full realization and effective 
implementation of article VI of the NPT Treaty.24  
 Steady and significant progress has been achieved recently in the negotiations 
in the CD both on the political and technical levels. The updated “rolling text” forms 
part of the CD’s report submitted to the fifteen session of the General Assembly.25  
 Many difficulties still lie ahead for the conference on disarmament to resolve. 
To finish the work by a target date in 1996, the CD will have to negotiate with much 
determination and a great sense of urgency. There seems to be a growing recognition 
that the Ad Hoc committee might have to adjust its methods of work to match the task 
at hand. 
 The events from outside, have also contributed to advances in the negotiations 
of conference. On 20th October 1995, for instance, France, the United Kingdom and 
the United States announced their respective intentions to sign the relevant protocols 
to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, the treaty of Rarotonga in the first half 
of 1996. Protocol 3 of that treaty is an undertaking not to test any nuclear explosive 
device anywhere within the South Pacific Nuclear Free zone.  
 As China and Russia federation have already ratified the protocol. The 
announcement by France, the United Kingdom and the United States of their 
signature to it would mean that the nuclear weapon states will have undertaken a 
commitment not to test in that geographical area. That represents yet another 
indication of the strong determination of the international community, Nuclear and the 
non-nuclear weapon states alike, to reach agreement on a CTBT in 1996.26  
 Through the official policy goal of the United Nations in general and complete 
disarmament, it has never been seriously pursued because such an idea runs into 
tremendous problems of definition. There are crucial differences in the meaning and 
approach to the two forms “Arms control and disarmament”. The first US plan for the 
elimination of all nuclear weapons was submitted in November 1946, known as the 
“Baruch Plan” after Bernard Baruch, one of its authors, under this plan, the USA, who 
was the only nuclear power in the world, offered to dismantle them and make its civil 
24  Matin Zuberi, n. 1, p. 3. 
25  Ibid., p. 5. 
26  Sohrab Kheradi, n. 19, p. 454. 
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nuclear knowledge available to all other countries. A new International Atomic 
Developmental Authority would supervise the weapons disposal and peaceful nuclear 
energy programmes. 
 The UN General Assembly adopted the plan on December 31, 1946. It was 
rejected by the Soviet Union and its allies. As the plan called for the establishment of 
the monitoring and supervision agency before disarmament began, the Soviets were 
suspicious of the pro-western majority of the organization which they felt would 
enable the authority to prevent Soviet research into nuclear weapons while US 
scientists had already acquired the knowledge needed to construct them. Later the 
Soviet Union exploded its first Atomic bomb in 1949. However, the Baruch Plan is 
important because it represented the first and probably the last chance to achieve a 
complete ban on nuclear weapons. The two powers, during the 1950s continued to 
call for such a ban as also for the total abolition of all weapons of any magnitude.27  
 It seems clear in the 1950s that complete nuclear disarmament would not be 
possible as the question of verification of compliance with a total ban became the 
crucial issue. French argued publicity that a total ban was impossible as the amount of 
fissile material in existence was large and no reliable verification system could be 
produced which guarantee that none had been hidden. Since total nuclear 
disarmament would demand total trust of the other side, which did not exist to the 
level needed in the cold war, it was impossible objective which they wanted to pursue. 
Before several years superpowers could bring themselves to admit that this was 
indeed the case.28  
 While disarmament is considered as an alternative to military strength, arms 
control also complements it, since both enhance national and international security in 
different ways. While proponents of disarmament saw the existence of weapons as a 
cause of arms race and war, arms control was felt to represent a recognition of the 
continuing utility of military power in the modern world and the new arms controllers 
believed that there was no simple cause and effect relationship between the possession 
of weapon and outbreak of war as armaments were ever present feature in the picture 
27  Kaplana Chittaranjan, “Arms Control and disarmament: Is an NWFW Possible?” Strategic 
Analysis, March, 1997, pp. 1699-1700. 
28  Matin Zuberi, n. 2. 
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of international politics and they were as much a part of the peace time as well as the 
war time environment. 
 Beside the NPT a number of important multilateral arms control and 
disarmament agreements were signed in the nuclear sphere. They are: The Antarctic 
Treaty signed 1959. The treaty banning nuclear weapon test in the atmosphere, in 
outer space and under water or the Partial Test Ban Treaty (signed 1963); the treaty 
on principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer 
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies or the outer space treaty (signed 
1967); the treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the 
Caribbean or the Treaty of Tlateloko (signed 1967), modified in 1991 and amended 
1992); the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or NPT (signed in 
1968); the treaty on the prohibition of emplacement of nuclear weapons and other 
weapons of mass destruction on sealed and the other ocean floor and in the subsoil 
thereof the seabed treaty signed 1971; the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty or 
Treaty of Rarotonga (signed in 1985); and the convention on the Physical Protection 
of Nuclear Material (signed 1980). 
 Throughout the cold war period, the armament rare between the Soviet Union 
and the United States was controlled by a number of bilateral agreements even then 
the period of cold war witnessed a mad arms race between the two superpowers. 
 Since the end of the cold war a number of arms control advocates military 
officers and politicians, argued that the US should substantially reduce its reliance 
upon nuclear weapons. Some extremist believe that the elimination of nuclear 
weapons should be an explicit goal of the United States. To carry out such 
preparations, thereby making a limited war more feasible itself further undermined the 
credibility deterrence supposedly provided through the presence of a weapons system 
capable of massive retaliation. What emerged an insecurity generating arms race 
spiral with quantitative and qualitative increases at all levels whether in regard to 
tactical or strategic weapons/ delivery system.29  
 
 
29  Praful Bidwai and Achin Vanaik, South Asia on a short fuse: Nuclear politics and future of global 
Disarmament, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001, p.21. 
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Nuclearization in South Asia 
 India and Pakistan conflict in south Asia region stands out as one of the 
world’s most intractable conflicts of the twentieth and twenty first centuries. The 
conflict, which began in 1947, survived the cold war and continues to be intractable. 
The intractability of the India and Pakistan conflict received tremendous attention 
from the international community as a result of the introduction of the nuclear 
weapons into the conflict region in the 1970s and India’s nuclear test followed by 
Pakistan’s in 1998 making the conflict intense and dangerous.30  
 South Asia was the first region to experience the politics of nuclear dynamics 
in the intractable conflict between India and Pakistan. China, though a central Asian 
country, and an official nuclear weapon state, plays an important role as far as the 
issue of nuclear proliferation in South Asia is concerned. The South Asian countries 
after a long struggle and hard won freedom from the colonial rule, do not want to be 
sacrificed by the cold war players. After the liquidation of the Soviet Union, and of 
the cold war, the countries of the region felt insecure as they had lost the Soviet 
Umbrella. This again resulted in a crisis of strong ‘balancer’ in the region. These 
factors made the regional countries more conscious about their security and self-
defense which ultimately pushed them to develop in the direction of nuclear know-
how. The American relations with South Asian countries especially India and 
Pakistan are the issue of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear arms control. Since the 
end of the cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Union American self image as the 
“only superpower” has reinforced the American assumption that the nuclear club 
should be restricted to its five present members and the United States is entitled to 
have the biggest and the best nuclear arsenal in order to preserve international 
stability. In pressing India and Pakistan to sign the NPT, the United States has 
presented its position in altruistic terms, emphasizing its desire to help prevent a 
nuclear war in South Asia and trying her best to keep its hold in this region. For 
reason of which US policy planners significantly emphasized its increasing interests 
in the area. As we know that United States is the only country that has ever used 
nuclear weapons, the American emphasis on nuclear danger in South Asia is viewed 
in India and Pakistan as at best patronizing and at worst racist. The United States has 
failed to give India and Pakistan concrete incentives to cap their nuclear weapons 
30  Saira Khan, n. 8, p. 62. 
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potential at present levels, they achieved it more broadly, reduce tensions over non-
proliferation that could threaten the stability of the Indo-American relationship. The 
US would have to end its ban on the sale of nuclear reactors to India and the other 
restrictions on United States cooperation with India civilian nuclear power program. 
Starting with restrictions on United State cooperation on nuclear safety. This would 
require amendment of the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferations Act to allow Exports of 
Nuclear technology under specified conditions.  
 India undertook five tests in 1998 and almost a year later, declared herself to 
be a state of nuclear weapon. Pakistan also tested its device in May 28, 1998 just 15 
days after India tested its device. 
 The lack of trust and understanding between India and Pakistan is well known: 
neither side is willing to initiative a relationship of reciprocated good gestures. The 
animosity created by differences over the nuclear issue between Washington, India 
and Pakistan also was destructive. US non proliferation pressure precluded open 
discussions between India and Pakistan on regional security. Pak resented the 
imposition of the Pressler amendment, which it said was discriminatory, and India 
objected as strongly to US pressure for it to join the NPT and curb its space and 
missile activities. As a result more India and Pakistani diplomatic energy went to 
diverting US pressure than to devising arms control to promote regional security. 
 The Prime Ministers of both the countries realize the delicacy of the strategic 
stability and the arms control in South Asia, just after the 1998 nuclear test. They met 
in Lahore, for greater understanding and confidence building. But the hopes were 
dashed by the Kargil war, which was fought by the two rivals. The Sep. 11, 2001 
terrorist attack against New York and Washington and the US campaign against the 
Al-Qaida terrorist network and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan created even more 
resentment between India and Pakistan. India fear of similar terrorist attack was 
apparently realized when Indian Parliament was attacked on 13 Dec. 2001 by 
terrorists who were suspected to belong to two Pakistani based military groups, 
Lashar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad.31 Although the kargil war had heightened 
tensions, but the conflict remained limited because both side wished to avoid 
escalation to a general war that could lead to the use of Nuclear weapons. That’s why 
31  Bhumitra Chakma, The Politics of Nuclear weapons in South Asia, England: Ashgate Publishing 
Limited, 2011, p. 126. 
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as Kargil underscored the risk involved in conflict, it also demonstrated that India and 
Pakistan appreciate the importance of caution and restraint in their strategic 
competition, which is an essential condition for the arms control and deterrence 
stability. 
 India and Pakistan keep attending to the US ties in different directions and 
keep feeling that the US is or has been turning a blind eye towards other country 
nuclear activities. They try to see a pattern in the US policies towards them and 
others, they react and at time over-react. As we know that in US Nuclear Policies, 
while non proliferation remains the prime objective, the hidden objective of 
maintaining US supremacy is the engine that provides the driving force. In order to 
achieve the objectives, the US had to operate within certain parameters related to ends 
it wants to achieve and the means it uses to achieve those ends.32  
 Though China does not comprise a south Asian country, but its significance in 
the politics of South Asia cannot be ignored. Her policy on weapon of Mass 
Destruction (WWD) has been in many respects ambivalent. In 1992 China signed the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It also showed its willingness to join CTBT. 
It supports the convention on banning the further production of fissile materials which 
has uses in nuclear weapons. China continues to conduct underground nuclear tests, 
although it has started that it will stop the testing once the CTBT enters into force. It 
also did not join the Nuclear Suppliers group (NSG) and not bothered to meet the 
guidelines of NSG, while transferring its nuclear technology. China agreed with US in 
1992 to abide by the norms guidelines and parameters of Missile Technology control 
Regime (MTCR). But the US concern about the Chinas Proliferation activities in 
south Asia and the middle East is not meaningless as, export of China’s Missile 
system and missile related technology, remained an important element of China’s 
foreign ministry sales. US allegation of transfer of M-11 Missile system to Pakistan 
by China in 1993 resulted in the imposition of sanctions against China for its Export 
of Missile related technology to Pakistan controlled under category II of the MTCR. 
Though the sanction were waived in Oct. 1994 after Chines commitment to abide by 
the 1987 version of the MTCR Annex, s well as its commitment not to export ballistic 
missile system inherently capable of reaching a range of 300 km with space load of 
32  Savita Dutta, “The US Post Cold War Non Proliferation Objective: Ends and means” Strategic 
Analysis, Oct. 1996, p. 1063-1064. 
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500 kg which are the basic MTCR control parameters. China concept deals only with 
missile and the missile system and not with the missile related technology, which 
according to US is more important as it offers the proliferent state the possibility of 
developing an indigenous missile production capability. China had also been reported 
to transfer C-808 ship based cruise missile to Iran. Although these systems do not 
violate the basic MTCR parameters, they nevertheless potentially increase Iran’s 
capability to threaten commercial shipping in the Persian Gulf.33  
 President Clinton also accepted the importance of China as well as its relations 
with USA in his first important policy speech. China has replaced Japan as the 
number one supplier. Trade circles estimate that more than 200,000 American jobs are 
depending on the China’s trade and there is a huge potential in the Chinese market 
specially in sectors like civil aviation nuclear energy etc. Aside from these interests of 
economics and business, US is being compelled to deal with China due to the present 
day world realities. She is a nuclear power with credible deterrent and second strike 
capability and further also enjoys veto power in the UN Security Council. The second 
most sensitive area is the Korean Peninsula with the increasing economic doubt of 
South Korea and the worsening situation in North Korea, the USA is also worried 
about the nuclear question and stability of North Korea itself. This issue is also 
entangled with the Sino-US relations and nobody is sure about the leverage enjoyed 
by China vis-à-vis North Korea.34  
 The post war period witnessed the rising drama associated with North Koreas 
nuclear weapon programme, under the bush administration. The US government 
shared its concerns of proliferation with Pakistan because North Korea was believed 
to have sold its missile technology to Pakistan.  
 In International politics there are no permanent friends and enemies. It can 
also be seen in the case of USA and Japan. Japan is a known allay and strategic 
partner of USA, its increasing economic power influence is seen in fields like trade. 
This compelled USA to take a positive but cautious view towards Japan. In April 
1996 USA signed a security pact with Japan mainly aimed at future military 
hegemonistic designs of China. 
33  Mitchel B Wallerstein, “China and Proliferation: A Path Non Taken?,” Survival, vol. 38, No. 3, 
Autumn, 1996, pp. 59-61. 
34  M.V. Rappi, “Clinton’s Asia Policy”, Strategic Analysis, Jan-Feb. 1997, pp. 1576-1577. 
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 The enhanced US diplomatic interest in Thailand may also be due to the 
impact of the overall post-cold war scenario. As we see geographically, Thailand is 
located at the cross roads of Indo-China and Myanmar (Burma). Myanmar is also 
another sensitive target of USA which it does not want to be left isolated, as they fear 
such isolation may end her up as a camp follower of China. 
 The involvement of USA in Asia pacific can be summarized as the ongoing 
process of the US’s quest to contain China through engagement, but how successful 
will this strategy be, is a question to be answered by the future but the emerging 
scenarios in the global power game do not favour either very much. On the other hand 
we have to look for such answers in their own domestic, economic and political 
scenario.35  
 The cold war period witnessed the rivalry between US and Soviet Union. Its 
emphasis on arms control was pursuit of military stability (stability through crisis 
management and stability in arms role), so as to prevent a nuclear conflagration. 
Nowadays the possibility of such a major nuclear war is practically nil. Under these 
circumstances, the western nations, with the US at their head, see threats to their 
security coming mainly from the employment of nuclear bio-chemical weapons by 
irresponsible Third world countries and terrorists. That is why the west has shifted its 
attention to preventing proliferation of weapons, deeming the prevention of 
emergence of new nuclear weapon state as the number one issue in world security 
after the cold war. US give priority to prevention of nuclear proliferation in its 
security and foreign policy. For that reason, the US has designed a strategy against 
proliferation and works jointly with its allies to prevent nuclear arsenals of the former 
Soviet Union from proliferation or running out of control. The US has also 
strengthened international nuclear non proliferation mechanism, emphasizes 
transparency in military armament, enhances the functions of supervision and 
verification of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), controls the export of 
sensitive technology and steps up intelligence surveillance vis-à-vis third world 
countries in an effort to contain nuclear and missile proliferation. The US attempts to 
prevent proliferation of WMD by the following measures: 
(i) Treaties, convention and agreements 
35 Ibid., pp. 1577-78. 
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(ii) Effective strategic nuclear deterrence to maintain nuclear superiority 
(iii) Research and development of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) 
 A new institution has been formed with the purpose of controlling transfers of 
Hitech conventional weapons and dual purpose technology for military and civilian 
use. This is for all practical purposes and intentions a coordinating institution of 
western countries in their joint efforts to prevent proliferation of high technology and 
advanced equipment to the third world. The United Nation is playing more prominent 
role in advancing international arms control and disarmament. The intra-UN 
negotiations over the convention on the prohibition of the chemical weapons (CWC) 
and the comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) have been successes and the two 
instruments are open for signature.36  
 The arms control and disarmament reached a new level in 1997. And the other 
parties have yet to reach a consensus as to what should be the next goal of arms 
control. As US underline the policy with western nation on prevention proliferation of 
WMD, missile and hi-tech conventional weapons and accelerating development and 
development of antiballistic missile defense system. The Developing countries are 
most concerned with further promotion of nuclear disarmament and they demand that 
the nuclear states formulate a program on ‘Nuclear disarmament with a specified 
time’. The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) passed a resolution in 1996 
urging that the 4th special session of the UNGA on disarmament be convened in 1997. 
There was still a need to reach agreement on a new arms control agenda. Such 
military powers as the United States which seek military superiority by means of arms 
control have created difficulties and problems in international arms control and 
disarmament. 
 The arms control and development poses a new challenges in international 
arms control and disarmament. USA and Russia among other countries have always 
demand arms control and disarmament to be a crucial component of the national 
security. Strategy for future accommodation with transformation from major war 
mechanism to minor war mechanisms, they have indeed begun a drastic reduction of 
redundant nuclear and conventional weapons. These countries however, did not 
reduce truly sophisticated weapons and armaments and progress in disarmament did 
36  Wang, “Changes and Challenges in International Arms Control and Disarmament in the wake of 
the cold war”, Strategic Digest, Oct. 1997, pp. 1589-1593. 
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not stop them from engaging in a hi-tech arms race on a still higher plane. As we 
know that American technology of nuclear warheads in almost perfect. US 
consequently continues to strengthen its strategic nuclear force focusing on improving 
launch vehicles and means of command, control communication and information 
(C31) that nuclear warfare calls for. Russia continuously emphasis for better striking 
power, targeting accuracy and mobility and the strengthening of its submarine based 
nuclear force. Britain and France are likewise committed to upgrading and 
augmenting their strategic submarine based nuclear force. 
 Nuclear disarmament stimulates the development of conventional hitch and 
new tech weapon and arms and such a new trend has gained greater prominence. The 
Nation realizes that future warfare will take the form of information war in the 
shadow of nuclear deterrence. The conventional hi-tech weapons involve less risk and 
have greater value in martial practice, might well be the key in determining the 
outcome of future warfare. The US, Britain and France and the other countries have 
all tilted towards hi-tech, high performance conventional weapon in their defense 
expenditure. The US believes that the core of information lies in gaining the upper 
hand in the abilities to obtain process and utilize information. France, Germany, 
Britain and other country of West European countries have decided to increase 
investment in defense related science and technology which will play a key role in 
future warfare. France and Germany conduct these research and development of a 
new generation of military satellites. Japan has also decided to establish a compact hi-
tech military force. Some developing nations scramble to purchase A WACS aircraft, 
air tankers, reconnaissance satellites antimissile destroyers, anti-ballistic missile and 
other advanced arms and equipments.37  
 The efforts of US to accelerate the development of antimissile defense systems 
will have a direct impact on disarmament and spark off a fresh round of Nuclear arms 
race contrary to the trend of disarmament and the caution about proliferation, the US 
is quietly developing anti-missile defense system and working on a new generation of 
antimissile weapons capable of downing ballistic missiles. The US has emphasized 
time and again that the greatest threat it faces in the post-cold war era is proliferation 
of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their delivery vehicles. After several 
years of debates, it formally decided in 1996 to develop and deploy multi-faceted anti-
37  Ibid., pp. 1589-1593. 
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missile defense system besides, 10 countries and regions including Israel, Turkey, 
Saudi Arabia, the Netherlands and Taiwan are installing or purchasing American anti-
missile defense system. The US argues for stronger international anti-proliferation 
mechanisms on the one hand. On the other is heavily proliferates various advanced 
weapons including anti-missile weapons.38  
 Since  the early 1990, about a dozen disarmament and arms control treaties has 
been reached, taken effect or about to be signed soon between the US Russia and also 
internationally on a multilateral basis, implementation of the treaty will become a 
major issue confronting the international arms control and disarmament process. 
 In October 2002 it emerged that DPRK had been working clandestinely to 
enrich uranium for weapons use, using centrifuge equipment. These appeared to be 
some linkage to Pakistan’s centrifuge program and in 2005 Pakistan confirmed that it 
had supplied centrifuges in DPRK. 
 In December 2002 DPRK recovered the IAEA seals on it facilities at 
Yangbyon and ordered the IAEA inspectors out of the country. It has since restarted 
its small reactor and claims to have reprocessed the 8000 irradiated fuel roads to 
recover weapon-grade plutonium. In April 2003 it withdraws from the NPT-the first 
country to do so. 
 From 2003 negotiations has been intermittently under way to secure some 
agreement on curtailing North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. These involved 
China, South Korea and the USA, which has insisted upon complete, verifiable and 
irreversible dismantling of North Koreas weapons program, through diplomatic 
dialogue in a multilateral framework involving those states with the west direct stocks 
in the outcome. 
 Iran attracted world attention in 2002 when previously undeclared nuclear 
facilities became the subject of IAEA inquiry while investigating IAEA found 
inconsistencies in Iran’s declarations to the Agency and raised question as to whether 
Iran was in violation of its safeguards agreement as a signatory of the NPT. 
 Iran joint the NPT in 1974 and in 1975-76 construction started on two 1293 
MWE nuclear reactors comprising the Bushier power station on the Persian Gulf. 
38  Ibid. 
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Siemens KWU was the contractor. After the Islamic revolution payment was withheld 
and work was abandoned early in 1979 with unit I substantially complete. 
 In 1994 Russia was brought into complete unit 1 as a VVER-1000 reactor. 
This necessitated major changes, including fabrication of all the reactor components 
in Russia under a construction contractor with Atoms troy export.  
 The momentum in disarmament and arms control will continue to be 
maintained in spite of problems and challenges. But at the same time we note that the 
existing international anti-proliferation mechanisms cannot control nuclear 
proliferation altogether. A number of treaties and accords have been concluded in 
recent years to curb nuclear proliferation. Such treaties and accords have their positive 
side but not entirely satisfactory with regard to certain articles because of its failure to 
give full expression to the just demands and reasonable positions of many developing 
countries including China. Some articles are clearly discriminatory. Moreover, these 
treaties and accords have failed to mention the conclusion of legal documentation on 
the non-first use of nuclear weapons and so, use or threat to use nuclear weapons 
against non-nuclear states and nuclear-free zones. No mention is made either of the 
need to conclude a convention on the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear weapons. 
Hence, it will be a protracted and arduous task to attain the lofty goal of 
Comprehensive Prohibition through destruction of nuclear weapons.  
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EVOLUTION OF INDIA’S NUCLEAR PROGRAMME 
 According to conventional wisdom in the field of international relation, the 
build up of a nuclear weapon encouraged by a state attempts to improve its security 
through relative powers gains. In this line of thinking communication between the 
states is determined by their relative power capabilities and their common threat 
perceptions.1 
 After independence from the British, India had to formulate its foreign policy 
so as to serve its national interest. In 1947 India tried to build up its place in the 
community of nations. India also wanted to achieve its objective in the field of 
political, social, economic, scientific and technological development with democratic 
peaceful structure. India tried to develop friendly relations with all countries. India 
does not need nuclear weapon for prestige or status. India uses the nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes which also are a huge source of power. 
Nehru Era 
 It hardly needs to be stressed that India’s nuclear policy during the Nehru era 
(1947-64) was chiefly driven and dictated by Nehru’s soaring idealism. While 
projecting himself as a peace anchorite, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru time and 
again emphasized that the country’s nuclear policy fundamentally hinged on the 
principle of nuclear non-proliferation and world disarmament. In his policy 
utterances, Nehru had made it clear that India would stay away from developing 
nuclear technology for military purposes.2 
1948 to 1964 / Abstinence in the Nehru Era 
Foreign Policy and Nuclear Policy during Early Years 
 The foreign policy of India was formulated without the influence of British, to 
serve its national interest. The core objective of every state, keeping in view its own 
national interest, is to take highest advantage of the actions of other states. The main 
reason of foreign policy to try to find alteration in the performance of other states in 
favour of oneself.3 
1 Karsten Frey, India’s Nuclear Bomb and National Security, London and New York: Routledge, 
2007, p. 1. 
2  BM Jain, Indian in the New South Asia: Strategic Military and Economic Concerns in the age of 
Nuclear Diplomacy, London and New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2011, p.39. 
3  V.N. Khanna, Foreign Policy of India, New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 2004, p.1.  
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 Nehru was sure that it is essential for a country to stay independent in its 
actions and it should be both politically and economically strong and workable. Nehru 
was fearful by the big powers which may attract newly independent states to join their 
power block. Nehru declared India not to be aligned to any block.4 
 Nehru wanted to be friendly to all states without being entangled in any 
alliance and for him cooperation among the nations was the most essential. He said, 
“we seek no domination over any country, domestic or other our main stake in world 
affairs is peace and to see that there is racial quality and the people who are 
subjugated should be free”.5 
 India wanted to be cooperative with Pakistan and other immediate neighbours. 
Nehru always tried to maintain a friendly move towards Pakistan for the achievement 
of this purpose he takes up the policy of non-alignment. Non alignment is the result of 
India’s foreign policy as it reflects the independence of the country. As the Vice-
President of the interim government in 1946 in a broadest on 7th September 1946, he 
said “we propose as far as possible, to keep away from the politics of power groups 
aligned with one another which had led in the past to two world wars and which may 
again lead to disasters on an even vaster scale”.6 Nehru also said that it helps in 
maintaining “friendly cooperation with both the conflicting blocks and act as a means 
of communication between them in times of crisis and conflict”. Non-alignment was 
followed by Nehru against the nuclear and cold war club. He said we are 
“unequivocally committed against the evil forces of fascism, colonialism, racialism 
and aggression”.7 
 By adopting a non-aligned policy, it does not mean that if there was any 
problem in the security or it might be threatened or aggression takes place, India 
cannot be and shall not be neutral.  When President Harry S. Truman ordered the 
dropping of bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 in a bid 
to end the second world war, more than 95 percent of the men, woman, children and 
non-combatants in those cities were killed. Those horrifying human killings made a 
deep psychological impact on front-ranking leaders such as Mahatma Gandhi and 
Jawaharlal Nehru. Mahatma Gandhi an apostle of peace and non-violence was deeply 
4  R.C. Hingorani, Nehru’s Foreign Policy, Oxford: IBH Publishing Company, 1989, p. 85. 
5  Ibid. 
6  Ibid., p. 80. 
7  Ibid., p. 81. 
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shocked over the employment of atom bombs as an instrument of US foreign policy. 
Further, at Gandhi’s initiative, India not only lent full support to the Washington 
declaration of November 1945 but also came forward with a comprehensive proposal 
to ban the use of nuclear technology for devastating purposes. Again, India actively 
supported the 1946 Acheson-Lilienthal Report that emphasized the immediate need 
for devising an effective mechanism for the international control of nuclear weapons.8 
 In a press conference on 13th November 1945 Nehru said that “the danger of 
the nuclear bomb would continue to hover over our heads as long as the cause of 
friction was not removed. There is always a fear among other neighbouring nations 
that this atomic energy could be used for their destruction and take it to unheard of 
levels.9 
 On outlining the thrust of the nuclear energy programme in the constituent 
Assembly on 4th April, 1948, Nehru said, “Atomic energy is a vast source of power 
that is coming to the world … if we are to remain abreast in the world as a nation 
what keeps ahead of things, we must develop this atomic energy quite apart from wars 
indeed, I think, we must develop it for the purpose of using it for peaceful purposes”. 
A passion for peace exhorted both Gandhi and Nehru to condemn the nuclear 
programme intended for military purposes. Their anti-nuclear weapon position was 
reflected in the country’s foreign policy as well. Trusted lieutenants, scientists, and 
technologists worked hard to articulate their views on the thrust of India’s nuclear 
policy.10 
 After the use of atomic energy by United States against Japan, Nehru and 
Bhabha took the initiative to build up an institutional infrastructure to realize their 
vision of the nuclear energy programme, which was launched in March 1944.11 
 The nuclear programme of India has a long historical background. The origin 
of nuclear programme had started before the pre-independent era, when a young 
Indian physicist Homi Bhabha, who had trained under Earnest Rutherford at 
Cambridge University returned to India in 1944. Nehru and Bhabha had a shared 
vision of making India self-reliant in the energy field by embarking on a nuclear 
energy programme for two main reasons.  
8  B.M. Jain , n. 2, p. 41. 
9  Mohd. B. Alam, India’s Nuclear Policy, Delhi: Mittal Publications, 1998, p.10. 
10  Ibid., p. 42. 
11  M.V. Ramana, “India’s changing Nuclear Policy,” Peace Magazine, Jan.-Feb. 1998, p. 6. 
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(1) India’s conventional sources of energy were neither sufficient nor cost-effective 
in fulfilling the incremental energy requirements of the country’s rapid 
industrial development.  
(2) India’s southern and western regions possessed abundant sources of fissionable 
material that if fully exploited and harnessed for the energy purposes, would be 
much cheaper. 
Nehru and Bhabha took the initiative to build up an institutional infrastructure to 
realize their vision of the nuclear energy programme, which was launched in March 
1944. The Prime Minister Nehru and Bhabha were to build up the country’s economic 
sinews as it confronted appalling poverty, disease and deprivation. In order to make 
the country self-sufficient in energy, Bhabha approached the Tata Trust for financial 
assistance to set up an Institute of Fundamental Research in Physics and Mathematics. 
The Tata Trust’s positive response resulted in the setting up of the institute in June 
1945. The Tata Institute of Fundamental Research was created in Bombay with 
Bhabha as it first director.12 
 The underlying reason to develop nuclear energy was firstly to develop a source 
of inexpensive energy. Secondly to provide energy in any part of the country capable 
of developing energy resources such as hydro-electricity powered by fossil fuels and 
thirdly the thermal power stations, to maximize the economy of the grids (Nuclear 
power stations operate most effectively as base-load stations).13 
 Homi Jehangir Bhabha conceptualized that the Indian nuclear programme, 
utilized to fulfill the power requirements of agriculture and industry. Bhabha wanted 
to give the country a place of pride among nuclear powers. That is why he was 
motivated to set up nuclear research facilities, on a massive scale. Bhabha’s singular 
aim was to fully develop nuclear energy without heavily replying upon external 
sources to fulfill the country’s energy needs.14 
 The Atomic Energy Commission was set up in August 1948. But before that the 
Atomic Energy Act was enacted in April 1948 to promote research in nuclear energy. 
When Bhabha become the first director, he successfully convinced India’s first Prime 
12   B.M Jain, n.2, p. 42. 
13  Ibid. 
14  Ibid., p.43. 
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Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru to create a department of Atomic Energy (DAE) in 
1948.15 
 On 26 June 1946, Pandit Nehru said “As long as the world is constituted as it is 
every country will have to develop and use the latest scientific devices for its 
protection. I have no doubts India will develop her scientific researches and I hope 
Indian scientists will use the atomic force for beneficial purposes. But, if India is 
threatened, she will inevitably try to defend herself by all means at her disposal”.16 
 The danger posed by nuclear armament was known to the leadership of India. In 
the speech delivered in the constituent assembly on 14th August 1947 Jawaharlal 
Nehru observed “we hear a lot about the atom bomb and various kinds of energy that 
it represents. In essence today there is conflict between two things, the atom bomb 
and what it represents and the spirit of humanity. I hope that while India will no doubt 
play a great part in all the material spheres, she will always lay stress on the spirit of 
humanity”. In another speech in Lok Sabha Panditji on 10 May 1954 said “It is 
perfectly clear that atomic energy can be used for peaceful purposes to the immense 
advantage of humanity. It may take some years before it can be used more or less 
economically. I would like the house to remember that use of technology for peaceful 
purpose is far more important for a country like India whose power resources are 
limited than for a country like France, an industrially advanced country”.17 
 Nehru was not in favour of Indian development of nuclear weapons at a political 
level. Originally he was not in favour of nuclear weapons and in most of his speeches 
on nuclear technology he showed this intension. As in 1954 he called or a world wide 
end/pause of all nuclear tests. His opposition to the nuclear option for India draw in 
part from his delicate concern about opportunity costs of defense spending in a poor 
developing nation facing numerous, socio-economic challenges.18 
 While reaching to the opening of the country’s first nuclear reactor, Apsara, at 
Tombay in January 1957, Nehru categorically declined to use atomic energy ‘for evil 
purposes’. A similar tone was reflected in his speech delivered before the Lok Sabha 
on 24 July 1957. Nehru said: ‘we have declared quite clearly that we are not interested 
15  Sumit Ganguly, Conflict unending India Pakistan Tension, New York: Oxford University Press, 
2000, p. 102. 
16  M.V. Ramana, n. 11, p.6. 
17  J.N. Dixit, Indian foreign Policy, New Delhi: Dicus Books , 2003, pp. 280-281. 
18  Sumit Ganguly, n. 15, p. 102. 
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in making atom bombs, even if we have the capacity to do so, and that in no event 
will be use nuclear energy for destructive purposes… I hope that will be the policy of 
all future governments’. Just months before his death, when reports were pouring in 
of China’s nuclear preparations, Nehru rejected the suggestion that India should 
follow China and acquire nuclear weapons for ‘deterrence’.19 From the above 
statement, two important conclusions can be drawn. 
1. Nehru rejected outright the idea of making nuclear weapons, even if India 
attained the capacity. 
2. Nehru had bound all future governments to abstain from employing nuclear 
energy for destructive purposes.  
 He was the first world leader to call in 1954 for an end to all nuclear testing 
following US hydrogen bomb tests in the pacific; and their disastrous radioactive 
fallout. However, India’s civilian nuclear programme also had a ‘dual use’ or military 
capacity, of which other major figures like Homi Bhabha Chairman of Atomic energy 
commission were fully aware, and which they wanted to develop. Bhabha himself was 
not as categorically opposed to a possible future bomb as was Nehru. A top secret US 
government document of 1961, declassified in 1995, contained valuable material on 
the American assessment of Nehru’s commitment to opposing nuclear weapons even 
in the face of Chinese preparations to acquire and detonate such weapons, 
preparations and plans for which were detected by western intelligence agencies.20 
 Nehru also felt that as long as China was kept out of the United Nations it 
would be useless to talk about international governments to control the expansion of 
nuclear weapons. Nehru’s expectation that China would become a nuclear weapon 
power was proved to be correct as China conducted its first nuclear weapon test in 
1964, though this affair took place after Nehru’s passing from the scene. India took 
the proposal at the UN General Assembly to announce to the world community grave 
aspiration for the abolition and exclusion of atomic hydrogen, bacterial, chemical and 
other weapons of war and mass destruction in 1953. Due to India’s effort in 1953, 
Disarmament Sub-committee of disarmament commission considered the possibility 
of a standstill agreement in respect of genuine explosions and to give wide publicity 
19  Praful Bidwai and AchinVanaik, South Asia on a short fuse, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 
64. 
20  Ibid., p. 64. 
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of the destructive nature and degree of the weapons.21 In January 1956, Nehru 
announced in parliament that if sufficient resources unforced in India, atomic bomb 
could be made in three to four years. This is probably the first recorded public 
statement by an Indian leader on the technical feasibility of making a bomb. The 
uranium processing plant was specially made in Trombay in November or December 
1958 and slab of pure uranium had been produced.22 
 In January 1957 Jawaharlal Nehru which inaugurating India’s first nuclear 
reactor Apsara at Trombay he said “whatever be the circumstances we shall always 
use the atomic energy”.23 
 Pandit Nehru was not in favour of the development of nuclear weapons and 
his decision were deeply rooted in his scientific temper, hatred of nuclear weapons 
and nuclear allergy after the supreme tragedy at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.24  His 
actually peaceful intentions are reflected in his speeches. He told in Lok Sabha in 
1957 “we have declared quite clearly that we are not interested in and we will not 
make the bombs even if we have the capacity to do so.25 
 On 19 August 1958, Nehru said in the Lok Sabha: “There is not a shadow of 
doubt that if war is once started, the full panoply of the weapons, of the atomic age, 
will reveal itself”.26Nehru was quite aware of the destructive capacity of the atomic 
war. Nehru also recognized that India could gain power, prestige and influence at the 
global level and a measure of security at national level if India acquired nuclear 
weapon capability. He (evade/avoid) many of his antinuclear weapon statements with 
qualification that India could develop nuclear weapon capability and may opt to do 
some day. 
 In 1958, he said, “we have the technical know-how for manufacturing the 
atom bomb. We can do it in three or four years if we divert sufficient resources in that 
direction. But we have given the world an assurance that we shall never do so”.27 
21  Raja Menon, A Nuclear Strategy for India, New Delhi Sage Publications, 2000, pp. 69-70. 
22  G.G. Mirchadaini, Indian Nuclear Dilemma, New Delhi: Popular Books, 1968, p. 23. 
23  Lok Sabha Debates, July 24, 1957, Col. 4954, G.G. Mirchandani, India’s Nuclear Dilemma, New 
Dlehi, 1968, p. 56. 
24  T.T. Poulose, “India’s Nuclear Policy” in T.T. Poulose (ed.) Perspective of India’s Nuclear 
Policy New Delhi: Young Asia, 1978, p. 102. 
25  Demands for Grants, Lok Sabha, Debates, 2d ser., July 24, 1957, col. 4954. 
26  Jawaharlal Nehru: India’s Foreign Policy, Selected Speeches (September 1946 – April 1961), 
Publication Division, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting , New Delhi, 1961, p. 210. 
27  George Perkovich, “What makes the Indian Bomb Tick?” in D.R. Sardesai and Raga G.C. 
Thomas (eds.), Nuclear India in the Twenty First Century, New Delhi: Palgrave MacMillan, , 
2002, p. 27. 
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From 1960s 
 On 10th August, 1960, Nehru said in the Parliament that “No declaration that I 
make today will necessarily bind people in future, but I do hope, we shall create an 
atmosphere in the country which will bind every government in future so that it may 
not use this power for evil purposes”.28 In 1961, when Zerlina reactor went critical 
Nehru announced that although India could make the bomb in two years, but it chose 
not to do so.29 Such statements of Nehru as given above had two advantageous 
aspects i.e. on one hand the claim by Nehru for technical capability to build the bomb 
would win the global image and prestige on military, technical and scientific lines, on 
the other hand, his resistance to build bomb would earn moral prestige.30 
 In 1960s the Third World came to be recognized internationally as an entity 
politically and economically different from the first and second world’s, its nuclear 
concerns reflected verily largely those felt and spoken by Nehru and other founders of 
the non-aligned movement. This movement was given a recognized shape at the 
Belgrade non-aligned summit in 1961 with peace and nuclear arms control as its main 
slogan.31 Nehru also accepted though cautiously (undecided/ambivalently), the 
potential military deterrent and international power embodied in nuclear weapon 
capability. Bhabha being given a free hand in the development of India’s nuclear 
infrastructure should be viewed in this context. Nehru sought to lay the necessary 
foundations should a political decision to obtain nuclear weapons be made.32 In 
pursuit of this end, Bhabha worked inevitably towards a complete mastery of nuclear 
fuel cycle and towards a completely indigenous production process. 
 In late 1950s and early 1960s Nehru and Homi bhabha made many times such 
ambiguous and unclear statements as regards India’s capability to build nuclear 
weapons. Their interest in nuclear weapon had also its source in a wish to manifest 
Indian powerfulness, modernity and sovereignty apart from a sense of military 
threat.33 
28  Lok Sabha Debates, August 10, 1960, Column 2010. 
29  Raja Menon , A New Nuclear Strategy for India, New Delhi Sage Publication, , 2000, p. 72. 
30  Ibid. 
31  For a discussion on the origins of non-alignment and the quest for an alternative world order. 
32  Perkovich, For an account of the duality and ambiguity in Nehru’s nuclear thinking, see India’s 
Nuclear bomb, pp. 13-59. 
33  George Perkovich, n.27, p. 27-29. 
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 For the rapid development of nuclear energy in India, the Atomic energy of 
1962 was passed by Parliament in view of the developments (both political and 
scientific) in the field since the enactment of 1948 act. The New act of 1962 granted 
absolute powers to the government of India to provide for development, control and 
use of atomic energy for the welfare of the people of India and for peaceful purpose. 
The Act of 1962 has played a very important role in the evolution of Indian nuclear 
policy. It provided a firm base for the peaceful development of atomic energy in 
India. The atomic energy commission also made consistent efforts to create expertise, 
foster research, develop new technology and lay a stable foundation for the rapid 
development of nuclear energy in India.  
 In 1960s and early 1960s India did not have the bomb know-how and material 
equipment and designs for detonating a nuclear bomb. This fact was confirmed by 
Nehru. The nuclear weapon programme under Bhabha’s supervision and Nehru’s 
backing continued to operate under so much secrecy that it was very difficult for 
anyone to claim about the present capabilities and future plans. Thus in 1950s union 
of Nehru and Homi Bhabha hailed the dual use of nuclear programme. But the 
interests in potential military use aroused from 1962 through 1964.34 
 China played a significant role in this context. India’s nuclear programme in 
the aspect of nuclear weapons development was influenced and shaped by Chinese 
factor to a larger scale than Pakistan. India kept its nuclear weapon option open to 
contradict and deter the nuclear power of China. China treated India like a rival.35 
 Indo-China friendship broke in 1959, when the dispute over the Aksai Chin 
territory emerged. The mutual relationship further worsened after the Tibetan uprising 
and flow of refugees to India. Furthermore, China materially helped the Naga rebels, 
encouraged Pakistan to needle India, supported Islamabad on Kashmir and frequently 
wrote about the impending collapse of Indian state, to be taken over by 
revolutionaries. The Chinese had also built a road to Sinkiang.36 
 In October 1962 the Sino-Indian border war is of great relevance in the history 
of Indian nuclear programme because it was after this war that a change took place in 
popular opinion and Indian elite over the question of nuclear weapons. The border 
34  Ibid., p. 66. 
35  Karsten Frey, n. 1. pp. 111-113. 
36  Raja Menon, n. 21, p. 71. 
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dispute between India and China which was continuing for about a decade had 
resulted in a vicious border war in October of that year. Big casualties were inflicted 
upon Indian armed forces, which were mostly unprepared for Chinese attack. India 
lost some 14,000 square miles that it has claimed along her borders laying towards 
Himalaya. After the defeat of India, Nehru was forced to concede to the demands at 
home for increased defense spending and modernization.37 India’s emergence from 
the 1962 defeat as a mighty regional power with world’s fourth largest military 
machine is as much a response to the rout as it is a product of a seemingly unalterable 
military drive sparked by the war. In Indian analysis the war came to be seen as a 
negation of India’s pacific policy enshrined in the Panchsheel doctrine of Nehru.38 
 Nehru had to face a demoralized nation and a vehement opposition that asked 
whether India would forever eschew a nuclear deterrent.39 The nuclear policy and 
programme of India until 1962, as it was publicly expressed, had been for peaceful 
purposes for example primarily for generating electricity, while at the same time 
ruling out for all times the feasibility of developing nuclear weapons. Such a policy 
received general support within the country until 1962, but after this date demands 
were raised for developing nuclear weapons. The reason behind such demands were 
India’s defeat in Indo-China war, rumours of 1963 that China was developing nuclear 
weapons and the first nuclear explosions of China at Lop Nor 16 Oct. 1964, when 
Nehru was alive he resisted such demands but after his death (in May 1964) such 
demands increased at a large scale.40 
 The nuclear policy was reassessed after the 1962 conflict. A humiliating defeat 
at China’s hand led to the first debate in Parliament about India’s nuclear options.41 
 While speaking in Parliament on March 23, 1963 on the Department of 
Atomic Energy’s budget estimates for the new fiscal year and MP, Mr. Rama Chandra 
Bede proposed the development of Indian nuclear weapons for self defense. He 
further said only those who wish to see the Russia or the Chinese ruling India will 
37  Summit Ganguly, Conflict Unending: India Pakistan Tension since 1947, New Delhi: Oxford, 
2002, p. 103. 
38 Bharat Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security; The Realist Foundations of Strategy, New 
Delhi: Macmillan India Limited , 2002, pp. 266-270; and Karsten Frey, n. 1, pp. 112-113. 
39 Ashok Kapur, India’s Nuclear Option: Atomic Diplomacy and Decision Making, U.S.A: Praeger 
Publications, pp. 145-152. 
40 Shyam Bhatia, India’s Nuclear Bomb, Ghaziabad: Vikas Publishing House Private Limited, 1979, 
pp. 106.  
41 Ashok Kapur, n. 39, p. 96. 
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oppose the development of nuclear weapons…. I beg the PM to make full use of our 
research in Atomic Energy.42 Nehru’s successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri tried to obtain a 
nuclear guarantee from the nuclear weapon states. This search ultimately turned futile 
when both, the US and the Soviet Union, refused to embrace this approach in any 
thoroughgoing way.43 
Shastri Phase 
 Nehru’s death on 27 May 1964 brought Shastri into the Prime Minister’s 
office. He firstly agreed for peaceful use of nuclear explosions, but at the later date, 
early on in 1962, he expressed his readiness not to rule out the development of nuclear 
weapons in future. This was a sharp departure from the views of his predecessor, Mr. 
Nehru who shortly before he died said that India would never develop nuclear 
weapons under any circumstances.44 In Lok Sabha there were five major political 
parties namely the ruling Congress Party, the Communist party, the Swantantra Party, 
the Jan Sangh and Praja Socialist Party.45 In December 1962, the first move against 
the Nehru’s policy of peaceful use of nuclear energy was the demand made by Jan 
Sangh for building nuclear weapons. The rumours of 1963 which made the first 
demand in Parliament for making nuclear weapons that China was going to detonate a 
nuclear weapon. And the defeat of 1962 war (Sino-India) was also a reason for the 
origin of this demand. It was proposed by Ramachandra Bade, Lok Sabha member of 
Jan Sangh party in March 1963 that India should develop nuclear weapons for self 
defense. But Nehru replied, “the cost and effort involved, and the added hypocrisy of 
making nuclear bomb while asking the existing nuclear powers to give them up, did 
not justify the small psychological benefits of nuclear status”. 
 Shastri while reacting to the Chinese explosion on 16th Oct. 1964 noted that 
“the Chinese blast was a shock and danger to the maintenance of world peace”.46 
During a radio broadcast he said that, the Indian government did not favour emulating 
the Chinese example of developing and testing nuclear bombs.47 But just a few days 
after the radio announcement he changed track and said in Parliament “I cannot say 
42 Lok Sabha Debates, March 23rd, 1963, vol. 15. 
43 A.G. Noorani, “India’s Quest for a Nuclear Guarantee”, Asian Survey, vol. 7, No. 7 (July 1967), 
pp. 490-502. 
44 Bhatia, the Statement of Nehru of not developing nuclear weapon is also found in Raja Menon, p. 
75. 
45 Shyam Bhatia, n. 40, p, 107. 
46  Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 17 Oct. 1964. 
47  Hindustan times, New Delhi, 19 Oct. 1964. 
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that our present nuclear policy would not be changed but we will keep our option 
open”.48 There was a pressure on the Prime Minister which started building up within 
the Congress party to develop nuclear weapons. It was clear that the gradually 
rethinking about conventional approach to nuclear development was predictable. The 
Congress party young leaders namely M.P., Mr. K.C. Pant brought pressure upon the 
Party leadership at the Durgapur Congress Session in early 1965, that India should 
change its nuclear policy and exercise its nuclear option. Thus it was the China factor 
that primarily provided the rationale for India’s nuclear decision making. The Chinese 
nuclear explosion also motivated Bhabha to prepare a secret plan to conduct nuclear 
explosion. In November, 1965, he proposed a plan to the Prime Minister, Shastri 
about India’s own Subterranean Nuclear Explosion Project (SNEP). Shastri 
sanctioned research upto a point where once the go ahead signal was given, it would 
take three months to have an explosion.49 In India during this period of time the 
nuclear debates were stimulated by perception of the Chinese nuclear threat. As one 
Indian study observed “India having coexisted for two decades with the nuclear threat 
from China, need not proceed beyond Pakistan to seek deterrent capabilities against 
China”.50 
 In 1964, throughout the winter session of the Parliament, Parliamentarians 
from five major political parties staked out competing positions on the issue of 
building  nuclear weapons. Congress and Swantantra Parties were divided over this 
question. Jana Sangh and BSP strongly advocated the bomb building programme 
while communist Party strongly opposed it.51 
 Those who were in favour that India should go nuclear, viewed certain 
benefits like stronger defense against China, the defense of the country in general, a 
restored political leadership of South Asia region, a position of strength, power and 
prestige at International level, and an improved national morale.52 
 The opponents of the Bomb building programme claimed that the cost of 
building nuclear weapon was not affordable. It would undermine India’s economic 
48  Sen Gupta Bhabni, Nuclear weapons, Policy option for India, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 
1983, p. 2. 
49  Ashok Kapur, n. 39, p. 194. 
50  P.R. Chari and Bhabani Sen Gupta (ed) Regional Cooperation and Development in South Asia, 
vol. 1, New Delhi: South Asia Publisher, 1986, p. 142. 
51  Bhatia, n. 40, p. 111. 
52  Ibid., pp. 110-111, 123. 
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development and would weaken India’s role in preservation of World Peace. As an 
alternative they suggested that India should seek guarantees of protection from the 
United States against any possible threat in future.53 
 Some parties, such as swantantra party which were right wring parties instead 
that India should not join either Eastern Bloc or Western bloc, and should follow the 
policy of non-alignment. But India should seek the support of the western block.54 
Mushtaq Ahmed, President of the Delhi Pradesh Congress Committee was the first 
Congressman of any stature to publicly declare. The acquisition of nuclear weapons 
was necessary to strengthen country’s defense. He gave this statement on 24 October 
1964 at a public gathering.55 
 The change in domestic compulsions of 1960’s and its rapid change in the 
world situation brought about certain shifts in the Indian nuclear thinking. These 
variations and shifts in the policy raised various basic question regarding the 
capability and motivations.  
 Homi Bhabha played a key role in supporting India’s nuclear capability during 
winter session of Parliament. He was affected by the Sino-India war followed by 
Chinese nuclear test. He wanted to keep the nuclear option open for our country. 
That’s why on 16 October 1964, when Bhabha was visiting London, upon hearing of 
the Chinese Nuclear test he called a Press Conference and told the reporters that 
Indian scientists too could produce a nuclear weapon within 18 months, if they wished 
so”. A few days later, on 24 October 1964, while broadcasting on the subject of 
nuclear disarmament over All India Radio (AIR), Bhabha quoted costs of nuclear 
explosion.56 Therefore, those member of Parliament supporting the case of 
manufacturing nuclear weapons and repeatedly expressing the view that nuclear bomb 
could be produced easily and relatively low cost in India had drawn heavily from 
Bhabha’s two statements which was made by him at two separate occasions in Oct. 
1964. These statements of Bhabha provided material substance to MPs who were 
pressing the government to change its policy of peaceful uses of the nuclear energy in 
an already changed atmosphere which followed Chinese nuclear test.57 Till October 
53  Ibid., pp. 112-113. 
54  Sumit Ganguly, n.37, p. 91. 
55  Shyam Bhatia, n. 40, p. 110. 
56  Ibid., p. 114. 
57  Ibid., p. 113. 
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1964, Shastri was not in favour of changing the existing nuclear policy on the arrival 
of Chinese nuclear test. On November 9, he said, “India ought not to make nuclear 
bombs but rather to work for their elimination”. After two weeks on 23 November, he 
said in parliament that “the government would continue to develop nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes only”.58 
 On 27 November, Shastri said in Lok Sabha that while India was not against 
the development of Nuclear Explosives, if they are to be used for making subway 
moving mountains and other such purposes.59This was the first occasion when Shastri 
had publicly favoured the feasibility of nuclear explosive technology for industrial 
use. This explosive technology was slightly different from that required for nuclear 
weapons. It was a visible change in Shastri’s nuclear policy.60 
 On 8 January 1965, during the annual conference of Congress Party at 
Durgapur, Shastri said that, “I cannot say anything about the future but our present 
policy is not to manufacture atom bomb”.61 This was significant occasion when 
government changed its position. 
 From the above statement Shastri’s reservation about the future was sharply in 
difference with Nehru’s nuclear policy. This statement was a turning point in India’s 
nuclear programme. As on the one hand Shastri allowed to develop nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes; on the other hand, he did not rule out the future option of 
developing nuclear bombs.62 
 Some writers point out the certain dodge in Shastri’s nuclear policy. In 
Congress party Shastri’s position was in danger due to domestic and internal 
economic problems. The Congress party and party in opposition pressurized Shastri to 
make a change in the nuclear policy. Thus Shastri closed the debate by saying that ‘no 
bomb’ policy could be subject to change. Due to these factors that Shastri found it 
expedient, under growing pressure, to make a change. Hence, on November 27, 1964 
he announced a hardly noticed, but a major shift, in nuclear policy.63 
58  Ibid.,, p. 120. 
59  Lok Sabha debates, 27 November 1994, column 2287. 
60  Shyam Bhatia, n. 40, p. 121. 
61  The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 8 January 1965. 
62  Shyam Bhatia, n. 40, p. 121. 
63  Perkovich, n. 27, p. 29. 
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 Those who pressed for a shift in nuclear policy line generally cited Homi 
Bhabha, hence, Shastri’s shift owed much to Homi Jahangir Bhabha. Before the 
announcement Shastri discussed with HomiBhabha that brought a change in the 
nuclear policy. The satisfaction of Bhabha was necessary for Shastri to avoid criticism 
of others. Hence, Shastri had to make a compromise that was best from Bhabha’s 
point of view. The foreign aid for India’s nuclear programme also had forced Shastri 
to avoid nuclear weapon programme and follow the path of peaceful use of nuclear 
energy. In fact the aid which was coming from foreign could be endangered in case 
India would follow the bomb building programme.64 
 In 1965 Indo Pakistani war over Kashmir broke out. During this conflict China 
provided diplomatic support to Pakistan and threatened to open a second front against 
India’s Himalayan border.65 But China did not engage in military action against India. 
US supplied weapons used by Pakistan against India during this war despite prior 
promises that it would not do so. During the war United States cut off the aidto both 
countries. In the UN backed ceasefire that took effort on 23 of September both parties 
agreed to it. This spectator of Sino-Pakistani collaboration against India forced India 
into a tougher foreign policy mode. The day before the UN ceasefire was to take 
effort, a hundred members of the Lok Sabha wrote to the Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur 
Shastri calling for India to exercise the nuclear weapons option.66 One of the letters 
read, “India’s survival both as a nation and as a democracy, in the face of the 
collusion between China and Pakistan. This casts a clear and imperative duty on the 
government to take an immediate decision to develop nuclear weapons”.67 The Prime 
Minister Shastri respond to the question in the Lok Sabha, he said that “despite the 
continued threat of aggression from China, which has developed nuclear weapons, 
government has continued to adhere to the decision not to go in for nuclear weapons 
but to work for their elimination. It is hardly necessary to alter this decision in the 
light of the conflict with Pakistan”.68 
64  Ibid., 29. 
65  William J. Barnds, India Pakistan and the Great Powers, New York: Praeger, 1972, p. 199. 
66  G.G. Mirchandani, India’s Nuclear Dilemma, New Delhi: Popular Book Services, 1968, p.39. 
67  Hari Ram Gupta, India-Pakistani war 1965, vol. 1, p. 20, in George Perkovich India’s Nuclear 
Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation, Backeley CA: University of California Press B, , 
1999, p. 103. 
68  Quoted in G.G. Mirchandani, India’s nuclear Dilemma, New Delhi: Population Books, 1968, pp. 
40-41. 
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 After a short war of 22 days with Pakistan in September 1965 and a immediate 
naked threat from China convinced Shastri and a peaceful democratic India that our 
neighbours have nothing to keep them united except to wage war to divert domestic 
attention. By forwarding development of peaceful Nuclear Explosive devices, Shastri 
in effect had allowed the nuclear scientists to arrive up at a point where, if necessary, 
it would be easy to switch over to weapons production in a short span of time. Openly 
Shastri was not in favour of a weapons programme but kept the weapons option open 
for the future and not to be bound under any such type of commitment for not using 
nuclear power.69 
 The Prime Minister Shastri could not carry forward his nuclear programme for 
any longer time because in January 1966 he expired due to a sudden heart failure at 
Tashkent. Bhabha also could not put his nuclear ambitions into practice because he 
too met with an accidental death, in an aeroplane crash, in the same month. India’s 
nuclear decision making and nuclear programme slowed down due to these 
happenings.70Lal Bahadur Shastri as a Prime Minister of India was the maker of real 
politic as a governing factor in India’s foreign and defense politics. He brought the 
important principles of realism and practicability to bear on our foreign policy and 
defense planning process.71 The demand for the nuclear option to be developed by 
India becomes very vociferous during Lal Bahadur Shastri’s tenure. Indira Gandhi 
who was a compromise choice as a Prime Minister had come to power.72 
The Indira Gandhi Phase – 1966 Onwards 
 Mrs. Indira Gandhi inherited from Shastri the challenges with respect to the 
foreign policy when she became the Prime Minister of India in 1966. Mrs. Gandhi 
directed India’s foreign affairs for continuous 10 years, from 1966 to 1977. The 
Group of jaded old Congressmen, who decided Mrs. Gandhi to succeed Lal Bahadur 
Shastri, made two predictions – 
1. That was having very little political experience in the exercise of government 
power. 
69  J.N. Dixit, n. 17, p. 81. 
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2. Mrs. Gandhi would be a man made puppet in their hands.73 
  After the death of Homi Bhabha Mrs. Gandhi chose Dr. Vikram Sarabhai, a 
very different personality from Bhabha, to replace him. Vikram Sarabhai was opposed 
to the fuel-scale development of nuclear weapons on moral grounds. He thought that 
the development of India’s well being depended on economic development. The 
qualities of Sarabhai distinguished from his predecessor.74 But it does not mean that 
Sarabhai was totally opposed to Bhabha. He did not oppose the decision of Bhabha. 
Shastri era for the development of peaceful nuclear explosive experiments as a 
minimum response to China’s nuclear capability. He also looks to share Bhabha’s 
philosophy of developing this nuclear technology as a part of the necessary total effort 
to counter progressing western dominance in Science and Technology.75 After 
Sarabhai became the Chairman of AEC, he attempted to revitalize India’s nuclear 
programme. He was actually committed to a peaceful nuclear policy. He also went in 
for trained or skilled safeguard for nuclear reactors. Sarabhai’s long range 
perspective. “The release of the energy of the atom” and “the conquest of the outer 
space” were the two targets of progress which were required to be achieved by India 
in order to (declare/ assest) the country’s newly acquired political independence. For 
1970 and 1980 he presented a ten year “profile” for the development of atomic energy 
and space research for implementation. The government accepted this. The Indian 
government fixed target dates for the nuclear energy and space programme for 
accomplishing each phase of the programme.  The estimated expenditure of Rs. 1250 
crores for nuclear energy development and Rs. 105 crores for the space research 
programme.76 On 15 February, 1966, the Indian representative to the non-proliferation 
treaty negotiations in Geneva insisted on balanced compulsion between nuclear 
weapons states and non-nuclear weapon states. His speech underlined the Indian shift 
from seeking nuclear guarantees to the desire for the elimination of nuclear weapon. 
On 1 March 1966, members from Lok Sabha (lower house of the Parliament) asked 
Prime Minister Gandhi of the future of the government to look for security guarantees 
from nuclear weapons states instead of developing nuclear weapon indigenously. She 
started that India would not seek security guarantee because India “should not do 
73  Sandip Pakvasa, n. 71,  p.4. 
74  Perkovich, n. 27, p.30. 
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anything which will precipitate the crisis and lead to the development of nuclear 
weapons in many more countries”.77 
 In June 1966, Vikram Sarabhai held his first press conference as chairman of the 
AEC and secretary of the DAE. He announced that he supported the Prime Minister’s 
continuing non nuclear weapon posture because “an atomic bomb explosion is not 
going to help our security”. He further stated that for a reliable nuclear deterrent, one 
example is not enough. He claimed that India did not have the money dedicate to the 
long-range missiles, radars, electronics, or industrial base that would be necessary to 
support a nuclear deterrent.78 India had taken a decision not to sign the nuclear non 
proliferation treaty because of its discriminatory provision which allowed the existing 
nuclear weapons states that are those countries which obsessed nuclear weapon by 
January 1968, to keep hold of their nuclear weapons while others were prohibited 
from having weapons or acquiring any technology capable of creating manufacturing 
them. 
 Indira Gandhi to start with may well have questioned the knowledge of 
developing peaceful nuclear experiments technology but her doubts were (small/ 
little/short) lived. She never publicly repudiated this technology.79 Mrs. Gandhi faced 
a tough time in the initial year. She continued on unsuccessful search for an effective 
nuclear guarantee from nuclear powers during that period.80 The treaty of nuclear 
non-proliferation by 1996 and international negotiations on a potential were in full 
swing with India playing a major role. India demanded that a fair treaty must 
necessitate existing nuclear weapon states to freeze and then eliminate their nuclear 
arsenals, and must provide security guarantees to state that do not acquire nuclear 
weapons while admitting its own renunciation/rejection of nuclear weapons. India 
refused to give up the right to develop and explode peaceful nuclear explosives as 
long as the recognized nuclear weapon states retained the right to conduct nuclear 
explosion. Mrs. Gandhi informed the Lok Sabha on June 7, 1967, “that in the final 
analysis the effectiveness of a nuclear guarantee will depend upon the vital interests 
of the givers and not upon the spirit in which the protected accept it”.81 At the end of 
77  George Perkovich, n. 27, p. 115. 
78  Vikram Sarabhai, Press Conference, June 1, 1996, in J.P. Jain, Nuclear India, vol. 2, New Delhi: 
Radiant, 1974, p. 179. 
79  Shyam Bhatia, n. 40, p. 139. 
80  Mohammed B. Alam, n.8, p. 24. 
81  Ibid. 
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the year 1967 it became clear to India that USA and USSR would not agree to the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty as required by India. 
 In 1968 Mrs Gandhi in Lok Sabha debated the NPT. She assured that the house 
that, “we shall be guided entirely by our self enlightenment and the consideration of 
national security”. She highlighted the shortcomings of the NPT while reemphasizing 
the country’s commitment to nuclear technology, “that not signing the treaty may 
bring the nation many difficulties. It may mean the blockage of help. Since we are 
taking this decision together, we must all be together facing its penalty. That was a 
turning point this house then strengthened the decision of the government by 
reflecting a national agreement.82 Mrs. Gandhi explained to the Lok Sabha that India 
would vote against the treaty, but at the same time, in her views, India would find no 
security benefit in acquiring nuclear weapons. 
 Mrs. Gandhi view that a nuclear weapon programme could weaken the country’s 
economy and damage its resources which could be utilized for more creative work.83 
There was pressure on India by influential powers led by the United States in respect 
of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. 
1. Maintenance of regional security and stability. 
2. It was derived from their anxiety that India and Pakistan should not become 
capable of producing nuclear weapons or missile. They wanted to certify that 
India, particularly, did not acquire nuclear arsenals and military missile 
development capacities. 
  First type of pressure was, India should not turn hegemonic towards other 
neighbouring countries in general. The second type of the pressure was hidden in 
comparatively high advocates of eliminating weapons of mass destruction, moving 
towards nuclear non-proliferation and attaining general disarmament.84 On 1st July, 
1968, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was signed. India refused to sign the 
treaty on the ground that it was discriminatory on part of non-nuclear weapon states, 
and also the right to conduct peaceful nuclear explosion. The inadequate nature of 
security assurances of NPT forced India to refuse it. Mrs. Gandhi was simply 
following the traditional patterns of India’s nuclear policy as had been outlined before 
82  J.N. Dixit, n. 17, p. 289. 
83  Perkovich, n. 27, p. 31. 
84  Paper laid on the table of the House on evolution of India’s Nuclear Policy, May 27, 1998, p. 2, 
http://www.indianembassy.org/pic/nuclear policy.htm, last assessed on 22 June, 2013. 
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by two of her predecessors, Nehru and Shastri. Most of the political parties supported 
Gandhi’s decision to stay away from NPT. The Swatantra Party was the only party 
which fully opposed this decision. Mrs. Gandhi wanted to keep the option open for 
peaceful use of nuclear energy that was also the reason behind rejecting the treaty.85 
 The political parties have consensus among them on non accepting the NPT 
while no consensus on building nuclear weapon. The scientists did not want to build 
the major nuclear weapon development programme but wanted to design prototype 
nuclear explosives to show their countrymen and the world that India could also 
developed technology to make nuclear weapons. The scientist also wanted to keep our 
military out of the nuclear decision making as the government did not agree to the 
military to hinder in this respect, and the matter fell on a small circle of central 
government officials and scientists.86 
 In a statement to Rajya Sabha on 15 March, 1970 Mrs. Gandhi observed: “the 
Indian government believes that the present policy of developing our scientific and 
technological capability and expanding our programme for the peaceful use of atomic 
energy and space research is in the best overall interest of the nation. In this matter, as 
in others, the government keeps the policy under constant review taking into account 
the need of our national defense and security”. In the meantime there was revolt in 
East Pakistan against the rule of West Pakistan in Bangladesh.87 In between there was 
a revolt in East Pakistan against the rule of West Pakistan. The first major resultant of 
the military attack and the existence of violence also with that of large number of 
refugees, both Hindu Muslim, fled from east Pakistan and moved into the India states 
of Assam, Tripura, Manipur and West Bengal, which put a weight on the economy of 
the country and danger to the security of the country. Mrs. Gandhi was tending to give 
general political support to the cause of Bangladeshis in the initial stages between 
March and May, 1971, there was no purpose to interfere militarily. Sardar Swaran 
Singh who initially was not in favour of intervention in Pakistan affairs, whereas he 
viewed that India should create/move international pressure through multilateral 
means which would certify the return of the refugees to East Pakistan.88 
85  Mohammad B. Alam, n.8, pp.  25- 27. 
86  Perkovich, n. 27, p.31. 
87  J.N. Dixit, n. 17, pp. 101-102. 
88  C.S.R. Murthy, India’s Diplomacy in the United Nations: Problems and Perspectives, New 
Delhi: Lancer Books, , 1993, pp. 108-109. 
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 The war took place in between the two countries from 3 to 10 Dec. 1971. After 
the 1971 war, ensuring loss of East Pakistan (Now Bangladesh) the economy of 
Pakistan was in bad shape. Pakistan could ill afford to devote substantial resource to 
strengthening its conventional forces. Simultaneously in Pakistan eyes, the United 
States was confirmed to be a singular, undependable for failing to prevent the breakup 
of Pakistan. Under these trying circumstances the pursuit of a nuclear weapon option 
was seen as a possible strategic solution.89 Pakistan’s decision to develop a nuclear 
device came much later. The outcome humiliating defeat at Indian hands in 1971, 
President Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto met with a group of Pakistan scientists in Multan for 
the development of nuclear bomb. In his outlook the possession of nuclear weapons 
could deter a future Indian intervention in Pakistani territory.90 Pakistan’s actual 
nuclear policy began after 1958 during the period of Ayub Khan he had no such 
intensions to use nuclear energy for peaceful purpose. The Direction of Atomic 
Energy commission of Pakistan, Dr. I.H. Usmani was having similar ideas while the 
then foreign Minister, Mr. Z.A. Bhutto and his supports were in favour of 
development of the atomic bomb.91 
  Pakistanis desire for nuclear weapon is rooted in its humiliation over the 
outcome of the 1971 war when East Pakistan broke away with the help of India. As 
west Pakistan is determined to have the bomb as an insurance against India 
intervention which is strategically and psychologically understandable. So there was 
no choice for India but to follow the nuclear option. So India has the general argument 
that it must have the bomb to counter Pakistan.92 
  Sarabhai did not live long to see his ambitious plans completed. He died on 
December 30, 1971. The perceptible goal of Sarabhai’s nuclear programme was to 
acquire for India a balance nuclear infrastructure and enable it to emerge as a 
threshold nuclear power. After Sarabhai, the programme Analysis Group was 
dissolved, the profile withdrawn and the explosion project was revived. The 
centrepiece of this programme was one or more nuclear explosion for peaceful 
purposes and was therefore an integral part of India’s development programme. 
India’s rejection of the NPT, withdrawal of the Sarabhai profile and the decision to 
89  J.N. Dixit, n. 17, p. 440. 
90  Shaista Tabassum, Nuclear Policy of the United States in South Proliferation or Non- 
Proliferation (1947-1990), Karachi: Royal Book Company, 2003, p. 64. 
91  Sumit Ganguly, n. 15, p. 106. 
92  K. Subramanyam, “India’s Nuclear Policy,” World Focus, August, 1998. 
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carry out one or more peaceful explosion had a deep impact on the bomb debate in 
India.  
 Mrs. Indira Gandhi’s nuclear policy initially was rather uncertain. In the course 
of 60s India took a rigid stand at various fora and tried to make sure an NPT that 
would look after security from the Chinese nuclear threat. The Indian leadership 
wanted the nuclear power to commit themselves not to transfer nuclear weapons or 
weapons technology to others, not to use nuclear weapons which was unfavourable 
for a country that did not have them, and safeguard the security of non-nuclear power 
countries endangered by nuclearized nation. In one of her important speeches, Mrs. 
Gandhi while supporting her government’s policy had said “I do not think our policy 
is at all negative one. I think that it is a very positive policy. We are building up our 
atomic power, of course, we are using it for peaceful purposes, but in the mean time, 
we are increasing our know-how and other competence. I fail to understand now our 
production of one bomb or two bombs will help us. The belief that China can attack 
any country with nuclear weapons with impunity, I think is a misconceived one”.93 
Among the elite some viewed that development of nuclear capability by India in the 
broader perspective of international power politics and superpower diplomacy.94 
 Political analysts like Sisir Gupta saw in it a chance for India to emerge as a 
regional power capable of affecting the regional balance of power independently 
without interference of other great powers.95 It was felt that India had no alternative 
but to obtain nuclear weapons. The very proximity and enormity of Chinese power 
left no alternative for India to go in for an adequate nuclear deterrent of its own and it 
was only a question of time before India become grateful to enter the race by absolute 
force of circumstances.96 
 The developing nuclear weapon technology issue was constantly debated in both 
outside and inside the parliament. On 26 November 1970, Mrs. Gandhi made a 
statement in the Parliament on the government’s desire to exploit nuclear energy for 
the economic development, she told the parliamentary consultative committee for 
atomic energy in development in July 1971 that the government would experiment 
93  Lok Sabha Debates, India, May 9, 1966. 
94  T.T Paulose, n. 24,  p. 104. 
95  Sisir Gupta, The Indian Dilemma, A World of Nuclear Powers, Mumbai: Jaco Publishing House, 
1969, p. 81-89. 
96  According to an article published in the Hindustan Times, May 9, 1970. 
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with nuclear explosion for engineering purposes. In Nov. K.C. Pant, Minister of State 
for Home Affairs declared our scientists are today engaged in gathering all relevant 
information in order that peaceful use of nuclear explosive devices when the 
technology is developed can be available for the economic benefit of the country.97 
 Foreign Minister Sardar Saran Singh said “it represented our resolve to develop 
our indigenous resources of energy for the benefit of our own people through our own 
effort.98 
 It was during this period that Pakistan talked about the need to have a nuclear 
bomb, through Pakistan had in fact, begun the nuclear weapons programme almost a 
decade before India tested its nuclear device. 
 India’s failure to influence the global regime that would address its security 
concerns pushed it further down the nuclear path. The US pressure on India which has 
also been argued on India during the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war also convinced Indira 
Gandhi of the signal importance of developing Indian nuclear capabilities. Though, 
the important factor that led to the explosion of Indian’s first nuclear device in May 
1974 were Indira Gandhi’s sense that India would gain confidence in itself as a nation 
and her as a leader and the Atomic Energy Commission’s determination to prove its 
(courage/mettle) 
 In September 1971, the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission 
announced at “the Fourth Atoms for Peace Conference” that India had been working 
on top priority basis, in the field of nuclear explosive engineering for peaceful 
purposes.99 The government officials started appearing on plans for peaceful nuclear 
explosion since late 1971. The Defense minister however delinked the idea of PNE 
from the use of nuclear weapons for defense. In respond to a question that Defense 
Minister stressed the use of conventional weapons and not substituting them for 
nuclear weapons.100 Mrs. Gandhi’s response to the question in parliament in Nov. 
1972 made it clear that the Atomic Energy Commission was constantly reviewing the 
progress in the technology of underground nuclear explosives from both the 
theoretical and experimental angle, taking into account their potential economic 
97  K.K Pathak,  Nuclear Policy of India: A third World Perspective, New Delhi, p. 131. 
98  Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 22 May 1970. 
99  Chandrasekhar Rao, “Proliferation and the Indian Test,” A view from India Survival, vol. XVI, 
No. 5, Sep.-Oct. 1974, p. 210. 
100  Lok Sabha Debates, Series 5, Vol. XI, No. 5, March 17, 1972, C 130-31. 
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benefits and possible environmental hazards.101 Again in 1973 Mrs. Gandhi repeated 
her earlier statement and went on to deny that any schedule had been fixed for 
conducting a PNE. Again in 1973 Mrs. Gandhi repeated her earlier statement and 
went on to deny that any schedule for a peaceful nuclear explosion.102 
 The peaceful nuclear explosion of May 1974 took a lot of preparations before 
the actual date of test. India was signatory to the partial Test Ban Treaty which 
required that a nuclear test should be conducted underground.103 
Pokhran I Explosion 
 Mrs. Gandhi was regularly informedof the progress on test preparations. Her 
final approval was required a few weeks before the test when the components had 
been assembled and were ready for testing. However the Prime Minister did not 
inform all her cabinet colleges. Some members of the cabinet were informed a few 
hours or a few days before the test, depending on their seniority. None appeared to 
home questioned the Prime Minister’s style of decision making. Therefore, on the 
Prime Minister’s orders, discussion on nuclear matters was never recorded in cabinet 
minutes. It was a style of executive decision making that persisted right up to and 
beyond the Pokhran test on 18 May 1974.104 
 The device was finally called the “Peaceful Nuclear Explosive”, but it was 
usually referred to as the smiling Buddha. Mrs. Gandhi maintained tight control of all 
aspects of preparation of the smiling Buddha test, which was conducted in extreme 
secrecy. India decided to go ahead with peaceful nuclear test to develop the new 
technology. India achieved a breakthrough in her activities/actions when she 
successfully exploded her first peaceful nuclear device at Pokhran on May 18, 1974. 
It was an underground explosion, a spin-off to India’s peaceful nuclear programme.105 
 Indian scientists used plutonium, designed to yield about 12 kilotons of TMT 
explosive energy. It was conducted underground. The device was placed at depth of 
107 metres in a scale in a chamber at the end of an L shaped whole. There was 
comprehensive radiation monitoring of the site and atmosphere before and after 
experiment showed that no radiation had been released into the atmosphere during the 
101  Lok Sabha Debates, Series 3, Vol. XI, No. 5, March 17, 1972, c. 130-31. 
102  Rajya Sabha Debates, Series 5, vol. XX, No. 3, Nov. 15, 1972 c. 138-39. 
103  Perkovich, n. 27, p. 33. 
104  Shyam Bhatia, n. 40, pp. 144-145. 
105  Kaul R,  India’s Nuclear Spin off, Allahabad: Chanakya Publishing House, 1974. 
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experiment. The experiment produced an apparent creator of average radius of 47 
meters and depth of 10 meters below pre-short ground surface in agreement with 
observations and on test elsewhere. It was part of the efforts to find viability of using 
underground explosions for constructive purposes.106 Mrs. Gandhi made the following 
important points, the experiment conducted was a part of the research and 
development work which the ACE had been carrying on in pursuance of the national 
objective of harnessing atomic energy for peaceful purposes. The world had been 
informed of Indian interest in the study of peaceful nuclear explosions in 1972 and 
again in 1973. The successful experiment had not resulted in any radioactive 
contamination. The ACE would publish data relating to the results of the study. All 
the materials equipments and personal involved in the project were wholly Indian. 
India had not violated any international law or obligation or any commitments in this 
regard with any country. 
Internal Reactions after 18 May, 1974 
 The Jana Sangh was the most forceful voice among all political parties in its 
campaign for a nuclear bomb after the Chinese attack in 1962 and Chinese nuclear 
explosion in 1964. It passed a resolution on June 2, 1974 stating that May 18, 1974 
was a “red letter day in Indian history. It also stated that India should manufacture 
nuclear weapons “to protect our independence”.107 The demand for a Atom bomb was 
not confined to only one sections or sections which can be termed as a lobby. It is a 
demand of a nation. Inthe nuclear policies of the earlier PM Nehru, “No Bomb ever” 
was modified by Shastri as “No bomb Now”. The same policy continued under Mrs. 
Gandhi. 
 On 23rd March 1975 Advani said in his presidential address to the Annual 
Session of his party that China had got a voice in global matter due to her nuclear 
powers. India should not mind annoyance of the superpowers and appealed for giving 
a nuclear dimension to India’s defense preparedness.108 In 1964 AB Vajpayee another 
vocal member said “that an Indian bomb was the answer to the Chinese bomb”he 
cautioned that government against making a commitment for all times to come that 
106  Annual report, Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, 1974-75. 
107  L.K. Advani, Indian Express, New Delhi, 31 May 1974. 
108  Indian Express, New Delhi, 24 March, 1975. 
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nuclear energy should not be used for defense purposes.109 Ch. Charan Singh (leader) 
described the explosion as a good development. Morarji Desai was the notable 
exception who opposed the PNE. He doubted the government’s intention saying that 
explosion would encourage those who favoured a nuclear weapons programme for the 
country. The Indian Institute of Public Reactions to the explosion published on July 
27, 1974 said that its metropolitan poll of adult literate showed that 90% of them were 
proud of the explosion. In Delhi, 99% were excited. Roughly the same percentage felt 
that the test had raised Indian’s stature in the international community. 
External Reaction after 18 May, 1974 
 The developing countries had by and large welcomed the experiment. The 
United States expressed satisfaction that the IAEA safeguards system had worked in 
regard to agreements with India and that the material used had not come from the 
USA. The United States however, restated its stand against nuclear proliferation. The 
Soviet Union noted that India had carried a research programme determined to keep a 
level with the world technology in peaceful uses of nuclear energy. A fresh Atomic 
Energy Commission congratulated India while China simply reported the event 
without comment and Japan regretted. Canada was satisfied that India had not 
violated any agreement between the two countries. But at the same time according to 
the Canadian Secretary of state for external affairs, the experiment represented a 
service setback to efforts being made in the international community to prevent all 
nuclear testing and to inhibit proliferation of nuclear explosion technology. The 
government of India was unable to subscribe to this view. India had repeatedly 
reaffirmed its policy of using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and used 
specifically started that Canada would understand the background of the experiment. 
Intentions of study in this area had not been kept a secret. The difference between the 
Indian and Canadian view was one of the interpretation that should be resolved 
through discussion. 
 As regards Pakistan, a separate letter had been written to Prime Minister Z.A. 
Bhutto explaining the India stand. Indo Canadian cooperation could be traced way 
back to the 1950’s. Until the signing of the NPT, cooperation between the two 
common wealth powers was fairly close. It has been claimed that in 1971 Prime 
109  Times of India, New Delhi, 25 March 1975. 
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Minister Trudeak tried unsuccessfully to persuade Mrs. Gandhi to promise not to 
develop a nuclear device. The Canadian Reaction to the 1974 PE had, as noted earlier 
been sharp and Canada suspended cooperation in the nuclear field. Mrs. Gandhi dwelt 
at length on the Canadian reaction in her statement to the parliament. India initiated 
negotiations with Canada to solve the crisis created by the latter’s decision to stop all 
further nuclear cooperation with this country.110 The negotiation went on for 4 years 
and finally in May 1976 Canada informed India that further nuclear cooperation 
between the two countries was not possible. The message stated, in the view of 
Canada’s policy to have nuclear cooperation with countries which had renowned the 
use of Canadian supplied materials, equipment and technology for nuclear explosives, 
further cooperation with India would not be compatible with the policy, and since this 
Canadian requirement was not acceptable to India, a settlement on any other basis was 
not possible.111 Subsequently, India made an agreement with USSR for the supply to 
which had been stopped by Canada. 
 Pakistan’s reaction that the Indian PNE posed a threat to its security was in a 
sense not unexpected. Mrs. Indira Gandhi wrote a personal letter to the Pakistan PM 
ZA Bhutto explaining the peaceful nature of the Indian test. She referred to the 
continuing unity of the Shimla Agreement between the two countries and assured him 
that the test was devoid of any political or foreign policy implications.112 An aide-
memoire issued by the Pakistan government following Bhutto’s letter raised a number 
of questions about the Indian test. 
 India after 1974 finalized the nuclear option strategy which argued that India 
possessed the technological capacity to develop nuclear weapons if security interests 
required it, but it would refrain from exercising this military option. By adopting this 
strategy India tried to satisfy twin objectives of retaining a moral high ground on 
disarmament while providing enough military potential to give adversaries pause. 
However, India did incur the penalties of the international non-proliferation regime113 
110   LSD Vol. XLV(2), 20th Nov. 74, Col. 91, vol. LXI, 21 Jan. 1976, col. 114, Vol. LVII (16), 10 
March, 1976. Col. 92-93 vol. LXIII (17). 
111  LSD vol. LXII (16), 20 May, 1976, col. 14-515. 
112  Foreign Affair Record, Vol. XX, No. 6, June 74, p. 196. 
113  Bhahma, Challenge, New Proliferation: The US-Indian Conflict, New Delhi: Orient Longman, 
1993, pp. 74-75. 
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and at the same time also spurred the development of its most immediate adversary, 
Pakistan’s nuclear program.114 
 With regard to the USA, the American interest in the relationship between 
nuclear power and potential spread of nuclear weapons started to increase. This 
interest was to culminate in major policy decisions taken by the Carter administration 
in 1977 and 1978. The delays in the supply of enriched uranium to the Tarapur plant 
began around 1975.115 
 There was uproar in Parliament as MP’s wanted to know the motive behind the 
disruption in the supply of fuel. It was asked if the US had been mounting pressure on 
India to sign the NPT or accept certain safeguards or if the USA had fear that India 
would produce nuclear weapons.116 At one point, there was a heated debate on the US 
Secretary of state’s statement about India’s intentions of producing atomic 
weapons.117 
 It was after the Pokhran Explosion that India tried to develop a coherent 
nuclear policy. The earlier approach of peaceful nuclear development was now further 
expanded. Since there is not much technological difference between a peaceful 
nuclear technology and the nuclear weapon technology. Pokhran demonstrated India’s 
capability to make nuclear weapons. The explosion created ambiguity among the elite 
whether India would go or would not for nuclear weapons. The PNE gave India a 
deterrent capability. The logic of geostrategic unity had rationalized the PNE 
experiment because it gave India a different kind of deterrent capability. At the same 
time, India continued to adhere to the peaceful approach to nuclear energy. 
 Mrs. Indira Gandhi was under tremendous pressure at home to go for the 
explosion. Even during Nehru’s life time the demand for India possessing a bomb had 
started in right earnest. Shastri his successor was under tremendous pressure 
particularly after the Durgapur session of the Congress where for the first time even a 
resolution was moved demanding India should go nuclear. This pressure had built up 
from within the Congress itself. The demand in congress did not reduce anyway but 
were on the increase due to the China factor. The media too was supportive to this 
114  Perkovich, n. 27, pp. 194-197. 
115  A.G Noorani , “Indo-US Nuclear Reactions,” Asian Survey, vol. XXI (4), April, 88, p. 415. 
116  Lok Sabha Debates, vol. XLII (11), 29 Aug. 74, col. 101 vol. XLV (12), 20 Nov. 74, col. 114, 
vol. XLV (12), 21 Nov. 74 Col. 40-63, Vol. X (4), 1 March 78, cols. 198-90. 
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kind of development. According to political analysts and defense analysts India 
should go nuclear demanding a clear cut and unambiguous stand on this issue. All 
these reasons which have been enumerated in detail in the previous paragraphs 
constitute the domestic factors impinging Indira Gandhi to go nuclear or in other 
words parliament, the media and the political parties were fairly active and public 
opinion was in its favour. 
 After 1974 and the growing threat by the Chinese nuclear arsenals, there was a 
case as per the theory of realism, to increase India’s nuclear weapon capability. While 
the scientists were eager to go ahead with the further developments of a 
thermonuclear capability and were, reportedly, given the go head to conduct 
preliminary work, the technical capacity to do so was radically reduced. Following the 
1974 nuclear test the availability of fassile material went from one to zero. This was 
somewhat on account of the sharp international reaction especially from Canada, on 
India stance that it will be used for ‘peaceful purposes’ and partly on account of the 
closure of the Trombay Plutonium separation plant for renovation. This was joined 
with a dispute, which had broken out between Raja Ramanna (he was chief architect 
of the 1974 nuclear device) and Homi Bhabha who was the head of the India Atomic 
Energy Commission in their attempt to control the organization. This disagreement 
paralysed the bomb makers at the Bhabha Atomic Research Center. 
 The explanation for no further test is that after Pokhran explosion Mrs. Gandhi 
was involved too much with domestic political problems which made her to impose 
internal emergency in June 1975. Gandhi had more and more important things to 
worry about than the nuclear policy. The state of emergency ended in 1977, Morarji 
Desai was elected as the new Prime.118 Another reason could be the adverse reaction 
of the nuclear technology supplier countries i.e., the USA and Canada which might 
have compelled Gandhi to avoid any further test.119 
 As we discussed earlier Canada had already demonstrated its disapproval by 
immediately withdrawing its aid to India because of the fact that India had used 
plutonium produced in the reactor built with Canadian assistance for its 1974 nuclear 
explosion.120 
118  Perkovich, n.27,  p. 34. 
119  Mohammad Alam, n. 8, p. 31. 
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 Hence, after the 1974 nuclear explosion, India had the technology to build the 
nuclear explosives, but with no policy actually to go ahead and do so. The 
government maintained the traditional commitment only to use atomic energy for 
peaceful purposes and declared that it would not make nuclear weapons. Mrs. Gandhi 
followed the self-restraint policy and hoped that it would bring international respect 
for the nation’s moral singularity.121 
The Janata Era 
 There was a shift in Indian government position. In March 1977, Janta Party 
came to power and elected Morarji Desai, as its head. With his installation Prime 
Minister Morarji Desai’s government followed one traditional policy of peaceful 
application of nuclear technology. Janta government reviewed Indira Gandhi Nuclear 
policy and criticized peaceful nuclear explosion of 1974. The two issues figured 
prominently in India’s nuclear policy both was being the direct fallout of the 1974 
PNE experiment viz. the stoppage of supply of fuel to the Tarapur Atomic plant by 
the United States and the suspension of Canadian fuel to Rajasthan plant. Desai’s 
statement on nuclear policy was mainly the products of India’s stand on issues like 
PNE. 
 India was using nuclear technology for the peaceful purpose. But Prime 
Minister Desai questioned the need for conducting a PNE for the purpose of using 
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. He regarded the results of the PME as 
inadequate compensation for the push to international public opinion and the 
consequences it had on India’s pursuit of nuclear knowledge. Desai denied any 
pressure from outside powers in the decision taken of not conducting any further 
PNE. 
 The Prime Minister Morarji Desai had a very strong aversion to nuclear 
weapons and was dead set against development of nuclear capability but at the same 
time, had equally strong objections to signing the PNT on the basis that the treaty was 
manifestly inequitable. The rest of the leaders, even from the party that had once 
pushed for development of the nuclear capability went along with his policies. This 
121  Mohammad Alam, n. 8, p. 31. 
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was in spite of the knowledge that Pakistan was gearing up construction of the 
Kulzuta uranium enrichment plant.122 
 Some features of his policies were: 
1. India will not acquire nuclear weapons. 
2. India would not throw open its nuclear facilities to international inspection 
except on a reciprocal basis; 
3. India would not carry out any more nuclear explosions unless when absolutely 
necessary for its peaceful nuclear programme; even than it would be an 
explosion conducted in secrecy. 
4. India would not sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty until the nuclear 
powers have taken definite steps towards nuclear arms control. 
5. India would not submit to international pressures to accept a nuclear policy that 
would hurt its national pride and its indigenous nuclear energy development 
programme.123 
 In Morarji Desai first press conference on March 24, 1977, he told a West 
German interview, “I will give it to you in writing that we will not manufacture 
nuclear weapons. Even if the whole world arms itself with bombs, we will not do so”, 
he also criticized Indira Gandhi for her decision to conduct the 1974 nuclear 
explosion.124 
 The Prime Minister Morarji Desai, on one hand, opposed the manufacturing of 
atomic weapons on strong moral grounds, on the other hand, he did not exclude 
completely the option of peaceful application of nuclear energy. On October 21, 1977, 
he stated in his Kremlin speech: “Atomic energy like many is a scientific invention 
that has its constructive and destructive potential. It is up to as to ensure that through 
it we seek the victories of peace and not the disastrous triumphs of war. It is my 
conviction, and that of the people of India, that the world must totally eschew one use 
of the atom for military purposes. This can only come if we can bring about total 
disarmament of existing nuclear weaponry. It is with this faith that I publicly declared 
that India shall not use nuclear energy for other than peaceful purposes.  
122  Shaista Tabassum, n. 90, p. 59. 
123  Mohammad Alam, n. 8, pp. 32-33. 
124  Perkovich, n. 27, p. 35. 
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 Desai called nuclear weapons as a evil and disliked anybody in the government 
who could talk about nuclear weapons. For the sake of India’s security, Desai had 
over-confidence in the Indian military power. He much preferred industrial 
development to nuclear weapons as immediately after his election he said that cottage 
industry was more useful to the country than its nuclear programme.125 
 Mr. Desai clarified that he had only pledged to observe nuclear explosion but 
would have no hesitation to have a “blast” which presumably was a peaceful exercise. 
The Prime Minister made three statements in parliament in July 1978. On 26 July, 
Desai made an apparent move back from his earlier pledge that India would undertake 
no more nuclear explosion even for peaceful purposes. Answering questions he said 
he was not ruling out atomic blasts for engineering purposes such as mining oil 
prospecting or earth moving. The Prime Minister indicated that the kind of nuclear 
test he was opposed carried out at Pokhran. Pokhran created all the troubles without 
our gaining anything, he said adding that it really was staged by Mrs. Gandhi for 
political purposes.126 
 “India would never stage a nuclear explosion in future, even for peaceful 
purpose…” Later some redress was made by him in a statement in Parliament, a 
month later of his General Assembly address, to the effect that “he would not rule a 
nuclear blast for engineering or other peaceful purposes”. This was a piece of 
“prevarication uncharacteristic of him”, but it may have helped to restore the policy 
situation to a degree of uncertainty. In May 1979 Desai further clarification in the 
parliamentary consultative committee removed all uncertainty. He made it clear that 
“India would not change its peaceful nuclear policy even if Pakistan were to explode 
an atomic bomb, and he rejected all suggestions about talking a flexible attitude on 
the question”. He said that he was convinced “not only on morals but on practical 
grounds that it would be suicidal to go nuclear”.127 
 The External Affair Minister Vajpayee had declared at the UN General 
Assembly on Oct. 4, 1977, that India had been consistently opposed to the acquisition 
125  Bharat Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: the Realist Foundations of Strategy, New 
Delhi: Macmillan India Limited, 2002, pp. 338-340.  
126  Lok Sabha Debates, July 26, 1978. 
127  Major General D.K. Patil and P.K.S. Namboodiri, Pakistan’s Islamic Bomb, New Delhi: Vikas 
Publishing House Private Limited, 1979, pp. 140-141. 
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and development of nuclear weapons and that it would not go in for them even if all 
other countries in the world did so.128 
 Earlier on September 30, 1977 he assured that council of foreign relation in 
New York “it is our solemn resolve that whatever the rest of the world may do, we 
will never use atomic energy for military purpose”.129 
 Mr. Vajpayee reiterated the consistent policy of the government of India not to 
manufacture nuclear weapons. The salient features were: 
1. India was not only against the proliferation of nuclear weapon but also against 
nuclear weapons themselves. 
2. India would always oppose any means or measures which stood in the way of 
peaceful utilization of nuclear technology. 
3. Now proliferation of nuclear weapons should not be confused with non 
dissemination of nuclear technology. 
4. India would be prepared to cooperate wholeheartedly with other countries in 
discussing ways and means of putting at the danger of nuclear weapons.130 
 The parliamentary consultative committee on atomic energy which met on May 
7, 1979 informed Prime Minister Desai about recent American Discovery that 
Pakistan had embarked on a programme to make weapons grade fuel. Therefore, the 
government should reconsider its policy in view of the new situation. Mr. Krishna 
Kant the member of the Janta Party who publicly advocated a weapons programme 
noted that India was under US pressure to submit full scope safeguards. He also 
reminded Mr. Desai of report that weapons grade uranium had been illegally 
abstracted to Pakistan from the United States. Desai, now ever felt that it would be 
suicidal for India to abandon its rejection of nuclear weapons. He reaffirmed his 
government’s declared policy against making nuclear weapon.131 
 Janta party’s policy under Morarji Desai was described as a “Nuclear Munich” 
hinting at the alleged intention of the policy to appease the western countries.132 
 
 128  Lok Sabha Debates, June 24, 1977, cols. 166-167. 
129  Sunday Standard, October 3, 1977. 
130  Lok Sabha Debates,  November 17, 1977, Col. 118-119. 
131  Statesman, New Delhi, 8 May, 1979. 
132  R. Rama Rao, “A Nuclear Munich” in TT Paulose (ed.), Perspective of India’s Nuclear Policy, 
New Delhi: Young Asia Publisher, 1978, pp. 240-46. 
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Morarji Desai’s views on Nuclear Issue were as follows: 
 India would be using the nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and not 
manufacture nuclear weapons. He questioned on the need of conducting PNE for the 
purpose of using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. He regarded the results of the 
PNE as inadequate compensation for the jolt to inherent zonal public opinion. 
 India would not undertake any more nuclear explosion while mentioning 
India’s option to conduct experimental explosion and he again qualified it by saying 
that if needed, it would be done in consultation with other people. Mr. Desai denied 
any pressure from outside powers not to conduct any further PNE. He denied that he 
would agreed to allow inspection of India’s atomic power plants. His condition was 
that until they allow us to inspect their plants, we’ll not allow ours to be inspected. 
India will not sign the NPT whatever be the consequences. 
 He also insisted on reducing nuclear weapons, destroying existing stockpiles 
and concluding a comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. On the nuclear front, the thought 
marked about the Morarji Desai government is the fact that it tried to toe a line which 
signified a marked departure from the line that had been followed on this issue by one 
previous government. The government which was coalition government which had 
came into being as an accumulation of political groups each having its own agenda. 
All these parties had come under the umbrella of the Janta Party. Jan Sangh which had 
always followed a very tough line with regard to the nuclear issue right from the 
beginning as can be noted in the statement of its leader L.K. Advani in the wake of 
the Pokhran 1 explosion calling it a “red letter day in Indian history”.133 Shri A.B. 
Vajpayee had cautioned the government against all times to come not to comment that 
“nuclear energy should not be used for defense purposes”.134 It was the complexion of 
coalition politics which weighed on them to radically change their point of view. On 
the one hand the dominant view which they represented and the rightwing views of 
the Jana Sangh believed in a strident nuclear posture. However, they had become a 
part of Janta Party, a new formation, a sort of new experiment which had come into 
existence to protest against the excesses of emergency inflicted by Indira Gandhi and 
her congress party. 
133  Indian Express, New Delhi, 31st May, 1974. 
134. Times of India, New Delhi, 25th March, 1975. 
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 Prime Minister Sri Morarji Desai’s statement in the Lok Sabha in the course of 
a discussion that “it (the Pokhran 1 test) was conducted by Mrs. Gandhi for the 
political reason”.135 Much can be reduced from an open statement by the then Prime 
Minister on the floor of one house attributing a political reason to the Pokhran I blast, 
he also believed  that the previous regime had done this for deriving political mileage 
out of entire exercise. 
 The panchant of Morarji Desai’s to do something biometrically different from 
the previous regime encouraged him to take a posture which in a way differed from 
what the Congress had adopted on this issue. It was basically an anti-congress line 
(attuned/familiar) to the dominant thinking of the Janta party. In July 1979 Janta party 
collapsed. 
The Charan Singh Government 
 The interim government headed by Mr. Charan Singh had a brief innings after 
the collapse of the Janta coalition. Prime Minister Charan Singh followed a hard line 
policy and abandoned the nuclear policy of his predecessor. Mr. Singh’s government 
introduced a qualitative change in India’s nuclear policy by linking the Pakistani 
factor into the future orientation of India’s nuclear programme. Pakistan clandestine 
nuclear programme come to light. It was feared that Pak was about to explode a 
nuclear device. Pakistan was secretly planning to build a uranium enrichment and 
reprocessing plant. The disclosure of these secret nuclear activities of Pakistan caused 
alarm in India that the former might be making progress towards acquiring a nuclear 
bomb. He feared that, Pakistan would use this bomb against India. He said that, “India 
does not want to join the race to make the bomb, but if Pakistan goes ahead with its 
plan to make a bomb, then we will have to reconsider the entire question.136 Charan 
Singh in his Independence Day speech on 15 August 1979 said that “If Pakistan went 
nuclear India would review its nuclear policy.” His stand was also supported by C. 
Subramaniam, the interim Defense Minister who hinted that India might face a 
decision to go nuclear before long and indentified Pakistan as the most likely 
stimulus”.137 In other words, he was conveying a message to the armed forces that the 
political leadership was well aware of the situation and gravity of the matter. Charan 
135  Lok Sabha Debates, July 26, 1978. 
136  Major General D.K. Patil, P.K.S, n. 127. 
137  Mohammad B. Alam, n. 9, pp. 34-36. 
55 
 
                                                          
Chapter 2 
Singh was even prepared to risk stoppage of fuel supply to Tarapur. It was a radical 
departure from the policy of erstwhile government. His tenure was only 5 month till 
Jan. 14, 1980. 
RETURN OF INDRA GANDHI 1980  
Replying to the debate on the motion of thanks to the President's address in the 
Lok Sabha on January 30, 1980, Mrs. Indira Gandhi the then Prime Minister said "the 
production of nuclear bombs by any country in the region is based to create reaction 
in others, which will increase the suspicion and fears of the intentions of the bomb 
producer. We have made it clear that India has no intention of producing nuclear 
weapons? but at the same time we do not give up our right to use nuclear energy for 
peaceful and development purposes.138  
She told the Parliament that although her government was committed to the 
peaceful use of nuclear energy but it would not hesitate from carrying out "nuclear 
explosion or implosion, whatever is necessary in the national interest. Mrs. Gandhi 
said-it was necessary to study the issue closely because of Pakistan's on going nuclear 
programme which would have a serious impact on the security environment of the 
region. She said "we must have our eyes and ears open and be in touch with the latest 
technology. We should not be caught napping.139 During the debate on demand for 
grants for the Ministry of Defence on July 19, 1980, Mr A. B. Vajpayee (BJP) and Dr 
Subramanyam Swamy (Janata) asked the government to make a nuclear bomb in view 
of Pakistan's reported efforts to acquire nuclear capability. However Mrs Gandhi ruled 
out making of any bomb. At a press conference on 10th July 1981, clarifying India's 
nuclear intentions, Mrs Gandhi said "we do not believe in deterrent theory and that 
India would not make nuclear weapons even if Pakistan did so.140 
In a statement in Parliament on 22nd August 1984, she said the government 
"did not think it necessary to revise the nuclear policy because of Pakistan's acquiring 
the bomb. China too had the nuclear weapon. Pakistan’s acquiring nuclear weapon did 
not make any difference. After Mrs Gandhi's return to power in 1980, India again 
went back to the policy of keeping the nuclear option open and maintained that the 
conducting of a peaceful nuclear explosion would be decided on the basis of India's 
138  Selected speeches and writings of Indira Gandhi. 1980·S1, Volume  IV, New Delhi, Publication 
Division, Govt. of India, 1985, p.17. 
139  Hindustan Times, 14 March 1980. 
140  Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 11th July, 1981. 
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national interest. By early 1981, there were open demands in India from various 
sections of the society i.e. MPs, military officers, journalists and commentators that 
the country should openly develop nuclear weapons.141 
 “A report of a seminar held in New Delhi in 1982 which was well attended by 
various military officers also concluded that "with regard to a possible Pakistan 
nuclear threat, India has two options: either it remains one step ahead of Pakistan in 
its nuclear weapons programme so that it is not caught in a disadvantageous position 
or it keeps its nuclear weapons capability in complete readiness. Either way India will 
have to perform a delicate balancing act."142 
 Although Pakistan did not pose any immediate threat to India in itself, its 
close collaboration with China and West Asia in the nuclear development area and 
with the United States for its conventional military needs, Pakistan did create a direct 
security threat to India.143  
The Soviet presence in Afghanistan was responsible for the revival of the US 
interest in South Asia. Pakistan had been taken as an ally by the US to deal with any 
Soviet expansionist design in the region. The US decision to arm Pakistan has been a 
part of the strategy. Although Nuclear Weapons in the hands of India or Pakistan were 
not likely to be viewed as a direct strategic threat to the United States, the United 
States has always strongly opposed it because "as the USA held the view that as 
nuclear weapons proliferate, more would be the threat of a holocaust.144  
As a result of the power politics in the South Asian region, it seemed as if the 
USA needed Pakistan more than Pakistan needing the USA. India's nuclear policy 
under Mrs. Gandhi in the 80's was determined by a variety of factors which may be 
considered in terms of geopolitics, geostrategic, defence and development. A number 
of factors like the Chinese help to Pakistan, US-China strategic link up, constant 
problems in Sino-Indian relationship had a profound impact on Indira Gandhi's 
thinking and this helped to remould the nuclear policy of India which was previously 
single track to make it more attuned to the realities of the situation. Moreover Indira 
141  Must India have the bomb, World Focus, New Delhi. June 1981 (Special issue). 
142  U.S. Bajpai, (ed.) India's Security: The Politico Strategic Environment, New Delhi: Lancers 
Publishers, 1982. 
143  Shrikant Paranjape, US Non-Proliferation Policy in Action. New Delhi: South Asia Sterling 
Publishers Pvt. Ltd. 1987, p. 28. 
144  Anti-Nuclear Noises, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol XX, No.42, October 19, 1985, p.1767. 
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Gandhi, the politician was fed on propaganda against imperialism, her deep rooted 
commitment to decolonisation .and her resentment over the fact that even after years 
of independence the third world was still dependent on the developed world. She was 
of the firm view that India's self-reliance and development were possible if nuclear 
technology could be used as a catalyst for social and economic development. As far as 
India's defence was concerned, she was fully aware of the threat perception that 
prevailed in the region and therefore she adopted a dual track policy that entailed 
keeping the nuclear option open in sharp contrast to her predecessor Moraji Desai 
who had openly declared his opposition to the nuclear option. This was a marked 
departure from India's much touted single track policy of sticking exclusively to the 
peaceful application of nuclear technology. This kind of a decision was totally hers. 
Indira Gandhi was a politician who was single minded in her determination, 
even though she was dubbed ruthless, dictatorial and arrogant. The determination with 
which she pushed the Pokhran nuclear test in the face of criticism from all the major 
powers of the world earned her kudos at home. Her strong belief was that the western 
powers would not allow India to emerge as a major play i.e. nuclear field. During the 
time of the PNE in 1974, Indira had the massive mandate of 1971 which had firmly 
ensconced her position in the party and the government. Her strategy was to show the 
world powers that India could go in for a nuclear explosion and also term it peaceful. 
At the same time she wanted to reap rich dividends at home by showing her political 
opposition that she meant business and she was capable of following a strong foreign 
policy and that she would not buckle down the pressure of the western powers, Her 
first step to offset such threats was forging closer defence and strategic ties with the 
Soviet Union. Soviet Union provided military hardware and weapons for India's 
defence production and supplied heavy water for nuclear power reactors. The 
increasing military cooperation between India and Soviet Union caused severe 
consternation in the American. thinking that India was heavily pro-Soviet and diluting 
its non-aligned policy but India's own security considerations as well as the US 
military assistance to Pakistan left India with no option.145  
Whatever may be the criterion to evaluate Indira's nuclear policy, the sole 
factor governing Indira Gandhi's nuclear policy was her firm belief that the real 
145  Mrs. Indira Gandhi's statements on Foreign Policy January-March, 1982, New Delhi. External 
Publicity Division, New Delhi, Ministry of External Affairs, Govt. of India. 
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strength of India lay in if superior military and technological position and power. 
Though she was firmly opposed to the arms race and stockpiling of arms she was 
firmly opposed to the policy of nuclear hegemony followed by the nuclear haves who 
wanted to dominate over the nuclear have not’s. In one of her major speeches in the 
eighties when she took over as chairperson of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1983 
from Fidel Castro of Cuba she said very firmly "our plan for a better life for each of 
our peoples depends on world peace and the reversal of the arms race. Only general 
and complete disarmament can provide credible security. Negotiations confined to a 
closed circle of nuclear weapons powers have made little progress. We are non-
nuclear states, who want nuclear energy used only for peace. But we too have a right 
to live and be heard.146 The basic emphasis of her nuclear policy was to develop 
nuclear energy but at the same time keep in mind. India's security considerations but 
deep inside she firmly believed that India should have a nuclear status. 
That was very much a part of her psyche and it was deeply ingrained in her. 
For she essentially believed that so long nuclear weapons imbalance continued, it 
would be difficult to put a stop to nuclear proliferation. This was reflected in her 
speech which she delivered at the UN in New York on the 14th October, 1968. She 
stated "the problems of insecurity cannot be solved by imposing arbitrary restrictions 
on those who do not possess nuclear weapons, without any corresponding steps to 
deal with the basic problem of limiting the stockpiles in the hands of a few powers. 
How can the urge to acquire nuclear status be controlled so long as this imbalance 
persists.(IBID).From the above statement one can safely conclude that heart of hearts 
Indira Gandhi always had a desire that India interests from the point of view of 
security. It was she who was instrumental in India should go nuclear. 
It will not be an overstatement if we say that Indira Gandhi was the real 
architect of India's nuclear programme even though her father Jawaharlal Nehru laid 
the foundation, Mrs Gandhi made the nuclear programme more geared and tuned to 
suit her adopting an aggressive posture on the nuclear front or in other wards making 
India join the exclusive club of a few nations. No wonder the reactions which we got 
to the Pokhran explosion were really strident and at times it bordered on the 
ridiculous: The then Secretary of State of the US Henry Kissinger described it as a 
catastrophe and an incentive to many countries emulating India's example. A US 
146  Indira Gandhi, On peoples and Problems, London: Hodder and Starghton, 1982.  
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Congressman Long described it as a crime committed by India.147  
Indira Gandhi found no plausible reasons in the condemnation by Western 
powers particularly American's criticism of the nuclear policy adopted and pursued by 
India because India was very much in favour of complete nuclear disarmament and 
India's stand in this regard had been very consistent. At the committee on 
disarmament in Geneva held in 1983, India "consistently tried to keep the focus of 
negotiations on the most urgent measures in the field of nuclear disarmament, through 
active involvement in the work of adhoc working groups on the prevention of nuclear 
war and nuclear disarmament. It has been the constant endeavour of India to ensure 
that the Committee on Disarmament does not detract from the most crucial issues 
before it, namely, prevention of nuclear war and the cessation and removal of nuclear 
arms race.148    
Also at the first committee of the UN General Assembly's 38th session, India 
again tabled a resolution on the convention on prohibition of the use of nuclear 
weapons. The purpose behind this exercise was to reaffirm the importance of these 
immediate measures, the adoption of which would considerably minimise the threat of 
a nuclear war." Out of the sixty two resolutions, India co-sponsored ten and voted in 
favour of forty three, while on seventeen other resolutions it abstained and exercised 
negative vote, on two other resolution which in India's view were either of peripheral 
or of dilatory nature. At the 27th regular session of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency' held in Vienna in 1983, Raja Ramanna, leader of the Indian delegation 
supported major resolutions adopted by the conference bringing South Africa's 
nuclear establishment under IAEA inspection.(IBID). India's dual track policy of 
pursuing the nuclear programme for peaceful uses and simultaneously retaining the 
right to keep it's nuclear option open, was essentially rooted in situational 
compulsions. Indira Gandhi totally rejected the idea of the giving up the nuclear 
option, Indira Gandhi firmly believed that in a global environment of the kind that 
prevailed, India should take a stand which is in no way be something termed as a 
compromise with its sovereignty and autonomy-India's policy vigorously championed 
by Indira Gandhi was certainly an eyesore to the west and as a result of which it 
stepped up its pressure for acceptance of IAEA safeguards in return for fuel for the 
147  Nair Baldev Raj, American Geopolitics and India. New Delhi: Manohar Publication, 1976, p. 
158. 
148  Annual Report, Ministry of External Affairs, Government, of India, 1983-84 pp.-37 -38. 
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Tarapur plant. India rejected the offer for it went against her sovereignty and national 
pride. 
Indira Gandhi's bitter experience on the nuclear fuel issue exhorted her to 
make all possible endeavours to attain self-reliance in the nuclear energy field without 
compromising with India's known stand in relation to safeguards. She was 
instrumental in encouraging research and development in the field so that there is 
great scientific progress. In the Research and Development sector which comes under 
the BARC, the construction of the thermal research reactor (Dhruva) was undertaken 
which has already been commissioned. Under the I&EM sector, the heavy water 
plants were set up at Baroda, Tuticorin, Kota and Talcher. Other heavy water plants 
were set up at Baroda, Tuticorin, Kota and Talcher, Thar (Maharashtra) and 
Manuguru (Andhra Pradesh).149 The Thal Heavy Water project is based on mono 
thermal process. The financial sanction for the project was given in 1982 at the cost of 
Rs.187.65 crores. It has the capacity of 110 MT per annum. Besides, the work of 
mining and processing of uranium is carried out by Uranium Corporation of India 
limited. In the both plan it under took at Bhatia, Narwa (IBID).  She followed the dual 
track policy because in her opinion this strategy was most suitable for a country like 
India. Keeping in view the political situation in the region Indira Gandhi's policy was 
most needed because Pakistan was being actively supported by China and the United 
States as has already been outlined in the beginning of the Chapter. 
If India out rightly declared herself a nuclear weapon state, she would have 
risked the sanctions of the international community. Our country would have been 
castigated but at the same time keeping in view India's position vis-a-vis Pakistan, 
Indira Gandhi felt that if she foreclosed the nuclear option, Pakistan would be 
emboldened. Therefore, the dual track policy to keep Pakistan at bay and at the same 
time conveying a message to the international community that India would not take 
nuclear hegemony lying down and there should be complete disarmament. 
Towards the end of her Prime Ministership in a statement in Parliament on 
22nd August 1984 she said the government "did not think it necessary to revise the 
nuclear policy because of Pakistan acquiring the bomb. China too had the nuclear 
149  Performance Budget Deptt. of Atomic Energy, Government of India, 1985. 
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weapon. Pakistan acquiring nuclear weapon did not make any difference.150  
Indo-Pak nuclear relations worsened as a result of an American press report 
that Mrs Gandhi was urged by her military advisors to launch a pre-emptive strike 
against Pakistan's installations at Kahuta and the plan was abandoned due to the fear 
of counter attack by Pakistan. In mid-October 1984, a few days before her 
assassination Mrs Gandhi struck a slightly different note while addressing a group of 
Army commanders said that Pakistan's nuclear propgramme was "a qualitative new 
phenomenon in our security environment which must add a new dimension to India's 
defence planning ( Indian Express, New Delhi, 15th October, 1984). Thus, Indira 
Gandhi played a pivotal role in giving India's nuclear policy a new dimension and 
thrust. Her stress on 'scientific development in the field of nuclear energy and high 
emphasis on research and development in the field of science and technology all 
contributed to a sound nuclear infrastructure. Her accent on all these aspects made 
India capable of designing and making nuclear reactors. Therefore, Indira's dual track 
policy of championing disarmament at international fora and at the same lime not 
giving up the nuclear option and keeping open projected her as a leader who would 
not buckle down under pressure of the western power and who would not tolerate 
nuclear hegemony of the west in any manner. Even though the pro-bomb lobby made 
noises during her regime too that India should declare herself a nuclear weapon state, 
Indira Gandhi very shrewdly followed the dual track policy. 
The Rajiv Gandhi Era 
As a young leader of India, Rajiv Gandhi, though a fresh entrant to politics 
had a penchant for fast scientific and economic modernization of India. He articulated 
the role of science and technology as a driving force in India's modernization and 
economic development. He lent succour to the scientific R&D to help build sound 
scientific and technological infrastructure. His commitment to the peaceful 
application of nuclear technology is evident from encouraging the setting up of new 
nuclear power reactors in the country and he earmarked liberal funds for the nuclear 
energy development programmes. 
Rajiv Gandhi succeeded his mother Indira Gandhi as the Prime Minister of 
India in the wake of Mrs Gandhi's assassination on the 31st of October 1984. Rajiv 
150  Lok Sabha Debates, August 22, 1984, Col. 112 . 
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was a young and dynamic leader with a 101 of enthusiasm 10 brings about change in 
the Country. He included a 101 of young elements into the party and government, 
people who were achievers in their own fields. He had a great fascination for science 
and technology and looks a lot of interest in research and development. He finally 
believed that the key to India's development lay in rapid development of science and 
therefore he helped build up a sound and strong technological infrastructure. He was 
highly committed to peaceful application of nuclear technology and he gave liberal 
funds for the selling up of nuclear power reactors and for the nuclear energy 
development programme. India was a force to reckon with internationally. He wanted 
to make India's presence powerfully fell in the comity of nations. He adopted his own 
strategy or approach to deal with the issues of nuclear non-proliferation, global 
disarmament and integrative economic world order in close Cooperation with the 
super-powers. Though the Delhi Declaration of November 1986, during the visit of 
Soviet President Gorbachev both the leaders reaffirmed that “non-violence should be 
the basis of community life”. They stressed that the real threat to the entire mankind 
was the nuclear arms race. Rajiv Gandhi said in no uncertain terms that "there is only 
one answer to the menace of nuclear weapons and that is to dismantle all nuclear 
weapons, terminating the nuclear arms race on earth and preventing a nuclear arms 
race in space”.151 
On the important nuclear issue, the media, Parliament and political parties 
continued to debate and deliberate at length during the period when Rajiv Gandhi was 
the Prime Minister. He himself articulated his government policies through his 
pronouncements in the media and the Union Parliament while responding to repeated 
queries from members of his own party as well as the opposition. Even though Rajiv 
Gandhi's stand on the nuclear issue did not reflect any radical change in comparison to 
Indira Gandhi, but it must be taken note of that his tilt towards the west because of his 
modem approach was not at the cost of national interests. The government of the day 
kept on responding to repeated concerns that were voiced in the media and Parliament 
that Pakistan was inching closer and closer to a nuclear device On 29th Jan. 1985, in 
an interview with CBS of the US at the time of the six Nation Appeal on Nuclear 
Disarmament, Mr Gandhi said "yes we guarantee that we won't use nuclear capability 
in a regional conflict, because we have not transformed that capability into weapons. 
151  Annual Report, Ministry of External Affairs, Govt. of India, 1987-88. 
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We are worried that Pakistan is going ahead in developing nuclear weapons in another 
interview with reporters of India Today on 31st June 1985, Mr Gandhi said. But we 
are committed not to make a nuclear bomb and we are not going to do it.152 
During the first session of Parliament in 1985, members expressed their 
concern over Pakistan's nuclear capability. Members of the Rajya Sabha brought to 
the notice of the government the reports about Pakistan being capable of exploding a 
nuclear bomb. The Minister of External Affairs Mr Baliram Bhagat said that the 
government was monitoring with utmost vigil all the developments.153 Replying to 
questions on Pak's nuclear capability put to the PM in the Lok Sabha, the Minister of 
State for Science and Technology, Shivraj Patil said that Pakistan was one of the 
several countries which had claimed to have acquired nuclear capability to produce 
enriched uranium which could in principle produce nuclear weapon, if it so desired. 
The Bhabha Atomic Research Centre continued to keep abreast of all relevant 
developments in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The government would continue 
to maintain utmost vigil and would take all necessary measures to safeguard the 
country's interests.154 
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi criticised the United States for failing to check 
Pak's nuclear capability before his visit to the United States. In an interview to 
Financial Times on April 4, 1985, Mr Gandhi said I think, (the Americans) must make 
their policy with regard to Pak very clear, rare they are going to let Pak make a 
nuclear bomb every indication is that they are. He further said "Pakistan is very close 
to one if they have not got one and nothing is being done to stop it. And once, it is 
there it will be a fait accompli. We will be landed with a bomb on the sub-
continent."155   
On 3rd May 1985, Mr Gandhi said in the Rajya Sabha that induction of 
sophisticated weapons into Pakistan would pose a grave security threat to India which 
would be compelled to divert its resources for defence. However, he made it clear that 
there would be no compromise with India's security. He expressed his displeasure at 
the waiving of the Symington amendment by USA which amounted to an indirect 
152  Ram Susan, Pakistan Bomb: Confused Indian Response, Mainstream, 15th Jan., 1986. p.6. 
153  Rajya Sabha Debates. March 14, 1985 CoI.55-56. 
154  Lok Sabha Debates, March 27 1985, Col 63-64. 
155  Elliot John, "We have got five years," Financial Times, April 1985. 
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help in Pakistan's nuclear programme.156 The growing clandestine activities of 
Pakistan created an alarm in India. Rajiv Gandhi speaking at an AICC meeting on 4 
May 1985 said that "we feel that they are developing a nuclear weapon. We are 
looking into various aspects of this question to see /what action we should take. We 
are not convinced that all powers which can do so are trying to stop them.157 
During his Moscow visit, Mr Gandhi said on May 22, 1985 "we are extremely 
worried about Pakistan's nuclear programme. We feel that they are very close to 
developing a nuclear weapon. It did come up in our discussion and this is also being 
debated in India. We are especially worried about the programme because we feel that 
the US could do more to stop developing a nuclear weapon and they are not doing 
so.158 
Expressing concern over the growing evidence on Pakistan's nuclear 
programme the BJP demanded that India must make the bomb. The National 
executive of the BJP which concluded its three day meeting at Bhopal on July 21, 
1985 adopted a resolution calling upon the government to take immediate steps to 
develop "our own nuclear bomb" in view of the reports that "the threat, of Pakistan's 
nuclear bombs is real. It further expressed concern that Pakistan was continuing to 
proceed with its programme of making a nuclear bomb. The BJP on its part felt it 
necessary to declare that it could not even conceive the idea of countering Pakistan's 
threat by willy nilly pushing India into the umbrella of any super power. The 
resolution stated that the diplomatic initiatives taken by the government to deter 
Pakistan from going nuclear appeared to have completely failed.  The BJP had no 
doubt that, inspite of Pak's protestations, the acquisition of such nuclear weapons 
could only be intended to intimidate India and pose a serious threat to its security and 
integrity. The only alternative as perceived by the BJP was to develop our Own 
nuclear bomb.159 
 On 25th July 1985, responding to questions in Parliament the PM replied that 
India was preparing to meet the nuclear threat from Pakistan."160                                                                                                                                                     
Responding to a group of reporters AEC Chairman Raja Ramanna declared that India 
156   Lok Sabha Debates. May 3, 1985. 
157  Times of India. New Delhi, 5th May, 1985 
158  Times of India, New Delhi, 5th May, 1985. 
159  Time of India, New Delhi. July 22, 1985. 
160  Lok Sabha Debates, July 25, 1985 Col. 1·  
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could develop "a suitable nuclear weapons delivery system and that the country's 
growing nuclear self-sufficiency meant that” if anyone tried to twist our hands we  
could flex our muscles too.161 
Addressing the National Defence College, Mr Gandhi on October 9, 1985, 
said a nuclear weapon was a very dangerous tool in the hands of countries where 
violent changes occurred and where there was no established system of command and 
control. He said India had firm evidence that Pak's nuclear bomb was being financed 
not solely by that country but other nations as well. Would this mean that the bomb 
would be made available to these countries also? He asked. The impact of a Pakistan 
bomb on South Asian security as well as global balance had to be considered.162 He 
further said that "Pakistan must desist from making such a weapon. If they do we can 
build, defend and go on further down the road. He said India had the capability of 
manufacturing a nuclear bomb 11 years ago but had refrained from going ahead. "We 
have demonstrated to the world that we have the will not to proliferate. Replying to 
questions at a press conference on October 11, 1985 he said that Pak was fairly 
advanced in its nuclear programme. The PM made it clear, there was no question of 
New Delhi or other cities being flattened. However, he said that there are numerous 
measures apart from making nuclear weapons to protect India's security. On the 
famous Jack Anderson's report about India's hydrogen bomb he said "our entire 
nuclear programme is in civilian area. There is no military nuclear programme. It is 
open to questions in Parliament, it is open to discussion in the press. Basically it is 
visible to everyone.163 
About NPT, he said India would not sign it as it was discriminatory.164 
Opposition members like A.B. Vajpayee wanted India to go nuclear. The Janata Party 
at its annual convention passed a resolution stating that "being a sovereign nation 
India has. the right to exercise its nuclear option in full freedom. Rajiv Gandhi said "I 
am not closing the option.165  During his visit to the USA in October 1987, Rajiv 
Gandhi made it very clear to the President of USA that India was not interested in an 
arms race and that India's but at the same time he added that India would not tolerate 
any presence of nuclear weapons in the neighbourhood. He however was quick to say 
161  Statesman Weekly, 26th July 1985. 
162  Selected speeches of Rajiv Gandhi, External Publicity Division, No. 107, pp. 54-55. 
163  Ibid., pp. 441·42. 
164  Times of India, New Delhi, 12th October 1985. 
165   Selected speeches of Rajiv Gandhi, n. 162, p. 46 
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that "India had no intention of producing nuclear weapons unless constrained to do 
so".166 This statement was a clear indication that he was making an oblique reference 
to Pakistan which was being actively supported by the USA. The Indian Prime 
Minister reminded the President that Pakistan had been using American weapons in 
the past in reply to an assurance by the President that Pakistan would not use 
American weapons against India. The P.M. rejected outright the proposal to make 
South Asia a nuclear free zone and the United States request to India to accede to the 
NPT. Rajiv Gandhi emphatically stated he was fully opposed to the Pakistani proposal 
of a nuclear weapon free zone mooted at the UN in 1986. Moreover, he also opposed 
the NPT saying that it was highly discriminatory. He however voiced his support to 
six nations five continent initiative held in Stockholm in 1988. India strongly 
supported the idea of comprehensive test ban treaty including the establishment of an 
integrated multilateral verification system within the UN. Rajiv Gandhi was a great 
champion of disarmament is amply proved when he put forward an Action Plan for a 
nuclear weapon free and non-violent world order at the third special session of the 
General Assembly on disarmament on the 9th of June 1988 where he said "we are 
approaching the close of the twentieth century. It has been the most blood stained 
century in history. Fifty eight million people perished in two World Wars. Forty 
million might have died in other conflicts. In the last nine decades, the ravenous 
machines of war have devoured nearly one hundred million people. The appetite of 
these monstrous machines grows on what they feed Nuclear War will not mean the 
death of a hundred million people or even a thousand million. It will mean the 
extinction of four thousand million, the end of life as we know on our planet Earth. 
We come to the United Nations to seek your support. We seek your support to put a 
stop to this madness. It is a dangerous delusion to believe that nuclear weapons have 
brought us peace. It is true that in the past four decades, parts of the world have 
experienced as absence of war. But a mere absence of war is not a durable peace. The 
balance of nuclear terror rests on the retention of nuclear armouries. There can be no 
ironclad guarantee against the use of weapons of mass destruction. They have been 
used in the past. They could be used in the future. And in this nuclear age, the insane 
logic of mutually assured destruction will ensure that nothing survives, that none lives 
to tell the tale, that there is no one left to understand what went wrong and why. Peace 
166  The Observer (London), 1 March 1987.  
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which rests on the search for a parity of power is a precarious peace. If we can 
understand what went wrong with such attempts in the past, we may be able to escape 
the catastrophe presaged by doctrines of nuclear deterrence. There is a further 
problem with deterrence. The doctrine is based on the assumption that international 
relations are frozen on a permanently hostile basis. Deterrence needs energy, even if 
one has to be invented. Nuclear deterrence is the ultimate expression of the 
philosophy of terrorism holding humanity hostage to the presumed security needs of a 
few. The past few years have seen the emergence of a new danger: the extension of 
the nuclear arms race into outer space. The ambition of creating impenetrable defence 
against that has not been penetrated by superior weapons, nor any weapon for which 
superior nuclear weapons has merely escalated the arms race and complicated the 
process of disarmament. This has happened inspite of the grave doubts expressed by 
leading scientists about its very feasibility. Even the attempt to build a partial shield 
against nuclear missiles increases the risk of nuclear war. History shows that there is 
no shield has not been found. Societies get caught in a multiple helix of escalation in 
chasing this Chimera, expending vast resources for illusory security while incurring 
the risk of certain extinction. When the General Assembly met here last in Special 
Session to consider questions of disarmament, the outlook was grim. The new cold 
war had been revived with full force. A new programme of nuclear armament had 
been set in motion. 
As a result, during the years that followed, fear and suspicion cast a long 
shadow over all disarmament negotiations. Humankind was approaching the precipice 
of nuclear disaster. Today there is a new hope for survival and for peace. There is a 
perceptible movement away from the precipice. Dialogue has been resumed. Trust is 
in the air. How has this Transforming occurred? We pay tribute to the sagacity of the 
American and soviet leaderships. They have seen the folly of nuclear escalation. They 
have started tracing the outlines of a pattern of disarmament. At the same time, we 
must recognise the role of countless enlightened men and women all over the world, 
citizens of the non-nuclear weapons States as much as of the weapons states. With 
courage, dedication and perseverance they kept the candle burning in the enveloping 
darkness. The Six Nation initiative voiced the hopes and aspirations of these many 
millions. At a time, when regions between two major nuclear weapons states dipped 
to their nadir, the Six Nation Argentina’, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and 
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Tanzania refocused world attention on the imperative of nuclear disarmament. The 
appeal of May 1984, issued by Indira Gandhi, 010 Palme and their colleagues struck a 
responsive chord. Negotiations stalled for years began inching forward. The process 
begun in Geneva has led to Reykjavik, Washington and Moscow.167 
Rajiv Gandhi submitted an Action Plan to the Special Session on is armament 
of the United Nations General Assembly. The Plan called upon the international 
community to negotiate a binding commitment to general and complete disarmament. 
This requires a systematic monitoring of such developments an assessment of their 
implications for international security and widespread dissemination of information 
obtained. By the closing years of the century, there must be a single integrated 
multilateral verification system to ensure that no new nuclear weapons are produced 
anywhere in the world. Such a system would also help in verifying compliance with 
the collateral and other disarmament measures envisaged in the Action Plan. It would 
serve as an early warning system to guard against violations of solemn international 
treaties and conventions. The Plan for radical and comprehensive disarmament must 
be pursued along with efforts to create a new system of comprehensive global 
security. The components of such a system must be mutually supportive to 
participation in it must be universal.168  
It must be without reservation. The heart of the Action Plan was the 
elimination of all nuclear weapons in three stages over the next twenty two years, 
beginning now. Rajiv Gandhi proposed this Action Plan to the United Nations as a 
programme to be launched at once. While nuclear disarmament constitutes the 
centrepiece of each stage of the Plan, this was buttressed by collateral and other 
measures to further the process of disarmament. Proposals have been made banning 
other weapons of mass destruction. Steps were suggested for precluding the 
development of new weapons system based on emerging technologies. The Action 
Plan suggested ways through which conventional weapons should be reduced to a 
minimum possible level only for defensive purposes. The Action Plan also outlined 
ideas for the smooth conduct of international relations in a world free of nuclear 
weapons. 
167  Excerpts from the speech delivered by Rajiv Gandhi on 9th June 1988 at the special session on 
disarmament, UN General Assembly, Central Govt. Publications, New Delhi, 1988. 
168  Summary of Action Plan submitted by UN General  Assembly, Special conference on 
Disarmament held on 9th June 88, Central Govt. Publication, Delhi. 
69 
 
                                                          
Chapter 2 
The salient features of the Action Plans were : 
First, there should be a binding commitment by all nations to eliminating 
nuclear weapons in stages by the year 2010 at the latest. Second, all nuclear weapon 
States must participate in the process of nuclear disarmament. All other countries 
must also be part of the process. Third, to demonstrate good faith and build the 
required confidence, there must be tangible progress at each stage towards the 
common goal. Fourth, changes are required in doctrines, policies aid institutions to 
sustain a world free of nuclear weapons. Negotiation should be undertaken to 
establish a comprehensive global security system under the aegis of the UN.  
Rajiv Gandhi put forward the Action Plan for a Nuclear Weapon-Free and 
Non-Violent World Order at the third special session of the General Assembly on 
disarmament in June 1988. The Action Plan contained "a package of measures that 
structurally link the entire range of issues presently on the world disarmament 
agenda", calling upon the international community "to negotiate a binding 
commitment in general and complete disarmament-a commitment which should be 
total and without reservation".169 It aimed at achieving the objective of nuclear 
weapon free world by the year 2010. 
The important feature of the Action Plan contained the "binding commitment" 
by all nations to eliminate nuclear weapons not merely confined to the super powers, 
but also involving nuclear threshold states to assume the corresponding obligation. 
India specifically proposed that negotiations must commence immediately for a new 
treaty to replace the NPT which lapses in early 1995. The new treaty should give legal 
effect to the binding commitment by the entire industrial community to eliminate all 
nuclear weapons by the year 2010.170 In the group of non-aligned nations also, India 
maintained that there was an urgent necessity for cessation of nuclear arms race and 
for the comprehensive test ban treaty. Indian minister of state for external affairs, K. 
Natwar Singh, while addressing the conference on disarmament, highlighted "India's 
commitment and contribution to the multilateral disarmament process".171 At the UN 
conference on disarmament and development held in New York in August-September 
1987, India was unanimously elected chairman of the conference. There too, India 
169  Annual Report 1988-89, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, p. 52. 
170  Ibid., pp. 52-53. 
171  Ibid., p..53. 
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continued to maintain that in the nuclear age, "the search for unilateral security 
through nuclear deterrence must be replaced by a search for global security through 
nuclear disarmament".172 
Thus, in the Rajiv Gandhi regime, the global approach to Action Plan 
constituted the cornerstone of India's nuclear policy. This may be summarized as 
under: 
(i) global disarmament by all nations, 
(ii) support to peaceful uses of nuclear energy;  
(iii) opposition to the militarization of outer space; 
(iv) establishment of an integrated multilateral verification system within the UN; 
(v) opposition to selective nuclear weapon free zones; and  
(vi) opposition to the discriminatory NPT regime. 
Though India's nuclear policy during the Rajiv Gandhi's era did not depart 
from the "dual track" policy adopted by Indira Gandhi, the major contribution of 
Rajiv Gandhi lay in the successful conclusion of agreement in December 1988 
between India and Pakistan pledging not to attack each other's nuclear facilities. This 
has laid down a strong foundation for any future bilateral non-proliferation 
arrangements in the region, depending upon the nature, form and content of political 
rapport between the leaderships in India and Pakistan. As reiterated in our alternative 
paradigm that the people's psychology will remain a crucial factor in creating positive 
conditions to defuse tensions on the nuclear issue. If judged in the context of current 
global scenario, Rajiv Gandhi's conception of the Action Plan is becoming more 
relevant today when nuclear threats from regional states as well as, ethnic and 
religious conflicts are becoming deeper, thus posing a real threat to peace and stability 
in the world. His idea of non-violent free world order can be a good starting point for 
managing increasing violence at different levels, but all noble and pious ideas, known 
to mankind have remained unfructified. Because so long as governing structures and 
policies remain based on inequity, oppression and rampant corruption, this will breed 
violence which in bound to make our planet more violent and volcanic. Nevertheless, 
the stark reality is that any good initiative originating from poor developing nations, 
172  Annual Report 1987-88, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, p.52. 
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will hardly fructify. The power syndrome will continue to inform the world order or 
world disorder. Brzezinski in this regard pleads for a greater US role in determining 
the international relations. He writes: "The new world order thus depends very much 
on the United States on the choices if marked the leadership it seeks to exercise.173 
Rajiv Gandhi followed a policy which was roughly similar to Mrs Gandhi's 
policy. However, Rajiv Gandhi due to his western education and fairly liberal outlook 
was not against the West. He firmly believed in imbibing from the west their 
technological progress, scientific known how and their sense of discipline which 
would take a long way in making India one of most prosperous nations of the world. 
Rajiv Gandhi believed in opening up new channels with the west and at same time he 
ensured that India's special relationship with the USSR was not affected. This policy 
won acclaim both at home and abroad. Rajiv Gandhi believed in adopting a high 
profile foreign policy like the western leaders because he believed in making foreign 
policy an instrument through which he would project a strong image of India abroad 
and at home he wanted to  show people that at the global level, India was emerging as 
a strong player. Thus, he pushed foreign policy into top gear so as to convey a clear 
cut message to the people back home that a strong India could integrate with the 
world and it would accrue immense benefits both political as well as economic to the 
country. 
V P Singh Government 
In the wake of the 1989 election a government leaded by VP Singh came into 
being. It was a coalition government which had several constituents in it consisting of 
the Janta Dal, TDP, AGP, DMK, and Congress (s) etc. What was typical about this 
government was the fact that it enjoyed outside support from the BJP and the left 
front. However, this government of VP Singh did not bring about any major change or 
reversal on the nuclear front. It continued to stress that the nuclear option would 
remain open. Perhaps the BJP which had championed the case of India' going nuclear 
openly did not have any leverage due to nature of the government which depended on 
two crutches of support. The BJP which had recorded a spectacular victory by 
winning a record number of seats did not have a government of its own agenda on a 
variety of issues including the nuclear issue. Following the fall of the V.P. Singh 
173  Zbigniew Brzezinski, Order Disorder and U.S. Leadership”, The Washington Quarterly, Spring 
1992, p.5. 
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government the Chandrasekhar government was far short lived to effect any kind of 
diametric change in the nuclear issue. It was basically a continuation that of the past 
option would remain open. These two regimes were too lack lustre with regard to 
developments on the nuclear front because they were always fighting for their 
political survival. Chandra Shekhar government came in power. he resigned his post 
of prime minister in1991.His government did not make any  development in nuclear 
field. 
Era of coalitions 
P.V. Narasimha Rao Period 
P.V. Narasimha Rao was one of the most able administrators who brought 
major economic reforms. He is also known as the Father of Indian Economic 
Reforms. He dismantled the License Raj and reversed the socialist policies of Rajiv 
Gandhi’s government.  
In 1991 with the Indian government in very deep financial troubles and the 
country’s gold holding mortgaged to the international monetary fund [IMF]was 
approached for bringing loan, which could have been vetoed by the US. By the time 
Narasimha Rao assumed power later that year, the government was aware that it was 
putting the nuclear programme in real danger by seeking IMF credit.174 
The domestic political scenario underwent a great change in 1991 when Rajiv 
Gandhi was assassinated at Sriperambadur at the height of electioneering. The 
Congress gained quite a few seats in view of the sympathy wave that was generated 
due to his tragic death. Post-election, Congress set about the task of electing a new 
leader to head the nation. Even though the power struggle within the Congress was 
intense, the mantle was donned by P.V. Narashimha Rao an erudite, scholarly senior 
statesman who had a mix of having been a popular leader because he had been the 
Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh and had always won elections to the Lok Sabha like 
some of his peers in the Congress who were adapt at backroom dealings minus any 
mass base. His fierce loyalty to the Gandhi family, statures and seniority in the party 
paid off. From the point of view of foreign policy it was a positive development 
because he had conducted himself commendably during the stewardship of the 
External Affairs Ministry under two Prime Ministers. Prime Minister Rao, won 
174  Bharat Karnad, n. 38, p. 368. 
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accolades and all round praise from the world community of leaders for his maturity, 
brilliance, accommodation and sparks of vision during his successful visits to world 
capitals like Washington, Moscow, London, Tokyo etc. However on the domestic 
turf, he was considered a person whose hall-mark was indecisiveness so much so that 
his senior party and government colleagues resented his indecisiveness but his control 
over the party and government was complete. As a result, he had complete 
manoeuvrability both on the internal and external fronts. However, when he assumed 
office, the country's economy was in a doldrums, foreign exchange reserves were low, 
inflationary tendencies were on the rise. To add fuel to the fire, India was facing the 
additional problem of losing a long, trusted and reliable partner in the security and 
defence arena, the USSR. For India, the changes in the USSR hold special 
significance in the context of our long and enduring relations with the Soviet 
Union.175 
As a result India was subjected to immense pressure by the USA to cap its 
missile programme. Moreover, the USA also mounted pressure on India when it 
sought to blacklist the Indian Space Research Organisation and asking the Russians to 
terminate the contract for the supply of cryogenic rocket engine to India. This created 
uproar in the Indian Parliament and the strong arm tactics of USA came in for all 
Round criticism. During this period, the Parliament was fairly active on the nuclear 
issue. The Rao government  had to respond repeatedly to queries by members on a 
variety of matters related to nuclear issue like Russia Support to Pakistan, the Chinese 
behaviour following accession to NPT, the repeated statements of the USA 
particularly on the missiles issue and of course the NPT extension issue and the 
CTBT. Thus Discussion in parliament on the nuclear issue was wide and far ranging. 
In response to  a question about the support  that the USSR extended to Pakistan on a 
nuclear free zone at the UN, the minister of state for External Affairs Ediordo Falereo 
replied "this year, the USSR  changed its vote from abstention to positive on a 
resolution on South Asia as nuclear-Weapon Free zone, sponsored by Pakistan. 
During his visit to the USSR recently, External Affairs Minister expressed 
disappointment that the USSR chose to change its traditional position on the proposal. 
The Soviet leaders attributed their change to the new disarmament priorities and 
175 Annual Report, Ministry of Defense, Government of India, 1991-92. 
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stated it had no bearing on Soviet friendship with India.176 
In response to another question which wanted to know China's conduct after 
signing the NPT and if the government intended bringing about any change in the 
nuclear policy, the Minister of State for External Affairs Shri R.L. Bhatia said 
"though China has recently become a signatory of the NPT, she appears to be 
continuing with her nuclear programme. China has conducted two underground 
nuclear tests so far in 1992-. China's stand that the countries with the largest nuclear 
arsenals should take the lead in halting the testing, production and deployment of 
nuclear weapons and in drastically reducing such weapons prior to the convening of a 
widely representative international conference on nuclear disarmament with the 
participation of all nuclear weapon states has not changed. He further added that 
"government pursues a long standing policy of utilising nuclear power for peaceful 
purposes only. India has consistently advocated a comprehensive ban of nuclear 
weapons. Government's consistent position has been to ca11 for the total elimination 
of all nuclear weapons in a framework which is global and non-discriminatory".177 On 
the missile front, there was speculation in the media that the US was pressurising 
India. This had its echo in Parliament when a pointed question was asked if the US 
had requested India to stop deployment of Prithvi missile and offered in lieu of that 
transfer of defence technology in certain areas. To that the Minister of State for 
External Affairs Shri Salman Khurseed said that there was no such thing in offing. He 
said a firm "no".178 
On 7 February, 1992, Pakistan's Foreign Minister Shahryar Khan stated that 
"Pakistan had the components to assemble one or more nuclear weapons.179 On the 
other hand, in the same year, there was pressure on India to accept and sign 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Hence, it was difficult for India, at that 
time, to go ahead with a comprehensive series of tests.180 In 1993, Mr Rao took an 
anti-nuclear weapons stance. He was interested m constraining India's nuclear option. 
This attitude of Rao generated a hostile reaction from the nuclear and defence science 
establishments, the BJP, and the small but vocal circle of strategic analysts.181 In 
176  Rajya Sabha Debate, December 2.1991. 
177  Rajya Sabha Debates, December 3,1992. 
178   Lok Sabha Debates, May 9, 1994.  
179  Menon, n. 21,  p.105. 
180  Ibid. 
181  Perkovich, n.27,  pp. 39-40. 
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1994, when CTBT negotiations were underway in the Commission on Disarmament 
in Geneva, the pressure on Indian government- from BARC increased to permit a 
nuclear test before this treaty sealed off the testing option."182  
The question of nuclear talks with Pakistan was raised again. A question was 
asked if Pakistan had offered to renounce nuclear weapons and what was the 
government's response. The questioner also wanted to know if any steps in this 
direction had been taken. The Minister of State for External Affairs Shri R.L. Bhatia 
said that a government proposed to Pakistan in one of the six Non-papers forwarded 
to Pakistan on January 24 1994, that as further demonstration of its commitment for 
reducing mistrust end enhancing confidence between the two countries, India would 
be willing to enter into an agreement according to which both countries shall 
undertake not to be the first to use or threaten to use its nuclear capability against each 
other. Pakistan's response conveyed on 19th February 1994 in the form of "Comments 
and counter proposals" was regrettably dismissive."183 
George Perkovich has mentioned that in 1994, Indian scientists, under the rule 
of Rao government, managed to conduct a test of an air deliverable nuclear device.' 
"While the United States was preaching arms control to resistant South Asian officials 
and Kalam was trying to invigorate support for lagging missile programme, DROO 
team joined with a handful of designated Air Force officers to conduct the first 
realistic drop of a nuclear weapon from a Mirage 2000 aircraft. The event occurred 
near Balasore in May 1994. A nuclear weapon minus the fissile core, was affixed to 
the aircraft and released filling a prescribed distance until triggering sensors released 
safety locks and detonated the high explosives package that compressed the dummy 
nuclear core m simulation of an actual nuclear-weapons detonation. After years of 
relying on a rudimentary capacity to deliver a retaliatory nuclear blow, India finally 
possessed what the Air Force could accept as an operational deterrent."184 
Concern was also expressed in the Parliament about Russian help to Pakistan 
in the acquisition of weaponry. It was asked if the government had taken up the matter 
with the Russian government and if the Russian government had responsded. The 
Minister for External Affairs Shri Pranab Mukherjee replied that "the government are 
182  Karnad n. 38, p 373.  
183   Lok Sabha Debates, May 29. 1995. 
184  Perokvich, n.27, p. 39. 
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aware of attempts by Pakistan to acquire weapons from Russia. However, the Russian 
government has recently again indicated that it has not permitted any arms sales to 
Pakistan. The Government of India's concerns in this regard have been brought to the 
attention of the Russian authorities at various levels. During his visit to India in 
December 1994, the Russian Prime Minister Chernwmyradin had stated publicly that 
Russia had neither sold nor did it to sell arms to Pakistan.185 
The Prelude and the Extention of NPT: One of the most important international 
events which had far reaching effects on India's position in the comity of nations and 
the security environment in the South Asian region in particular was the 1995 
conference which ought to extend the NPT indefinitely. What is to be noted in' this 
section is India's stand and what was the domestic opinion in the country in regard to 
this issue. For a proper understanding of India's stand where it was extended 
indefinitely it would be in the fitness of things to trace the genesis of this debate in a 
sketch as a prelude to this particular issue. The international debate on non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons gained significant momentum after the Chinese 
nuclear test of 1964. If one goes into the history of India's stand on the NPT, one can 
make out that prior to 1964, India had relied mostly on development of conventional 
weapons to tackle the Chinese might but after the nuclear test of 1964, there appeared 
a perceptible change in position. India insisted that there should be corresponding 
obligation by the existing nuclear powers, that security of non-nuclear states lay in 
nuclear disarmament and not just security guarantees.186 This was the guiding 
principle for India in all it negotiations related to the NPT. India's NPT diplomacy 
took shape in the end 1960's around a set of important considerations.187  The Rao 
government did not take the Indian parliament and people into its confidence when it 
acquiesced to the US proposal to hold a secret multilateral dialogue known as 5+2+2 
(the twelve permanent members of the Security Council, plus Japan, Germany, India, 
and Pakistan) on regional nuclear non-proliferation. The secret London talks, held in 
April 1994, caused much dismay and fear among opposition parties, and several 
sections of the Indian community regarded the underhand activities of the Rao 
government with suspicion. Rao, however, tried to dispel misgivings that India would 
compromise its vital defence· and security interests by yielding to US bullying tactics. 
185  Lok Sabha Debates. May 20, 1995. 
186  Ashok Kapur, n. 39, p. l20.   
187  Ibid 
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Needless to say, the real motivation behind the US pressure tactics was to 
prevent India from emerging as an autonomous centre of power and a self-reliant 
nation in the ambit of rocketry and missile technology because the United States 
believed India would then be among the few advanced nations capable of producing 
spin-off technologies, which would be much cheaper than theirs. An eminent Indian 
space scientist, working in satellite communications, observed: 'The US is afraid that 
once India attains capabilities to launch rockets or fire missiles, the technology will 
be: five to ten times cheaper than theirs.188 Another Indian space scientist revealed 
that India had had to defer the Prithvi missile programme eight years previously 
during the Rajiv Gandhi regime because of the US intent to applying sanctions against 
India.189 But these pressures did not prevent India from developing missile systems.  
So far as the restraint factor is concerned, the Indian scientific community was 
of the view; according to Pushpa M. Bhargava, a genetic scientist, that India had 
shown greater restraint than the United States in such matters.190 Also, Raja Ramanna, 
a former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, U. R. Rao, a former chairman 
of the ISRO, and M. G. K. Menon maintained that India should not yield to US 
bullying and bluster. 
During his visit to the United States in May 1994, Narsimha Rao conveyed in 
a message to President Clinton that the US approach to regional denuclearization was 
misplaced and therefore would not work. He stressed that there was a need to 
eliminate nuclear weapons universally and not locally. If the United States, he hinted, 
was interested in undertaking this task, India was ready to cooperate as it had been 
doing in the matter of banning nuclear tests and stopping the production of fissile 
material. Rao time and again stressed that international denuclearization was the only 
way to eliminate all weapons of mass destruction from the planet. He further added 
that every nation, large or small, rich or poor, being sovereign, possessed an inherent 
right and responsibility to its people to ensure their security. The nuclear policy of the 
Rao government broadly contained the following elements: 
1. getting rid of the world of weapons of mass destruction by creating a world 
order based on equity and non-discrimination; 
188  Times of India, 18 May, 1994.  
189  Ibid. 
190  Ibid. 
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2. boosting international consensus on banning nuclear-weapon testing;  
3. preventing the production of fissile materials for weapon purposes; 
4.  initiating positive and vigorous steps and efforts toward global 
denuclearization; 
5. doing away with the discriminatory character of the NPT; VI. opposing 
regional nuclear disarmament; 
6.  favouring the use of nuclear and missile technologies for peaceful and 
constructive purposes; and 
7. advocating a 'nuclear no first use' agreement to outlaw nuclear weapons, and 
8. simultaneously launching multilateral negotiations for nuclear disarmament. 
These components were elaborated upon by Prime Minister Rao when he 
addressed the Joint Session of the US Congress in Washington on 18 May 1994.191 
The national elections were looming and Narasimha Rao endorsed the nuclear 
establishments to prepare for nuclear tests. The scientists told the Prime Minister that 
tests were needed to demonstrate India's technical capacity, and to prove the 
effectiveness of India's deterrent.192 
In the mid-1990s, India proposed to Pakistan a "no first use" of nuclear 
weapons treaty which also included an agreement "not to attack population centres" 
This was done without the knowledge of the chief of staff. But Pakistan refused to 
sign such kind of agreement with India.193 
Prime Minister Rao in his last months in office, consulted with the opposition 
and put together a deal for a Sukhoi-30 variant aircraft (SU-30 MK-l) with Russia. 
Sukhoi-30 is a nuclear-capable aircraft. Rao also allowed "the chiefs of staff targets to 
be assigned to all the 150 km-range Prithvi Short-range ballistic missiles which have 
been tested for accuracy of less than 40 metres at an extreme range.”194 
The Rao government's support of international denuclearization and its desire 
to keep India's nuclear option open tor security reasons proved convincing to 
191  Times of India, 19 May, 1994. 
192  Perkovich, n. 27, p .42 
193   Menon ,p. 108. 
194  Karnad, n. 38, pp. 375-376. 
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President Clinton to a great extent. In fact, Narsimha Rao was able to convince the 
Clinton administration that India, being a civilized entity, had never pursued a course 
of aggression and aggrandizement against any other country throughout the history of 
humankind. Instead, India's impeccable record of perpetual quest for a non-violent 
world order should, he stressed, be a matter of pride to all forward-looking civilized 
nations. He regretted that the West had often ignored that reality, either out of 
ignorance, or because of the malicious propaganda launched by India's adversaries. 
During his tenure, as Prime Minister, Rao had reservations for nuclear 
deterrence and did not see nuclear weapons particularly useful for India." "While 
leaders of the DRDO and AEC continued to work on designs for sophisticated nuclear 
weapons and continued to test nuclear missiles, Mr Rao did not authorize a concerted 
'nuclear production programme. India's nuclear capability remained modest covert 
and, therefore, ambiguous, while its nuclear policy remained ambivalent. 195 
Just two days before announcement of results of the 1996 general election, 
then prime minister P V Narasimha Rao had directed A P J Abdul Kalam, scientific 
adviser to the defence minister at the time, to keep his team ready for a nuclear test. 
Recounting Rao's plans were not meant to be as "the election result was quite 
different from what he anticipated", Kalam said he received yet another call from the 
then PM asking him to meet him along with Prime Minister-designate Vajpayee. This 
was "so that the smooth takeover of such a very important programme can take 
place," he elaborated the Prithvi program continued to advance. On 18 August 1992 
the ninth flight test of the Prithvi system was conducted. This was the second flight 
test of an extended 250 km version, and the first fully instrumented flight of this 
version. Rao slowed the program though, to avoid moving into deployment too soon, 
which risked triggering restrictions on technology imports. However, with the poll 
outcome throwing up a change in government, Rao ensured his impending successor 
Atal Behari Vajpaee was briefed in his presence on the nuke test plans and so enabled 
a smooth takeover of the nuclear programme.  
Atal Bihari Vajpayee from 16 May to 1 June 1996, The Bharatiya Janata 
Party (BJP) emerged from the May 1996 national elections as the single-largest party 
in the Lok Sabha but without enough strength to prove a majority on the floor of that 
195  Perkovich, n. 27, p.39. 
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Parliament. Under Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the BJP coalition lasted in 
power 13 days. Vajpayee was invited by President Shankar Dayal Sharma to form a 
government, but after 13 days in office, proved unable to muster a governing majority 
and resigned. 
In 1996, Bhartiya Janata Party's coalition government came into power at the 
centre and Mr Atal Behari Vajpayee was sworn in as Prime Minister. Mr Vajpayee 
immediately after his election as Prime Minister ordered the scientists for' nuclear 
tests. But his government fell after 13 days and did not last long enough to carry 
through the decision.196 
United Front government between 1996-1998 with Deve Gowda and Inder 
Kumar Gujral as PM 
During this period, Deve Gowda also held additional charges of Home Affairs, 
Petroleum and Chemicals, Urban Employment, Food processing, Personnel, etc. He 
had been collectively elected leader of the United Front coalition government. 
"The BJP platform had clear intention to "exercise the option to induct nuclear 
weapons" and "India should become an openly nuclear power to garner the respect on 
the world stage that India deserved.197 By 18 March 1998, Vajpayee had publicly 
begun his lobbying for nuclear explosion and declared that "there is no compromise 
on national security; all options including the nuclear options will be exercised to 
protect security and sovereignty.198  
In the spring of 1997 PM Gowda authorized two operations that brought India 
closer to an open declaration of its nuclear status. The first was deploying Prithvi 
missiles (numbering less than a dozen), which had by this time gone into series 
production, at Jalandhar about 200 km from the Pakistani border. The second was to 
authorize the construction of two additional test shafts 50 m deep at Pokhran to 
accommodate the sub-kiloton test devices in March. It appears that Gowda may have 
decided to conduct nuclear tests at this point, a question that remains unresolved at 
this writing. Construction on the shafts began on 1 April and was completed on 11 
April. Anil Kakodkar, BARC's director, travelled to the site on 15 April to inspect the 
196  Prakash Chander, India and Pakistan unending conflict, India: APH Publications Corporations 
2003, pp. 78-79.  
197  Ibid. 
198  Ibid. 
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shafts and possibly to prepare for moving the devices. But two days later Gowda was 
forced by a vote of no confidence to resign. 
I.K. Gujral 
Tenure- 21st April 1997 – 19th March 1998 for 332 days 
The most important task during his term as PM was his resistance in signing 
CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty). It made a clear way to conduct the Pokhran 
nuclear tests. He worked towards improving relationship with Pakistan and gave a 
five-point doctrine known as Gujral Doctrine. 
1997: Prime Minister I. K. Gujral said India will not sign the Fissile Material Cut-off 
Treaty (FMCT) or any other "discriminatory" nuclear agreement that would hamper 
India's nuclear program the deployment of the Prithvi was detected by U.S. 
intelligence in June, during Gujral's term in office, and brought about a diplomatic 
protest. Gujral downplayed its significance, pointing out that Pakistan had stored 
Chinese-made M-11 missiles of similar range at Sargoda, about 200 km from the 
Indo-Pak border. Gujral opposed nuclear tests and never approved them. Curiously 
enough though he did allow additional test preparations at Pokhran by authorizing a 
sixth shaft to be dug there in July. 
Vajpayee's successors, Deve Gowda and Inder Kumar Gajral were each asked 
to authorise nuclear tests. But both of them refused to conduct any nuclear tests. 
Instead of nuclear weapons, they gave importance to economic, political and 
diplomatic priorities. However, development and testing of ballistic missiles 
continued during 1996-97.199 
 
 
 
199  Perkovich, n.27,  p.144. 
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Chapter  3 
INDIA’S NUCLEAR PROGRAMME 
In March 1998, the BJP became the major party after parliamentary elections 
and took power. Soon afterwards, Prime Minister Bihari Vajpayee gave orders to 
arrange for a nuclear weapons test. The BJP-led government decided to conduct a 
nuclear test primarily due to domestic politics and secondarily because of the BJP's 
new strategic vision that included competition with China.1 In campaigning for 
election in 1998, the BJP promised in its manifesto to test nuclear weapons. When the 
BJP came to office, it soon became apparent that it would not be able to enact any of 
its election manifesto proposals and that the government would be short-lived. The 
promise to carry out a nuclear test was the only proposal that was attainable at the 
time. The fulfilment of the 'promise helped the BJP in the next round of elections in 
September-October 1999 
The United Front was only able to sustain a majority in Parliament until 1998, 
resigning after the Indian National Congress withdrew its support. In the Indian 
general election, 1998 the BJP again emerged as the single-largest party, but was able 
to assemble a governing coalition called the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). 
In 1998, national elections were held and coalition government led by 
Bhartiya Janata Party under the stewardship of Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee came into 
power at the centre. On 28 March, hours after receiving vote of confidence, A.B. 
Vajpayee once again gave Chidambaram, Kalam and their team the go ahead for 
conducting nuclear tests. As before, this decision was taken by only a handful of top 
political leaders and scientists, and military leaders were excluded from this nuclear 
decision-making. According to some commentators, this test decision of India was 
precipitated by the Pakistan's April 6, 1998, Gauri test. But their argument is not very 
much sound because BJP leaders had already made up their minds and also attempted 
to put the test decision into practice in 1996, before April 6. 
Pakistan's advancing missile programme deepened the conviction that India 
must respond to its growing strategic might but the Indian tests were meant to serve 
larger purposes.2 
1  BJP Election Manifesto '98, <http://www.bjp.org/manifes/manifes.htm> Rodney W. Janes and 
Sumit Ganguly, "Debating New Delhi's Nuclear Decision," International  Security, Vol. 24, No.4 
(Winter 2001): 181-189, last accessed on 2.2.2010. 
2  Perkovich, “What makes the Indian Bomb Tick?”, in D.R. Sardesi and Raga G.C. Thomas (eds.), 
Nuclear India in the Twenty First Century, New Delhi : Palgrave Macmillan,  p.46. 
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Consultation began between Prime Minister Vajpayee, Abdul Kalam, R. 
Chidambaram and officials of the Indian DAE on nuclear options. Chidambaram 
briefed Prime Minister Vajpayee extensively on the nuclear program; Abdul 
Kalam presented the status of the missile program. On 28 March 1998, Prime 
Minister Vajpayee asked the scientists to make preparations in the shortest time 
possible, and preparations were hastily made. It was time of tense atmosphere when 
Pakistan, at a Conference on Disarmament, offered a peace rhetoric agreement with 
India for "an equal and mutual restraint in conventional, missile and nuclear fields." 
Pakistan's equation was later reemphasized on 6 April and the momentum in India for 
nuclear tests began to build up which strengthened Vajpayee's position to order the 
tests. The BJP made political hay out of its demand that India deploy a nuclear 
arsenal, but in fact India was already taking that step. It had committed itself to 
deploying a nuclear arsenal in 1986 with its first truly serious efforts at integrating 
nuclear weapons with delivery systems, but its first qualified, operationally ready 
nuclear weapons and delivery systems only became available in May 1994. India had 
adopted (temporarily) a policy of "nuclear opacity" similar to that practiced by Israel - 
obtaining deterrent effect through an obviously advanced nuclear capability; having a 
genuine, though secret, nuclear option that could be exercised if needed; while 
avoiding the political and economic costs by refusing to openly acknowledge that it 
had progressed to full weaponization. 
In May 1998, BJP agreed with Fernandez and took the nuclear test decision by 
referring to the need for a nuclear balance with their potential Opponent. China had 
tested, from 1964 to 1995 and India wanted to display its nuclear capabilities to its 
strategic competitor. After the test, Prime Minister Vajpayee wrote a letter to 
President Clinton in which he named China as India's principal security anxiety.3 
India's May 1998 test ended the country's three-decades-old moratorium on nuclear 
tests. In a statement to the Lok Sabha, the lower house of parliament, after the test, 
Prime Minister Vajpayee announced that India would not be the first to use nuclear 
weapons. India & United States Strategic Relationship: Nuclear & Security 
Perspective and he promised to avoid an arms race, which would mean that India 
would produce just enough weapons for minimum deterrence.4 This nuclear doctrine 
3  John W. Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century, Cattle: 
University of Washington Press, 2001), 275-342. 
4  Star News, Statement by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in the Indian Parliament, 1.2.1998. 
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statement was the first component of a security policy, Nuclear Tests and the 
Emergence of Security policy, Doctrine, and Structures. The May 11, 1998 test led 
Pakistan's government to order a nuclear test, which was conducted on May 28, 1998. 
On June 6, 1998, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1172, which urged nuclear restraint 
by India and Pakistan.5 According to a report in Jane's Intelligence Review.6 A 
concise overview of India and Pakistan's nuclear arsenals, nuclear doctrines and 
ballistic missile capabilities accompanied by an assessment of the relationships 
between Pakistan, India and China. India's objective is to have a nuclear arsenal that is 
"strategically active but operationally dormant", which would allow India to maintain 
its retaliatory capability "within a matter of hours to weeks, while simultaneously 
exhibiting restraint." However, the report also maintains that, in the future, India may 
face increasing institutional pressure to shift its nuclear arsenal to a fully deployed 
status. 
May 11— Nearly 24 years after it detonated its only nuclear explosion, India 
conducted three underground nuclear tests today at a site in the country's north 
western desert. The move appeared to signal India's determination to abandon decades 
of ambiguity in favour of openly declaring that it has nuclear weapons. 
January 1998: Scientists at BARC claim they have developed a low cost method of 
extracting tritium from heavy water used in nuclear power reactors. 
May 1998: India conducts two rounds of nuclear weapon tests. After the first, Prime 
Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee announces that "a fission device, a low-yield device 
and a thermonuclear device" had been successfully tested in the Pokhran desert. Two 
days later the government explodes two more sub-kiloton nuclear tests at the same 
testing range. The five underground tests range in yield from less than one kiloton to 
an estimated 45 kilotons. 
Dr A.P.J.  Abdul Kalam and Rajagopala Chidambaram after the 1998 Tests 
P.K. Iyengar's term as chairman on the Indian AEC expired on 31 January 
1993, and he was replaced by Rajagopala Chidambaram, a fellow nuclear weaponeer 
from BARC. Chidambaram had participated in the 1974 test, but had received little 
recognition at the time. Now as head of India's nuclear establishment he made it his 
5  United Nation Security Council Resolution 1172, June 6, 1998. 
6  T.S. Gopi Rethinaraj, "Nuclear Diplomacy Returns to South Asian Security Agenda", Jane's 
Intelligence Review, May 2002, pp. 40-43. 
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mission to build on all the preparatory work that had gone on since the 80s on 
thermonuclear weapons, and push ahead with the development and testing of a 
hydrogen bomb. Chidambaram at the Indian AEC and Avil Pakir Jainulabdeen Abdul 
Kalam (aka A.P.J. Kalam, Abdul Kalam) at the DRDO, which had become a major 
power center for strategic system development, formed an effective team intent on 
rapidly advancing India's nuclear capabilities, and making India a recognized nuclear 
power. 
Operation Shakti: 1998 
Pokhran-II was the series of five nuclear bomb test explosions conducted by India at 
the Indian Army's Pokhran Test Range in May 1998.7 It was the second Indian 
nuclear test; the first test, code-named Smiling Buddha, was conducted in May 1974.8 
On May 11, 1998, at 3.45 p.m. local time, India conducted three simultaneous 
nuclear tests at its testing site near Pokhran in the north-western desert of Rajasthan. 
On that day, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee also issued formal statement confirming these 
tests.  According to him the three tests were "a fission device, a low-yield device and 
a thermonuclear device.9 
Some analysts expressed doubts as to whether a thermonuclear device had in 
fact been tested, with U.S. seismologists estimating that the total force of the three 
explosions was in the relatively low 10-20 Kiloton (K1) range.10 However, at a news 
conference on May 17, Indian nuclear scientists claimed that ''the blasts had a 
cumulative explosive yield of 55 KT, of force equivalent to about four of the atomic 
bombs which the U.S.A. had dropped on Hiroshima, Japan, in 1945.11 The fission 
device which had been tested on May 11 was an estimated yield of 15 K T which was 
smaller in size and weight compared with that tested in May 1974. 
On May 13, India tested two more nuclear devices with yields of 0.2 and 0.6 
KT respectively.12  Dr. P.K. Iyenger, former chairman of India's Atomic Energy 
7  CNN India Bureau (17 May 1998). "India releases pictures of nuclear tests", CNN India Bureau, 
1998, accessed on 14 June 2015.  
8  Public Domain, PD. "Official press release by India". http://www.meadev.gov.in/. Ministry of 
External Affairs, 1998. Accessed on 14 June 2015.  
9   Keesing’s Record of World Events, (Editor: Dr. D.S. Lewis, Editorial Department: Keesing's 
Record of World Events, England, Volume-XLIV, Number-S, 1998, p.42267. 
10  Ibid. 
11  Ibid. 
12  Ashley J. Tellis, India  Emerging Nuclear Posture between Recessed Deterrent and Ready 
Arsenal, Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2001, p. 500.2001, p.500 . 
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Commission said, ''By these tests we have demonstrated m an unambiguous fashion 
that we can make any kind of nuclear weapon.13 
Table 1: India’s Missile Arsenal, Composition, Capabilities and Characteristics 
Name Type Maximum 
range (km) 
Status 
Prithvi-I   Short-range 150 Deployed 
Prithvi-II   Short-range 250-350 
Prithvi-
III   
Short-range 350-600 
Agni-I Short to medium-range 700-1,250 
Agni-II Medium-range 2,000-3,000 
Agni-III Intermediate-range   3,500-5,000 
Agni-IV Intermediate-range 4,000 Tested 
successfully Agni-V Intermediate to Intercontinental-
range 
5,000-8,000 
Agni-VI Submarine-launched with 
intercontinental-range(probable 
MIRV) 
6,000~ Under 
development 
Agni-VI Intercontinental-range (probable 
MIRV) 
6,000-8,000 Under 
development 
Surya Submarine launched 
Intercontinental-range MIRV 
10,000~ Unconfirmed 
Surya Intercontinental-range Multiple 
independently targetable reentry 
vehicle (MIRV) 
8,000-12,000 Unconfirmed 
 
Table: 2 Indian sea-based nuclear-armed ballistic missiles 
 Name Type Maximum 
range (km) 
Status 
Dhanush Short-range 350 Inducted  
Sagarika (K-15)   SLBM 700 Awaiting deployment on 
INS Arihant 
K-4  SLBM 3,500 Tested  
 
In 1998, it came to power and lost no time in taking India nuclear. In the following 
year, they were able to withstand February 1999: The United States ends its 
13  Ibid. 
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opposition to extending World Bank loans to India, allowing the approval of a $210 
million energy project. 
Nuclear bombs and detonations 
Five nuclear devices were detonated during Operation Shakti. All devices were 
weapon-grade plutonium and they were 
The atmosphere was tense in the following few weeks leading up to Operation 
Shakti (Operation Power, the May 1998 nuclear test series). Pakistan's Foreign 
Minister Gohar Ayub (also referred to as Gohar Ayub Khan) had offered a "carrot" of 
soothing rhetoric on the day of Vajpayee's swearing in, saying at a Conference on 
Disarmament in Geneva that Pakistan would offer India "an agreement with India for 
an equal and mutual restraint in conventional, missile and nuclear fields." 
The "stick" side of the Pakistani equation was reemphasized on 6 April when 
Pakistan tested a new missile, named Ghauri, with a range of 1500 km (900 miles) 
and a payload of 700 kg (though it flew only 800 km in this test). This missile 
program had been known since 1997, and Pakistan had hinted about the imminent test 
on 23 March, but the test came as a shock to India which had felt itself far ahead of 
Pakistan with the Agni program although this program had been dormant for four 
years now. This escalation of the strategic challenge from Pakistan could only have 
strengthened Vajpayee's to conduct the tests 
Pakistan described the Indian tests as provocative and feels an urgent need to conduct 
nuclear tests and restore a sense of balance-of-power with India.14 
Upon hearing the news of the Indian nuclear tests, Pakistan's Foreign Minister Gohar 
Ayub Khan told his country's legislature on May 11, 1998, that "the country's defense would 
be made impregnable against any Indian threat ......”.15 On May 13, he warned that India's 
actions will not go unanswered.16 
In an inauspiciously timed visit, Bill Richardson, leading a high level U.S. 
delegation that visited New Delhi on 14 August, chose to take that opportunity to 
reassert the existence of a special relationship with Pakistan. 
14  Keesing’s Record of World Events, n. 9, p. 42268.  
15  Ibid., p. 42267. 
16  Ibid., 42269. 
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On May 17, Mr. Gohar Ayub Khan confirmed that the Cabinet had already 
taken the decision to carry out an underground nuclear test in response to the  Indian  
explosion.17 
The thermonuclear device series tested on May 11 and 13, 1998 was a two-
stage device of advanced design, which had a fusion-boosted fission trigger as the 
first stage and a fusion secondary stage which was compressed by radiation implosion 
and ignited, having Estimated Total Yield of 61 KT. 
The Announcement 
On 18 May, when Indian Deputy Prime Minister L.K. Advani announced that 
"India would from now on be pursuing a pro-active policy towards alleged Pakistani 
interference in Kashmir.”18 He warned that the Pakistani government should realize 
the change in geostrategic situation in the region and the fact that "India's tests had 
brought about a qualitatively new stage in Indo Pakistan relations.19 Mr. Advani's 
comments provoked a furious response on May, 19, from Pakistan's Prime Minister 
Nawaz Sharif who accused the Indian government of harboring aggressive' designs 
towards Kashmir.20 On 21 May, Indian government softened its attitude and 
announced a self-declared moratorium on further nuclear tests. Addressing the Lok 
Sabha on 27 May, Indian Prime Minister offered to negotiate a "no first use" nuclear 
pact with Pakistan. 
Shortly after the tests, a press meet was convened at the Prime Minister's 
residence in New Delhi. Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee appeared before the 
press corps and made the following short statement: 
“Today, at 15:45 hours, India conducted three underground nuclear tests in the 
Pokhran range. The tests conducted today were with a fission device, a low yield 
device and a thermonuclear device. The measured yields are in line with expected 
values. Measurements have also confirmed that there was no release of radioactivity 
into the atmosphere. These were contained explosions like the experiment conducted 
17 Carey Sublette, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program; 1998: The Years of testing," 
http://www.nuclearweaponsarchive.org/pakistan/paktests.html., lasted accessed on 3 April, 2015. 
18   Keesings Record of World Events,  n. 9, p. 42269. 
19  Ibid. 
20  Ibid.  
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in May 1974. I warmly congratulate the scientists and engineers who have carried out 
these successful tests.21 
Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee made a major statement in both the 
Houses of Parliament (December 15, 1998) on ongoing negotiations between the 
interlocutors of the two countries. He said that the country’s position remained that, 
“The present discussion should lead to conclusion of the CTBT before 1999.” He 
stressed that “under no circumstances India’s right to charter its own courses would 
be surrendered. Our talks are based on the fundamental premises that India will define 
its own requirement for its nuclear deterrent, on its own assessment of the security 
environment.” He made it clear that the government “will not accept any restraints on 
the development of India’s R and D capabilities. Such activity is an integral part of 
any country’s defense preparedness and essential for coping with new threat 
perceptions that may emerge in the years ahead.”22 
After a gap of twenty four years, India had demonstrated its scientific and 
technological powers to test a variety of warheads ranging from thermo-nuclear to 
sub-kiloton devices. 
Tests conducted on 11 and 13 May 1998 proved beyond any shadow of doubt 
India’s superiority over Pakistan in nuclear capability. In contrast, Pakistan’s nuclear 
and missile technology is limited by what China can provide for Pakistan. While 
China has declared to arm Pakistan with nuclear weapons and missiles to countervail 
India it cannot be in its interest to permit Pakistan to became an autonomous nuclear 
weapons power. 
On 11 May, a statement was issued by the government announcing that India 
had successfully carried out three underground nuclear tests at the Pokhran range. 
Two days later, after carrying out more underground sub-kiloton tests, the 
government announced the completion of the planned series of tests. The three 
underground nuclear tests carried out at 1545 hours on 11 May were with three 
different devices, a thermonuclear device on 13 May was also low-yield device, the 
sub-kiloton range.23 In the wake of the tests, the government made a number of key 
21  “Prime Minister's announcement of India's three underground nuclear tests". Fas.org. Accessed on 
31 January 2013. 
22  Parvin Sheth, Post-Pokhran Nuclear Politics: Fresh Perspectives on Indo-US Relations, Jaipur: 
Rawat Publication, 1999, p.61. 
23  Paper laid on the Table of the House on Evolution of India’s Nuclear Policy, May 27, 1998. 
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statements which, in aggregate, describe a new nuclear posture. This posture 
comprises the following seven elements; 
• Minimum deterrence 
• No first use and non-use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. 
• A programme of missile testing. 
• A moratorium on nuclear tests and accession to the comprehensive test ban 
treaty [CTBT]. 
• Negotiating a fissile material cut off treaty [FMCT]. 
• Export controls. 
• Promoting global nuclear disarmament 
India has publicly committed its nuclear program to be a “credible minimum 
deterrent”. The Prime Minister noted in a major statement on December 15, 1998 that, 
“just as our conventional defense capability has been employed in order to safeguard 
the territorial integrity and sovereignty of India against any use or threat of force, the 
adaptation of our nuclear deterrence posture has also followed the same logic. We 
have announced our intention to maintain a minimum deterrent, but one that is 
credible.” He further said that, “Our decision not sign the NPT was in keeping with 
our basic objectives. In 1974, we demonstrated our basic nuclear capability. 
Successively, thereafter, we have taken all necessary steps in keeping with the resolve 
and national will, to safeguard India’s nuclear option. This was signing the CTBT, a 
decision that also enjoyed consensus of this house. The decades of the 80s and 90s 
had meanwhile witnessed the gradual deterioration of our security environment as a 
result of nuclear and missile proliferation. In our neighborhood, nuclear weapons had 
increased and more sophisticated delivery systems inducted. In addition, India has 
also been a victim of externally aided and abetted terrorism, militancy, and 
clandestine war.”24 
India is now a nuclear weapon state. This is a reality that cannot be denied. It 
is not a conferment that we seek; nor is it a status for others to grant. It is endowment 
to the nation by our scientists and engineers. Our strengthened capability adds to our 
sense of responsibilities. We do not intent to use these weapons for mounting threats 
24  Prime Minister’s statement in Parliament on Bilateral Talks with United States, December 15 
1998,http://www.fas.org/news/india/1998/12/981215parl15dec.htm, last assessed on 22 June 2013. 
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against any country; these are weapons of self-defense, to ensure that India is not 
subjected to nuclear threat or coercion.25 
Vajpayee said Monday in a brief statement, referring to the 1974 underground 
12 kiloton test known as Smiling Buddha also conducted at Pokhran. Vajpayee further 
stated that like the 1974 test, none of the three tests resulted in venting into the 
atmosphere (which was not entirely true - some venting had occurred). 
He went on to say that the devices tested were a thermonuclear device, a 
fission device, and a low-yield device. 
"I warmly congratulate the scientists and engineers who have carried out these 
successful tests," Vajpayee added. Just two days later on 13 May, at 6:51 UCT (2:51 
a.m. EST, 12.21 p.m. local Indian time) India detonated two more sub-kiloton nuclear 
devices underground before declaring that the test series was completed. 
The test series was dubbed Operation Shakti-98 (Power-98) and the five tests are 
designated Shakti I through V. Like the 1974 test's moniker "Smiling Buddha", this 
name seems to have been stuck on the test series after the fact. The test operation 
itself apparently did not have a formal name. More recently it has been common to 
refer to the five shot test series as Pokhran II, the 1974 shot being Pokhran I. 
The first group of three tests (Shakti I, II, and III) were reported to have a 
combined yield of about 55 (or 58) kilotons and consisted of a two stage 
thermonuclear weapon design (Shakti I) with a yield of 43 kt, +/- 3 kt, (also stated to 
be 43-45 kt), a 12 kt test of a light compact weaponized tactical fission bomb, and a 
0.2 kt tactical fission weapon. There were three shafts located about 1 km from each 
other and 3.5 km from the control room. The Shakti I shaft was designated "White 
House" (also called "Whisky"), the Shakti II shaft was known as "Taj Mahal" (also 
called "Tango"), and the Shakti III shaft was called "Kumbhkaran". The shots were 
fired simultaneously. The second phase of two tests (Shakti IV and V) had yields of 
0.5 and 0.3 kilotons, and were fired in shafts designated NT 1 and 2 (for Navtala, the 
area where they were dug). A third device and shaft (NT 3) was prepared but was not 
fired. The second group of shots was conducted to generate additional data for 
improved computer simulation of designs. 
25 Suo Moto statements by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vaajpayee in parliament on 27th,may 
1998,https://www.indianembassy.org/inews/mayjune1598.pdfhttps://www.indianembassy.org/ine
ws/mayjune1598.pdf, last assessed on 20 June 2013. 
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 In May, 1998 India conducted five underground nuclear tests – Pokhran-II, 
following the Pokhran-I test of 1974. These tests established India as a nuclear 
weapons power, although it also resulted in the imposition of limited sanctions by the 
U.S., UK, Canada and other nations. By 2001, most of these sanctions had been lifted. 
To cool the rising tensions, between India and Pakistan following the nuclear tests, 
Vajpayee on 28 May, repeated his offer of a no-first use pact with Pakistan. 
Despite the Indian moratorium, Pakistan refused to rule out further nuclear 
tests. Hence, on 30 May, it announced that a further nuclear device had been tested.26  
News of the tests were greeted with jubilation and large-scale approval by the 
society in India. The Bombay Stock Exchange registered significant gains. 
Newspapers and television channels praised the government for its bold decision; 
editorials were full of praise for the country's leadership and advocated the 
development of an operational nuclear arsenal for the country's armed forces. The 
Indian opposition, led by Congress Party criticized the Vajpayee administration for 
carrying out the series of nuclear tests.27 
By the time India had conducted tests, the country had a total of $44bn in 
loans in 1998, from IMF and the World Bank. The industrial sectors of the Indian 
economy such as the chemicals industry were likely to be hurt by sanction. The 
Western consortium companies, which have invested heavily in India, especially in 
construction, computing and telecoms, were generally the one who were harmed by 
the sanctions.] In 1998, Indian government announced that it had already allowed for 
some economic response and was willing to take the consequences.28 
In keeping with its preferred approach to foreign policy in recent decades, and 
in compliance with the 1994 anti-proliferation law, the United States imposed 
economic sanctions on India.29 The sanctions on India consisted of cutting off all 
assistance to India except humanitarian aid, banning the export of certain defence 
26  Keesing’s, Record of World Events, n. 9, p.42270. 
27  Lyon, David (31 May 1998). "India detonates two more bombs". BBC India, 1998 (Follow up). 
Accessed on 17 January 2013. 
28  BBC Reports (1 June 1998). "India – will sanctions bite?". BBC Economic Review. Accessed on 
17 January 2013; Weiner, T. (13 May 1998). "Nuclear anxiety: The Blunders; U.S. Blundered On 
Intelligence, Officials Admit", The New York Times. Accessed on 2013-01-17. 
29  BBC Release (13 May 1998). "US imposes sanctions on India". BBC America. Accessed on 17 
January 2013. 
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material and technologies, ending American credit and credit guarantees to India, and 
requiring the US to oppose lending by international financial institutions to India.30 
The United States issued a strong statement condemning India and promised 
that sanctions would follow. The American intelligence community was embarrassed 
as there had been "a serious intelligence failure of the decade" in detecting the 
preparations for the test. On October 21, 1998 the US Congress authorized the 
president to waive the existing economic and financial sanctions against India and 
Pakistan for up to 12 months. By February 1999, citing a more flexible policy on 
India and nuclear nonproliferation, the Clinton administration gave up objections to 
India's request for a $150 million World Bank loan. By October 15, 1999, Congress 
adopted all amendment to the 'Defense Appropriations Bill' that granted the United 
States president the authority to waive all sanctions against India. The then United 
States President Clinton said, "To try to manifest your greatness by detonating atomic 
bombs when everybody else is trying to leave the nuclear age behind is just wrong. 
India and Pakistan must give up their arms race--a self-defeating cycle of 
escalation".31 
On the same day-when Pakistan conducted nuclear tests- the Indian Prime 
Minister Vajpayee stated that further Indian nuclear tests were expected. But the 
opposition, after Pakistan's announcement to tests, strongly criticized Bhartiya Janata 
Party for provoking dangerous nuclear proliferation in South Asia. 
By early 1999, the NDA government lost its majority after the AIADMK 
withdrew its support. President  Narayanan dissolved the Parliament and called fresh 
elections – the third in two years. Public anger against smaller parties that jeopardized 
the NDA coalition and the wave of support for the Vajpayee government in the 
aftermath of the Kargil War gave the BJP a larger presence in the Lok Sabha. The 
NDA won a decisive majority with the support of new constituents such as the Janata 
Dal (United) and the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam. 
On 12 May the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated: "The Chinese government is 
seriously concerned about the nuclear tests conducted by India," and that the tests 
"run counter to the current international trend and are not conducive to peace and 
30  "U.S. imposes sanctions on India". CNN. 
31  Boston Globe, May, 1998. 
94 
 
                                                          
Chapter  3 
stability in South Asia."32 The next day the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued the 
statement clearly stating that "it shocked and strongly condemned" the Indian nuclear 
tests and called for the international community to "adopt a unified stand and strongly 
demand that India immediate stop development of nuclear weapons".33 China further 
rejected India's stated rationale of needing nuclear capabilities to counter a Chinese 
threat as "totally unreasonable".34 In a meeting with Masayoshi Takemura of 
Democratic , Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China Qian Qichen was 
quoted as saying that India's nuclear tests were a "serious matter," particularly 
because they were conducted in light of the fact that more than 140 countries have 
signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. "It is even more unacceptable that India 
claims to have conducted the tests to counter what it called a "China threat” On 24 
November 1998, the Chinese Embassy, New Delhi issued a formal statement: 
India conducted nuclear tests last May, which has run against the 
contemporary historical trend and seriously affected peace and stability in South Asia. 
Pakistan also conducted nuclear tests later on. India's nuclear tests have not only led 
to the escalation of tensions between India and Pakistan and provocation of nuclear 
arms races in South Asia, but also dealt a heavy blow to international nuclear 
disarmament and the global nonproliferation regime. It is only natural that India's 
nuclear tests have met with extensive condemnation and aroused serious concern from 
the international community.35 
The most vehement and strong reaction to India's nuclear explosion was from 
a neighboring country, Pakistan. Great ire was raised in Pakistan, which issued a 
severe statement blaming India for instigating a nuclear arms race in the region. Prime 
Minister Nawaz Sharif vowed that his country would give a suitable reply to the 
Indians.36  
The day after the first tests, Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub Khan indicated that 
Pakistan was ready to conduct a nuclear test of its own. As he said: "[Pakistan] is 
32   "China is 'Seriously Concerned' But Restrained in Its Criticism", New York Times, 13 May 1998. 
33  Resources on India and Pakistan (1999). "China's Reaction to India's Nuclear Tests". CNS Center 
for Non Proliferation Studies Monterey, Institute of International Studies. Accessed on 15 
May 2012. 
34  Ibid. 
35  Chinese Embassy, New Delhi Active Correspondents (24 November 1998). "India-China Claim 
active approach", The Hindu, 24/xi-1998. 
36  "The nuclear politics: The 1998 Election". Nuclear weapon archives. Nuclear politics,  Accessed 
on 16 January 2013. 
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prepared to match India, we have the capability.... We in Pakistan will maintain a 
balance with India in all fields", he said in an interview. "We are in a headlong arms 
race on the subcontinent. 
On 13 May 1998, Pakistan bitterly condemned the tests, and Foreign minister 
Gohar Ayub by quoting that Indian leadership seemed to "have gone berserk [sic] and 
was acting in a totally unrestrained way."37 Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was much 
more subdued, refusing to say whether a test would be conducted in response: "We 
are watching the situation and we will take appropriate action with regard to our 
security", he said.38 
Sharif sought to mobilize the entire Islamic world in support of Pakistan and 
criticized India for nuclear proliferation. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had been 
under intense pressure regarding the nuclear tests by President Bill Clinton and 
Opposition Benazir Bhutto at home. Initially surprising the world, Prime 
Minister Nawaz Sharif authorized nuclear testing program and the Pakistan Atomic 
Energy Commission (PAEC) carried out nuclear tastings under the codename Chagai-
I on 28 May 1998 and Chagai-II on 30 May 1998. These six underground nuclear 
tests at the Chagai and Kharan test site were conducted fifteen days after India's last 
test. The total yield of the tests was reported to be 40 kt.39  
Pakistan's subsequent tests invited similar condemnations from multiple 
nations ranging from Australia to Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States American President Bill Clinton was quoted as saying "Two wrongs don't make 
a right", criticizing Pakistan's tests as reactionary to India's Pokhran II.40 The United 
States, Japan, and a number of other states reacted by imposing economic sanctions 
on Pakistan. According to the Pakistan's science community, the Indian nuclear tests 
had given an opportunity to Pakistan to conduct nuclear tests after 14 years of 
conducting only cold tests Pakistan's leading nuclear physicist and one of the top 
scientists, Dr. Pervez Hoodbhoy, held India responsible for Pakistan's nuclear test 
experiments in Chagai. 
37  Special Report (13 May 1998). "Pakistan condemns India's nuclear tests". BBC Pakistan. Accessed 
18 January 2013 
38  "The nuclear politics: The 1998 Election".  Nuclear weapon archives, Nuclear politics. Accessed 
16 January 2013. 
39  Chagai-I Special Report (13 May 1998). “Pakistan condemns India's nuclear tests,” BBC Pakistan. 
Accessed on 18 January 2013. 
40  Special Report (13 May 1998). "Pakistan condemns India's nuclear tests," BBC Pakistan,  
Accessed on 18 January 2013. 
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A state always feels weak if there is another in the neighborhood that is 
stronger. Its security demands that it makes itself more powerful than the neighbor. 
None can be sure that the other intentions are peaceful or will remain so and hence, 
each must maintain power for self-defense. Since no state can know that the power 
accumulation of the other is defensively motivated only, each much assume that it 
might be intended for attack. Consequently, each party’s power increments are 
matched by the other.41 
India’s Weaponry 
The nuclear weapons delivery systems that India possesses are as follows: 
India has several types of aircraft that could be used to deliver nuclear weapons. 
• The MiG-27 Flogger is a nuclear-capable Soviet aircraft produced in the 1970s 
and 1980s. The single-seat aircraft can fly to a range of approximately 800 km. It 
can carry up to 3,000 kg of bombs on external head points. India also has the Mig-
29 which has a ferry range of about 2900 km. 
• Jaguar IS/IB was nuclear-capable with the British Royal Air Force from 1975 to 
1985 and with the French Air Force from 1974 to 1991. The aircraft has a range of 
1,600 km with a maximum external load of 4,775 kg. 
• Su-30K and Mirage 2000H are the other nuclear capable aircrafts. Besides this, 
there is also the Su-30MKI aircraft. Mirage 2000H is claimed to have been used in 
May 1994 to test-drop a dummy nuclear bomb. 
The missiles in possession of India are as follow: 
• 150-km range Prithvi I. The short-range Prithvi (Earth) is a single-stage, dual 
engine, liquid-fuel, road-mobile SRBM 
• The two-stage Agni (Fire) IRBM with a range of 1,500 km 
• Agni II with a range of 2,000 – 2,500 km 
The development of a longer-range Agni III with a range of up to 3,500 km India also 
has plans for an ICBM program, referred to as the Surya. Most components needed 
for an ICBM are available from India’s indigenous space program. The latest model, 
the four-stage PSLV-C3 is capable of launching satellite weighing up to 1,200 kg into 
41 Keegly and Eugene Wittopf, World politics, New York: St Martin’s press, 1993, p. 390. 
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polar sun-synchronous orbit (570 km) or 3,500 kg satellite into low earth orbit (400 
km). India has successfully launched the PSLV and has thus acquired the capability to 
develop an ICBM.  
Table: 3 Showing India’s Missiles Possessions 
Missile Status Range / Payload Origin 
Prithvi-1 Operational 150 km / 1,000 kg Indigenous  
Prithvi-2 Operational 250 km / 500 kg  Indigenous 
Dhanush/Prithvi-2 Development/Tested 350 km / 1,000 kg Indigenous 
Agni-1 Variant Development/Tested 725 km / -1.000 Indigenous 
Agni-1 Tested 1.500 km  / 1,000 
kg 
Indigenous 
Agni-2 Serial Production 2,000-km / 1,000 
kg 
Indigenous 
Agni-3 Development  3,000-5,500 km / 7 
kg 
Indigenous 
Surya Development 5,500 km / 2,000 kg Indigenous / 
Russia 
Sagarika (SLBM) Development 350 km / 500 kg Indigenous / 
Russia 
 
Pakistan: 
Pakistan has the following nuclear weaponry: 
Aircraft   Payload 
1. A-5    1,000 kg 
2. Mirage III/5  3,500 kg 
3. F-16    2,000 kg 
The F-16’s have a delivery range of about 1600 kms. 
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Table: 4. Showing Pakistan’s Missile Arsenal: Composition, Capabilities and 
Characteristics:89 
Missile Year of 
testing/ 
Acquisition 
Range 
in Km 
Warned 
weight in 
kg 
Propulsion 
status 
Propellant 
Origin  Deployment 
status 
HATF-1 1989 80 500 Single solid Indigenous O 
HATF 1A 1992 100 500 - - O 
HATF II 1989 300 500 Two solid PRC (M11) D 
HATF III 1997 600-
800 
500 Two solid PRC D 
Ghauri I 1998 1500 500-750 Single liquid DPRK/ 
PRC 
T 
Ghauri II 1999 1500-
2300 
700 Two liquid DPRK/PRC T 
Shaheen I 1999 750 1000 Two solid PRC (H9) T 
Shaheen II 2000 2500 1000 Two solid PRC T 
M-11 1991-1998 300 500-800 Two solid PRC S 
 
In addition to air-and land-based nuclear capable forces, India is working on at 
least two naval systems, the Sagarika and the Dhanush, which may be equipped to 
carry nuclear warheads in the future. Work on the Sagarika missile began in 1991 and 
it is now in advanced development. The Sagarika is now designated as a submarine-
launched ballistic missile by U.S. intelligence. The Dhanush is a sea-launched 
ballistic missile 
A launch platform for a navy nuclear weapon may be the Advanced 
Technology Vessel (ATV), a nuclear-powered submarine project that has been 
underway since around 1985. Design and operational experience was gained from 
operating a Charlie I-class cruise missile submarine (named INS Chakra) that India 
leased from the Soviet Union from 1988 to 1991. Full-scale work on the ATV began 
in 1991 shortly after the Chakra was returned, and construction started in 1997.42 
 
 
42 General Depankar Banerjee, India-Pakistan-China - A Nuclear Arms Race in South Asia?, 
www.eias.org/conferences/euindia412/banerjee.pdf, last assessed on 22 June 2013. 
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Formulation of India’s Nuclear Doctrine 
United States sanctions after the Pakistani test and pressures further influenced 
Indian leaders to devise a Nuclear Doctrine and consider a specified Security 
Strategy. Starting in July 1998, a series of conciliations between then Foreign 
Minister Jaswant Singh and then US emissary Strobe Talbot dealt with nuclear 
weapons command-and-control and a transparent nuclear doctrine, as well as arms 
control. The Singh-Talbot dialogues eventually led to the reaffirmation of civilian 
command and control and a doctrine of "minimum deterrent and no-first-use.43 In this 
massive work, Tellis lays out a number of scenarios involving India's nuclear 
weapons program and concludes that a "minimum recessed deterrent" and a "force in 
being" will be the most likely outcome for the foreseeable future. Minimum 
deterrence meant that India would build enough nuclear weapons to deter the 
enemies, from attacking India. In order to guarantee no-first-use and avoid nuclear 
accidents due to faulty command-and-control, India would keep the components and 
the delivery systems for the nuclear weapons recessed and separate, and civilian 
control would continue.44 
On December 15, 1998, Prime Minister Vajpayee spoke before the Rajya 
Sabha, India's upper house of parliament, and outlined the main features of nuclear 
weapons doctrine and policy as follows: 
* "deployment, survivability, and second-strike capability" 
*India will deploy its nuclear deterrent - "minimum recessed deterrence." 
 *India's nuclear doctrine includes a policy of "No-First- Use" and "Non-use against 
non-nuclear weapons states;" 
• A policy of "No-First-Use" with a minimum nuclear deterrent. The 
development of a deterrent with a "second-strike capability"; 
• By way of meeting the anxieties of the United States and its allies, India was 
ling to join the CTBT and the FMCT-to-come and to make its export control 
was relating to "sensitive technologies" more stringent; 
And India will continue its missile development program and not accept any restraints 
43  Ashley J. Tellis, n. 12, pp. 392-398. 
44  Ibid., pp. 392-398. 
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on the development of India's research and development capabilities45 and DAE is 
accountable for production part. But during war if India is exposed to T clear Attack, 
the integration and Delivery will be provided to Military Leadership. 
The NSAB was partly composed of India's foremost strategic thinkers, 
including journalists, academics, and former officials, and was charged with assessing 
nuclear doctrine and security strategy.46 The Indian government's creation of national 
security architecture was aimed at diverging from traditional policymaking processes 
in New Delhi and developing a more strategic oriented culture.47 The NSAB helped 
bring issues of national security into the open for parliamentary debate and public 
scrutiny and comment.48 
A second goal was to bring the military into the national security decision-
making process.49 The government created a Chief of the Defence Staff, Defence 
Intelligence Agency, and a joint staff structure to integrate arms acquisition, logistics, 
intelligence, and military strategy.50 For last fifty years, prior to the creation of the 
national security architecture, elite groups of bureaucratic "mandarins" in the IFS and 
the IAS had run foreign and defence policy. Working primarily through the Cabinet 
Committee on Defence and National Security, they were largely divorced from 
politics and from strategic thinking.51 The armed forces were excluded from the 
decision making process due to distrust of the military by Nehru and other political 
leaders. Traditionally, the MOD and other ministers were only asked for clarification 
on technical matters in parliament, and they were not subjected to probing questions, 
particularly from parliamentary committees. The new national security architecture 
aimed at transforming the archaic decision-making process. However, the new 
45  N. Ram, "Dreaming India's Nuclear Future," Frontline, Volume 16, Issue 18, August 28-
September 10, 1999. Also, India's offer to join the CTBT and the FMCT was dependent upon 
Pakistan's acceptance of the treaties, which was unlikely. 
46  Subash Kapila, “India's National Security Council: A Critical Review,” South Asia Analysis Group 
Papers, May 10,2000]. 
47  See Kuldip S. Ludra, National Security Papers, Chandigarh: Thakur Strategic Research Centre, 
1999. 
48  Gurmeet Kanwal, India's National Security Strategy in a Nuclear Environment, New Delhi: IDSA, 
, December 2000; V.R. Raghavan, ed. National Security Management: Proceedings of a Seminar 
Organized by the Delhi Policy Group (New Delhi: Delhi Policy Group, 1998); Interview with Ted 
Andrews, India Desk Officer, State Department, April 19, 2002. 
49   Star News, Lt Gen B M Kapur, Deputy Chief of Integrated Defense Staff, Ministry of Defense, 
interviewed in New Delhi, India, September 2003. 
50   Sreeram S. Chaulia, "BJP, India's Foreign Policy and the 'Realist Alternative' to the Nehruvian 
Tradition," International Politics, Volume 39 (June 2002): 233.  
51   Cohen, India, 72-76; ChauJia, "BJP," 233. 
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architecture and a more assertive media struggled to overcome the influence of 
bureaucrats.52 The Cabinet Committee on Defence and National Security continues to 
Serve as adviser to government for  long-range threat assessments, and the NSC has 
not fulfilled its potential. Other problems remain, including the continuing of military 
leaders and the lack of legislative oversight of national.53 
The NSAB’S Draft Doctrine 
August 17, 1999, the NSAB released the Draft Nuclear Weapons Doctrine 
(Draft Doctrine).54 The Draft Doctrine called for no first use of nuclear weapons, a 
"credible" "run deterrent," survivability against a first nuclear strike, and second-
strike ability. The Draft Doctrine recommended a nuclear harmony of missiles, 
bombers, sub-marine-launched ballistic missiles (in short, SLBMs) to deliver nuclear 
weapons document the NSAB advocated moving away from a "recessed deterrent" 
toward that would "shift to fully employable forces in the shortest possible time.55 
There is an integrated operational plan, in which Service Generals would play 
a greater and more independent role and in which civilian command and control 
would be limited. The Draft Doctrine made no mention of strategic nuclear weapons 
and flexible response command and control. India's first indigenously built nuclear 
submarine, christened INS Chakra is launched in August 2009 under Advance 
Technology Vehicle Project and Indian Navy has given clearance for two more 7000 
ton Chakra Class submarine capable of carrying Intermediate Range Submarine 
launched missiles as , hence India will complete Nuclear triad because land and air 
platforms already proven as envisaged. 
After the Draft Doctrine was issued, the government was split, with some 
cabinet members finding it too ambitious.56 It is a debate between "hawks" and' doves 
anxiety nuclear doctrine and security strategy.57 
Ultimately, the Draft Doctrine was not adopted as official government pc ~ me 
52  Cohen, India, 82-83. 
53  Subhash Kapila, India's National Security Council. Also, C. Raja Mohan, Strategic Affairs, The 
Hindu newspaper, Dr. Manoj Joshi, Political Editor and Chief of News Bureau, and Siddharth 
Varadarajan, Foreign Policy Editor, The Times of India interviewed in New Delhi, India, 
September 2003. 
54  National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), Draft Nuclear Weapons Doctrine, New Delhi, August 
17, 1999.  
55  http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab20.aslb 
56  Praful Bidwai, "India's Nuclear Doctrine Ups the Ante," Asia Times, August 20, 1999. 
57   Gurmeet Kanwal, India's Nuclear Doctrine and Policy, New Delhi: IDSA, February 2001. 
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of the more hawkish NSAB members were not retained after 2000. However 
according to one of India's leading strategically thinkers, K Subramanian, elements of 
the document pointed to the future of Indian government policy.58 Pakistan and China 
believed that the Draft Doctrine reflected Indian government policy and constituted a 
plan for a sustained nuclear build up.59 Pakistan's Foreign Secretary, Shamshad 
Ahmed, said that an international response was needed to arrest India's "dangerous 
plan for nuclear and conventional arms escalation.60 China's response to the Draft 
Doctrine was that India should abide by UNSC Resolution 1172, adopted in June 
1998, which urged nuclear restraint on India and Pakistan.61 To a large extent, the 
Draft Doctrine was intended as a device to conciliate the realistic demands for nuclear 
doctrine, greater command and control. 
The Clinton administration criticized it, commenting that it would instead let 
loose an arms race in the region and further escalate tensions.62 The Clinton 
administration also demanded that India indicate how many nuclear warheads it 
planned to build.63 After the Draft Doctrine appeared the non-proliferation dialogue 
between then" Under Secretary of State Strobe Talbot and then Foreign Minister 
Jaswant Singh continued.64 Jaswant Singh in interview to a National Daily clarified 
the government's position regarding nuclear weapons.65 That India's Willingness to 
consider signing the CTBT and negotiating a FMCT. 
India's no-first-use policy 
India has a declared nuclear no-first-use policy and is in the process of 
developing a nuclear doctrine based on "credible minimum deterrence." In August 
1999, the Indian government released a draft of the doctrine66  which asserts that 
nuclear weapons are solely for deterrence and that India will pursue a policy of 
"retaliation only". The document also maintains that India "will not be the first to 
58  BBC Interview with Eric Arnett, Non-Proliferation Expert, State Department, April 29,2002. 
59  BBC Interview with Sohail Mahmood and Masood Khan, political counselors at the Pakistan 
Embassy to the United States, Washington, D.C., May 1, 2002. Pakistan believed that the DNWD 
signaled Indian intentions. 
60  BBC World News, September 7,1999. 
61  Ibid. 
62  BBC Interview with Eric Arnett, State Department, April 29, 2002. 
63  Karnad, Nuclear Weapons, 444-445. 
64   The  Hindu, 29 Nov 1999. 
65  The Hindu Times, November 29,,1999.] 
66 "Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine", 
Indianembassy.org. accessed on 30 April 2013. 
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initiate a nuclear first strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation should 
deterrence fail" and that decisions to authorize the use of nuclear weapons would be 
made by the Prime Minister or his 'designated successor(s). According to the NRDC, 
despite the escalation of tensions between India and Pakistan in 2001–2002, India 
remained committed to its nuclear no-first-use policy. 
India's Strategic Nuclear Command was formally established in 2003, with an 
Air Force officer, Air Marshal Asthana, as the Commander-in-Chief. The joint 
services SNC are the custodian of all of India's nuclear weapons, missiles and assets. 
It is also responsible for executing all aspects of India's nuclear policy. However, the 
civil leadership, in the form of the CCS (Cabinet Committee on Security) is the only 
body authorised to order a nuclear strike against another offending strike: In effect, it 
is the Prime Minister who has his finger "on the button." The National Security 
Advisor Shiv Shankar Menon signalled a significant shift from "No first use" to "no 
first use against non-nuclear weapon states" in a speech on the occasion of Golden 
Jubilee celebrations of National Defence College in New Delhi on 21 October 2010, a 
doctrine Menon said reflected India's "strategic culture, with its emphasis on minimal 
deterrence.67 
In our view, the principal role of nuclear weapons is to deter their use by an 
adversary. For this, India needs only that use by an adversary. For this, India needs 
only that strategic minimum which is credible with the policy of retaliation only.68  
Some important developments which took place in Indian atomic energy 
programme in the field of nuclear reactors during 1990s are discussed as under: 
On 29 April, 1998, PURNIMA-III research reactor became critical in the 
Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research at Kalpakkam. PURNIMA-III was 
identical to the KAMIN!. Fuel used in this reactor was in the form of plates of an 
alloy of aluminium and uranium-239. 
In September 1992, the first Unit of the Kakrapar Atomic Power Plant (KAPP- 
I) began operating in Gujarat. In May 1993, this Unit entered the commercial 
67 "Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine". 
Indianembassy.org. Accessed on 30 April 2013. and "Speech by NSA Shri Shivshankar Menon at 
NDC on “The Role of Force in Strategic Affairs”". Accessed on 27 July 2015. 
68  "Interview of the External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh with the Hindu. 28 November 1999 
(Extracts)," No.IOS. in Rashmi .lain (ed.). The United States and India (1947-Delhi 2007). p. 
4330434. 
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operation phase after operating successively at higher power levels to fulfil regulatory 
requirements. In January 1995, the second Unit at Kakrapar started operating and 
began receding power into the grid two months later. The Kakrapar station was 
reviewed by an international team of experts in January 1998.69 
On 31 March, 1993, Indian atomic energy programme received a severe blow 
as a fire accident occurred at Narora Atomic Power Plant in Uttar Pradesh. The 
accident did substantial damage to the turbine generator as well as power and control 
cables. After investigation it was found that fatigue failure of turbine blades and 
deficiencies in the cabling system caused the fire that incapacitated the control room 
instruments. Meanwhile all similar reactors in the country were asked to be shut down 
for a mandatory inspection. Nevertheless, the accident did not cause the release of 
radioactive material and radiation.70 
In October 29, 1996, Fast Breeder Reactor KAMINI went critical in the Indira 
Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research at Kalpakkam. This reactor's power was slowly 
raised and reached the rated value of 30 K W in September 1997.71 
In 1997, the International Atomic Energy Agency announced that it would 
break ground for a 500-MW(e) Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR), also located 
at Kalpakkam. India claimed that the FEBR would be completed in 2007. 
By 1999, the Cirus reactor had produced in India an estimated total of 240-336 
Kg of plutonium, and Dhruva reactor had produced an estimated 280 Kg of 
plutonium. 
Both Cirus and Dhruva are India's mam plutonium production reactors, 
produce weapons-grade plutonium. BARC converts uranium into metallic reactor 
irradiates that fuel in the Dhruva and Cirus reactors. Then processes the spent-fuel to 
extract weapons-grade plutonium.72 
In total, India has fourteen nuclear power reactors located across- the country. 
It is currently building eight more reactors. Of these reactors, only four are currently 
under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. The remaining reactors could 
69  Sundaram, pp. 120-121. 
70  Ibid., pp.118-120. 
71  Ibid ., pp.100-101. 
72  Busch,  p. 211. 
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be used for producing weapons-grade plutonian.73 
India has also several plutonium reprocessing facilities, which can extract 
plutonium from spent fuel produced at India's unsafeguarded commercial reactors. 
These facilities are located at Tarapure, Trombay and Kalpakam.74 
Some notable developments which took place during 1990s in Pakistan's 
nuclear reactors are given as under: 
The Chasma Nuclear Power Plant Project (CHASNUPP) which was initiated 
and then cancelled by France in the 1970s was resumed in the early 1990s under 
International Atomic Energy Programme related to nuclear power reactors. 
CHASNUPP, which was initiated and then cancelled by France m the 1970s, 
was resumed in the early 1990s under International Atomic Energy Agency 
safeguards. This reactor, based on Chinese first reactors model, was redesigned and 
its capacity expanded to 300 MW (e). On 1 August 1993, the concrete was poured 
into the CHASNUPP and, in the late 1995, the primary construction of CHASNUPP 
was completed. In November 1999, it began operations and was connected to the 
power grid (owned by Karachi Electric Supply Company) on 14 June 2000. In 1992, 
the China- Pak Khushab reactor deal was signed.75 The Khushab reactor is not under 
IAEA inspections. It has a capacity variously reported at between 40 MWT to 50 
MWT. It was commissioned in March 1996, but began operating only in April 1998. 
Pakistan developed this reactor with Chinese assistance which also supplied heavy 
water for the reactor. 
After discussing Indo- Pak nuclear tests, it seems necessary to look at the key 
elements of India's nuclear policy. In last December 1998, the key elements of India's 
nuclear policy were spelt out by Prime Minister Vajpayee in the p~r1iament. These 
were again repeated by the External Affairs Minister, Jaswant Singh, in an interview 
to the Hindu newspaper on 28 November, 1999. 
6 January 1999 US Ambassador to India Richard F. Celeste says the United States 
wants to know "concrete terms" for India's minimum nuclear deterrent so that the 
proposed deterrent is not perceived as an "open-ended threat" by India's neighbours. 
73  Ibid. 
74  Ibid. 
75  Raja Menon, A Nuclear Strategy for India, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2000, p. 105.   
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The Indian government reiterates that India's proposed nuclear deterrent "is not a 
fixity" and dismisses the US demand as "inconsequential." —"India Dismisses US 
Demand on Minimum Nuclear Deterrence.76 
15 January 1999 India's Minister of State for External Affairs Vasundhara Raje 
Scindia says that India and the United States have "narrowed down" the issues and are 
moving "in the right direction." According to Raje, Indo-US talks over the past six 
months have been "very crucial and helpful" for mutual understanding.77  
The danger of nuclear war in the region (Kargil War) 
In 1999, two months after the bilateral summit in Lahore, India discovered that 
Pakistani army disguised as terrorists had infiltrated through the Line of 
Control (LoC) into the state of Jammu and Kashmir with active Pakistani assistance 
and participation. In response, the Indian armed forces launched Operation Vijay to 
evict the infiltrators. By July, 1999 Indian forces had reclaimed territories on its side 
of the LoC. The Vajpayee government also established the Defense Intelligence 
Agency to provide better military intelligence and monitor India's border with 
Pakistan.78 
In 1999 Kargil conflict erupted between India and Pakistan. India and Pakistan 
have already fought three wars since 1947 prior to this conflict. This number rises to 
four if one considers the Kargil conflict a war because the number of people killed on 
each side exceeds the level that is fixed to declare a conflict as a war. It is important 
to discuss the Kargil war/conflict because “it ran serious risks of the use of nuclear 
weapons in South Asia.”79 An account of the Kargil crisis is made as under: 
During the winter of 1999, Pakistan sent several thousand militants and troops 
across the Line of Control (LOC) into the Indian-controlled Kargil heights. Pakistan 
was confident that it's conventional and nuclear forces would deter a large-scale 
Indian retaliation and it also hoped to gain global attention for the Kashmir issue by 
this action.80 
76  Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 6 January 1999, www.hindustantimes.com. 
77  "India Satisfied over Arms Talks with US," New Delhi: United Press of India, 15 January 1999. 
78  Sujata K. Dass, Atal Bihari Vajpayee: Prime Minister of India, India: Gyan Publishing House, 
2004. p. 199. ISBN 817835277X. 
79  Busch, p. 175.  
80  Ibid., pp.177-178. 
107 
 
                                                          
Chapter  3 
After crossing the LOC, the Pakistani infiltrators met no resistance in the 
unoccupied mountainous region of Kargil, hence, they pushed further into the region 
and dug in. From their positions the Pakistani troops threatened not only Highway lA, 
the lifeline between Kashmir and Ladakh, but also India's hold on Siachin. 
In May 1999, India discovered the movement of the Pakistani infiltrators m 
Kargil and responded by sending military troops into the region. Thereafter, several 
weeks of intense fighting continued between Indian troops and Pakistani infiltrators, 
which included heavy Indian artillery and air attacks. Air attacks were necessary 
because Pakistani infiltrators had occupied top position on Kargil mountains. 
By mid-1999, the Vajpayee administration threatened to extend fighting 
beyond the LOC if Pakistan 'did not withdraw its troops from Indian-controlled 
Kashmir. India signaled its intent to escalate the conflict by massing its troops along 
the LOC and the international border and dispatching naval ships in preparations for a 
naval blockade of Pakistani ports.81  
"As outbreak of a larger conflict appeared imminent and Pakistan increasingly 
came under strong international criticism, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif 
asked the United States President Bill Clinton to mediate between the two sides. On 4 
July, a meeting took place between Sharif and Clinton which also included the 
members of the U.S. National Security Council. Clinton Urged Pakistan to 
immediately withdraw its troops from the Indian territory. One of the striking features 
of this meeting was that "Sharif seemed astonished when Clinton informed Urged 
Pakistan to immediately withdraw its troops from the Indian Territory. One of the 
striking feature of this meeting was that "Sharif seemed astonished when Clinton 
informed’’ him that" the United States' "intelligence had detected preparations by the 
Pakistani military to deploy nuclear weapons.82 In the end, Sharif agreed to withdraw 
Pakistani troops from Kargil. 
''On July 11, the Indian and Pakistani Directors General of Military Operations 
met and reached an agreement on Pakistan's withdrawal."83 By mid- July, Pakistani 
troops began to withdraw. During the conflict, Pakistan threatened to use the nuclear 
bomb if India crossed the LOC. The U.S. intelligence also reported that Pakistan was 
81  Ibid., p. 178. 
82   Ibid. 
83  Ibid. 
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preparing its nuclear weapons for possible use. "According to some reports, India also 
put its nuclear forces on alert during the conflict." Retired admiral L. Ramdas, former 
Chief of Staff of the Indian navy, reported that "over a dozen of people in responsible 
positions on both sides advocated the use of nuclear weapons during the conflict. It is 
very difficult to tell now as to what would have happened if the United States had not 
intervened during the conflict or if the Indian troops had not gained a military 
advantage before the U.S. intervention. But, it is quite possible that the conflict would 
have escalated timber, greatly increasing the dangers of a nuclear exchange between 
the two countries.84 
UPA Government came into Power in 2004 
What is important to bear in mind is that India has embarked upon the policy 
of attaining self-reliance in the nuclear energy field. According to the UP A 
government's Report to the People, 2004-08, the total installed capacity of the nuclear 
power plants is set to rise from 4,120 NIWE to 6,780 NIWE by 2009 and 7,280 
NIWE by 2010.85 
India's latest feat in the field of nuclear technology is its construction of an 80 
MWE pressurized water reactor at Kalpakkam near Chennai, which 'marks the 
beginning of indigenous PWR capability', as stated by Atomic Energy Commission 
Chairman Anil Kakodkar on 1 August 2009. He the PWR at Kalpakkam was an 
addition to the nation's family reactors.86 The PHWRs use natural uranium as fuel; 
India's fast breeder reactors (FBRs) are 'globally advanced'; the advanced heavy-water 
reactor (AHWR) is globally unique, which would use thorium as fuel, and FBF. 
would use plutonium-uranium oxide fuel. Kakodkar further added the capacity factor 
of nuclear reactors would go up to 65 per cent next year.   
September 2004: As part of the India-United States Next Steps in Strategic 
Partnership (NSSP) initiative, which began in January 2004, the U.S. Commerce 
Department announces removal of Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) 
headquarters from the U.S. Entity List and the introduction of a "presumption of 
approval" for all dual-use items not controlled by the NSG, if going to the "balance of 
plant" portion of an Indian nuclear facility subject to international inspection. 
84  Ibid. 
85 UPA Government report to the people 2004-2008, http://pmindia.nic.in/upa_en_2004-
08.pdf,accessed on 18 september2009. 
86  The Hindu, 3 August 2009. 
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October 2004: Prime Minister Manmohan Singh launches the commercial phase of 
India's fast breeder reactor program with the initiation of construction on the 500 MW 
Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR). 
December 2004: Alexander Yuryevich Rumyantsev, director of the Russian Federal 
Atomic Energy Agency, states that Russia, because of its adherence to the NSG, will 
not continue to supply fuel for the Tarapur nuclear power plant, in spite of its 
provision of 50 metric tons of enriched uranium to the same plant in 2001. 
Rumyantsev comments that fuel provided in 2001 was for safety reasons, since "India 
at that time had no fuel." 
January 2005: Russia completes delivery of a 320 metric ton nuclear reactor, 
manufactured by the OAO Izhora Factories in St. Petersburg, Russia, for the first unit 
of the Kudankulam nuclear power project in Tamil Nadu. 
March 2005: The United States agrees to sell F-16 aircraft, which can be used as 
delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons, to India and Pakistan. 
April 2005: India participates for the first time at the Convention on Nuclear Safety 
(CNS) review meeting and ratifies the CNS. 
May 2005: India passes the Weapons of Mass Destruction and Their Delivery 
Systems Bill, in response to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540. 
June 2005: A meeting between U.S. Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman and the deputy 
chairman of India's Planning Commission, Montek Singh Ahluwalia, ushers in the 
formation of five working groups under the "India-U.S. Energy Dialogue." The 
nuclear energy working group will be responsible for research exchanges between the 
U.S. Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission and their Indian 
counterparts, the DAE and the AERB (Atomic Energy Regulatory Board) on such 
topics as "fusion science and related fundamental research. 
In an overt military development, India's then Defense Minister Pranab 
Mukherjee and US then Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld signed a 10-year defense 
agreement entitled "New Framework for the U.S.-India Defense Relationship" on 
June 27, 2005, just prior to the U.S.-India joint statement. This agreement called for 
expanding the bilateral defense trade including technology transfer, as well as joint 
research, development, and production programs. Russia and France have already 
voiced approval of the United States' broad lifting of constraints on trade with India, 
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hoping soon to be able to provide fuel and technology for India's nuclear, space, and 
defense programs. Quite clearly, the 123 Agreement as it is called will end our 
nuclear isolation and free us from technology denial regimes, which existed against us 
since the 1974 Pokhran nuclear test. 123, the name come after section 123 of the US 
Atomic Energy Act under which the United States had to conclude the Nuclear 
Deal.87 
June 2005: India's Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee and U.S. Defense Secretary 
Donald Rumsfeld sign a defense agreement entitled "New Framework for the U.S.-
India Defense Relationship." Areas of cooperation will include combating the spread 
of weapons of mass destruction, collaboration on missile defense, as well as defense 
strategy and intelligence exchanges. 
June 2005: India's 490 MWE Tarapur-4 pressurized heavy water reactor is connected 
to the grid. 
July 2005: The United States and India release a joint statement during a visit by 
India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to the White House. President George W. 
Bush pledges to work with Congress to adjust U.S. laws and with the international 
community to adjust international regimes to accommodate "full civil nuclear energy 
cooperation and trade" with India. The statement declares that as a "responsible state 
with advanced nuclear technology, India should acquire the same benefits and 
advantages as other such states." 
The United States also pledged to work to achieve "full civil nuclear energy 
cooperation" with India, seeking congressional adjustment of United States 
regulations. Specifically, the July 18, 2005 joint statement mentions fuel supplies for 
safeguarded nuclear reactors at Tarapur, Tarapur is under IAEA safeguards, but more 
than a dozen of India's nuclear reactors, heavy water production facilities, enrichment 
plants, and uranium purification sites are not. It is not easily possible to separate 
civilian and military nuclear facilities completely as they are mingled with each other 
at various stages. Plutonium used in its initial 1974 nuclear detonation originated in its 
Cirrus reactor, supplied under a civilian use pledge. Even if India fulfills its pledge to 
place a few more civilian facilities under IAEA safeguards, India would retain its 
"nuclear jewels" and keep Dhruva and other weapons-related nuclear reactors away 
87  The Times of India, Pune, Sep 8, 2008, p. 8. 
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from inspectors. It is pertinent to note that the tests by India hastened the 
establishment of NSG (1974) and enactment of NPT (1978).88 
On July 18, 2005 meeting between the United States President George W. 
Bush and India's Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh, India made major gains in one 
area of particular note: access to dual-use technology. Nuclear technology will lift 
India's masses to a higher level of electricity and convenience. Rocket technology will 
offer India's space program a giant leap forward. However, this same equipment and 
technology has another possible function: serving as a means to build a better bomb or 
longer range missile. India and the United States have charted a course toward 
transforming India into a "major world power in the 21st century." While the joint 
U.S.-India statement issued on July 18 represents a significant step forward in 
strategic bilateral relations. 
As of April 2005, India passed its Weapons of Mass Destruction and their 
Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Bill to cover activities of its 
nationals, whether domestic or abroad. Many of India's recent technological 
advancements, especially in the nuclear field, have been indigenous. This is 
demonstrated by India's reprocessing of mixed uranium and plutonium carbide fuel in 
its Fast Breeder Test Reactor at Kalpakkam in June 2005 and construction on the 500 
MW Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor in October 2004. While largely self-sufficient, 
India continues its pursuit of technology to advance its nuclear and rocketry programs 
forward. 
India's promise to continue its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing 
demonstrates an offer that is feasible to United States. India has also promised to 
refrain from the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to non-nuclear p 
n states. India is not loser since it is merely reiterating its current stand and does 
represent new promise. In promising to work with the United States for the inclusion 
of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut off Treaty (in short, FMCT). India has o signed a 
promise of working toward a treaty as it is merely reiterating its current stand, while 
the United States has surrendered many of its former policies, India has merely 
restated its own. 
88  P.R. Chari, India-US Relations promoting Synergy, New Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conflicting 
Studies, Jan, 21 2003. 
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August 2005: India and Pakistan agree to set up a telephone hotline by 
September 2005 to reduce the risk of a nuclear accident. The head of the Indian 
delegation, Meera Shankar, also offers Pakistan a draft agreement "for undertaking 
measures to reduce the risks of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons 
under their respective control." In a separate agreement the two parties agree to notify 
each other prior to tests of ballistic missiles, many of which are nuclear capable. 
August 2005: Britain's Foreign and Commonwealth Office issues amended 
measures to its policy restrictions on India. The measures state that the United 
Kingdom will consider on a "case-by-case" basis license applications for items on the 
NSG Dual-Use List, departing from its March 2002 policy to deny all such exports. 
The United Kingdom will also use the same method to evaluate all applications to 
export licensable items, including those licensable under WMD export control, and 
will encourage contacts between UK nuclear scientists, academics, and those within 
the nuclear industry with their Indian counterparts. 
August 2005: As part of the reciprocal steps to complete the U.S. and Indian 
NSSP, the U.S. Department of Commerce removes six Indian entities from the Entity 
List. Removed DAE facilities include Tarapur (TAPS 1 and 2), Rajasthan (RAPS 1 
and 2), and Kudankulam (1 and 2), two of which are under IAEA safeguards and one 
of which is to be placed under safeguards after completion. The other three entities 
are ISRO subordinates and include ISRO Telemetry, Tracking and Command 
Network, ISRO Inertial Systems Unit, Thiruvananthapuram, and Space Applications 
Center, Ahmadabad. The order also eliminates export and re-exports license 
requirements on items controlled unilaterally by the United States for nuclear 
nonproliferation reasons. 
September 2005: India and France issue a joint statement under which France 
acknowledges "the need for full international civilian nuclear cooperation with India," 
pledging to "work towards this objective by working with other countries and the 
NSG and by deepening bilateral cooperation." 
September 2005: Canada's Foreign Affairs Minister Pierre Pettigrew meets 
with Indian External Affairs Minister K. Natwar Singh and the two agree on measures 
including Canada's permission for the supply of nuclear-related dual-use items to 
Indian civilian nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency 
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safeguards, in accordance with NSG guidelines, and the development of peaceful uses 
of nuclear energy through bilateral and international forums. 
For the Congress-led UPA government of Manmohan Singh, the Rajiv Action 
Plan 1988 has remained a principal mantra, guiding India's views and perspectives on 
global disarmament. In his statement to Parliament on 29 July 2005, Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh said, 'Our commitment to work for universal nuclear disarmament, 
so passionately espoused by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, in the long run will remain 
our core concern.89 
United States and India signed a major nuclear co-operation agreement during 
a visit by United States President George W Bush in 2006 March. According to the 
nuclear deal, the United States will give India access to civilian nuclear technology 
while India agrees to greater scrutiny for its nuclear programme. Later United States 
approved a controversial law allowing India to buy their nuclear reactors and fuel for 
the first time in 30 years. In 2008 July, the United Progressive Alliance survived 
a vote of confidence brought after left-wing parties withdraw their support over the 
nuclear deal. After the vote, several left-wing and regional parties form new alliance 
to oppose government, saying it has been tainted by corruption. Within three months, 
following approval by the American Congress, George W Bush signed into law a 
nuclear deal with India, which ended a three-decade ban on American nuclear trade 
with Delhi.90 
Given India's energy needs, the Bush administration praised track record as a 
responsible nuclear state and decided to enter - I civil nuclear cooperation agreement 
in March 2006 to fulfil India's energy needs. Though the agreement evoked sharp 
criticism from leftist parties in India and anti-nuclear proliferation zealots in the 
United States, India has been able to seek a clean waiver from the NSG's  member 
nations, which would enable India to procure  nuclear-fuel-related and nuclear-
technology-related components. India has already entered into agreements with the 
members of NSG: Russia, France, and the United States. 
Subsequently, replying to a debate in the Raiya Sabha (Upper House) on17 
August 2006, the Prime Minister reiterated: 
89  www.dae.gov.in/pmstmt.htm,accessed on 10 April 2009 
90  BBC India Profile and Timeline 
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Our commitment toward non-discriminatory global nuclear disarmament 
remains unwavering, in line with the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan. There is no dilution 
on this court. We do not accept proposals put forward from time to time for regional 
non-proliferation or regional disarmament. Pending nuclear disarmament, there is no 
question of India joining the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons State, or accepting full-
scope safeguards as a requirement for nuclear supplies to India, now or in the future.91 
In a similar tone, India's Minister of External Affairs Pranab Mukherjee, in an 
interview to The Hindu, published on 21 November 2006, stated: 
We are committed to non-proliferation and disarmament. What Rajiv Gandhi 
said at the special session on disarmament of the United Nations [9 June 19881 is the 
guiding principle of our foreign policy. He told the world that we would not graduate 
ourselves from the threshold level-that was our position then, before 1998. We want 
that those who have nuclear weapons should stop proliferation-vertically, 
horizontally-reduce stock-piles m1C1 have a time-bound action plan [for 
disarmament]. And that [commitment] stands. In between, of course, we have gone 
for the [May 1998 nuclear] explosions. There have been developments and that 
cannot be erased. It has already taken place-but even in that context we are serious 
and we are engaging ourselves. In this United Nations session, we are going to move 
a resolution to this effect [for time-bound disarmament.92  
Indo US Nuclear Deal 
December 2006: U.S. President George W. Bush signs the United States-India 
Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act, a key step in enabling the United States to 
share civilian nuclear technology with India. 
In December 2006, a strong majority in Congress passed the Hyde Act, which 
approved the initiative, permitting American investment in India's civil nuclear power 
industry. These steps marked a huge change in United States and global thinking 
about how to work with India. They transformed India overnight from a target of the 
international nonproliferation regime to a stakeholder in it. Beyond those first moves, 
the United States Atomic Energy Act required a formal agreement to lay the legal 
91 quoted in Mani Sankar Aiyar,’Towards a Nuclear-weapons-free and non-voilent World Order’ 
www.gsinstitute.org/pnnd/pubs/AIYAR-RajivGandhi.pdf, accessed on 20 July 2008. 
92 quoted in Mani Sankar Aiyar,’Towards a Nuclear-weapons-free and non-voilent World Order’ 
www.gsinstitute.org/pnnd/pubs/AIYAR-RajivGandhi.pdf, accessed on 20 July 2008. 
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basis for bilateral nuclear collaboration. We concluded the "123 agreement" July, 
2007, after long and sometimes difficult negotiations. The benefits of these historic 
agreements are very real for the United States. For the first time in three decades, 
India will submit its entire civil nuclear program to international inspection by 
permanently placing 14 of its 22 nuclear power plants and all of its future civil 
reactors under the safeguards of the IAEA. Within a generation, nearly 90 percent of 
India's reactors will likely be covered by the agreement. With it, India will be brought 
into the international nuclear nonproliferation mainstream. The week before the test, 
Minister of Defense George Fernandez called China "potential enemy number one'’.93 
The India - United States Nuclear deal has to translate into economics, 
security, development and FDI. In United States, the Nuclear Lobby Group has 
gained an upper hand. Then American President George W. Bush and India's Prime 
Minister Dr. Man Mohan Singh, appear before reporters during a joint conference 
after signing Nuclear Deal, Monday, July 18, 2005. 
The Lobby Group forced White House to send a tough negotiator Nicholas 
Burn to negotiate further details and possible concessions to rescue the deal in the 
United States congress, He did well and ended up in getting tough concessions prior 
to President Bush's visit to India, which clearly project that India developed its own 
clear technology and become de facto Nuclear Power after Indo-US Nuclear deal. It is 
pertinent to note that Russia is sharing, Nuclear Weapons knowledge with China, who 
m turn sharing it with Pakistan. Russia and United States are sharing, Nuclear 
weapons knowledge between themselves. United Kingdom is totally dependent on 
United States in Nuclear Weapons knowledge. United States share of Nuclear 
Weapons knowledge also with France and both United States share Nuclear Weapons 
knowledge the Israel, who in return provide Nuclear Weapons knowledge to South 
Africa. Israel and South Africa are still not recognized as Nuclear Weapon States 
though informally it is said they are in possession of Nuclear Weapons. 
February 2007: India and Pakistan sign an agreement on "Reducing the Risk 
from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons" that requires both countries to 
immediately notify each other of any nuclear weapon-related accident that could 
create cross-border radioactive fallout risk or an outbreak of nuclear war. 
93  John F. Burns, "India Carries Out Nuclear Tests in Defiance of International Treaty," New York 
Times, May 12, 1998, 1. 
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August 2008: The IAEA Board of Governors approves the Agreement for the 
Application of Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities between India and the IAEA. 
September 2008: The NSG adopts a policy to transfer trigger list and nuclear-
related dual-use items and related technology to IAEA safeguarded Indian civilian 
nuclear facilities. 
October 2008: U.S. President George W. Bush signs into law the United 
States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act. 
This brings the U.S.-India 123 Agreement into force, which grants India advance 
consent to reprocessing in a designated safeguarded facility and provides fuel 
assurances. 
November 2008: The United Kingdom revises its Indian nuclear-related 
export policy and will evaluate license applications for items on the NSG trigger and 
dual-use lists destined for IAEA-safeguarded civil nuclear facilities in India on a case-
by-case basis. 
December 2008: India and Russia agree to cooperate in the construction of 
four nuclear power units at Kudankulam. A Russian diplomatic source reportedly 
claims the four new reactors may be VVER-1200s, capable of generating 1,170 MW 
each. The official also claims that Russia has agreed to supply India with six 
additional reactors. 
December 2008: France's AREVA signs an agreement with India's DAE to 
supply 300 tons of uranium to Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd. (NPCIL). The 
first consignment of sixty tons of uranium ore concentrate reportedly arrives in April 
2009 and will be used in pressurized heavy water reactors. 
January 2009: According to the Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (SIPRI), India has approximately sixty to seventy nuclear warheads, but its 
nuclear stockpile is thought to be only partially deployed. 
January 2009: India and Kazakhstan sign a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) under which Kazakhstan will reportedly receive Indian-made nuclear reactors 
and supply India with 2,000 tons of uranium. 
February 2009: India's NPCIL signs a MoU with France's AREVA to set up 
two to six EPR reactors (advanced pressurized water reactors) at Jaitapur. 
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February 2009: Russia's TVEL and India's DAE sign a long-term contract for 
TVEL to supply India with 2,000 metric tons of uranium pellets. Thirty tons of pellets 
are reportedly delivered to the Nuclear Fuel Complex at Hyderabad in April 2009. 
May 2009: The Agreement for the Application of Safeguards to Civilian 
Nuclear Facilities between India and the IAEA enters into force. 
May 2009: India signs the IAEA's Additional Protocol, which allows for the 
application of strengthened safeguards. 
Further, India's entry into the select group of five countries with the capability 
of building and operating indigenous nuclear-powered submarines, launched by Prime 
Minister Singh on 26 July 2009, is another milestone in India's modernization of its 
defense system. Singh stated that 'India's entry into the exclusive club will create 
ripples in the region.94 Singh further elaborated it was imperative for India to keep 
pace with 'global advances' while focusing on regional security. At the same time, 
Prime Minister Singh tried to assuage the fears of India's neighbours when he 
categorically said: 
We do not have any aggressive designs nor do we seek to threaten anyone. We 
seek an external environment .in our region and beyond that, conducive to our 
peaceful development and the protection of our value systems. Nevertheless, it is 
incumbent upon us to take all measures necessary to safeguard our country and keep 
pace with technological advancements.95  
July 2009: India launches the INS Arihant, its first nuclear-powered 
submarine, which will reportedly be capable of launching nuclear weapons. 
August 2009: India and Namibia sign an Agreement on Cooperation in 
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy that reportedly includes the sale of uranium to India. 
October 2009: The IAEA receives written notification of fourteen nuclear-
related facilities that India will put under safeguards: the Uranium Oxide Plant, 
Ceramic Fuel Fabrication Plant, Enriched Uranium Oxide Plant, Enriched Fuel 
Fabrication Plant and Gadolinia Facility at the Nuclear Fuel Complex in Hyderabad; 
TAPS 1 & 2 at Tarapur; RAPS 1, 2, 5 and 6 at Rajasthan; and KK 1 & 2 at 
Kundankulam. 
94 The Hindu, 17 June 2009. 
95 The Hindu, 17 June 2009. 
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October 2009: India designates the following sites for setting up light water 
power reactors: Jaitapur, in cooperation with France; Kudankulum and Haripur, in 
cooperation with Russia; and Chhayamithi Virdi and Kovvada, in cooperation with 
the United States. 
November 2009: India and the European Union sign an agreement for 
collaborative research on fusion energy. 
November 2009: Canada and India conclude negotiations on a nuclear 
cooperation agreement that would allow Canadian firms to trade in nuclear-related 
items with India. 
But India's double standards on non-proliferation discourse have come under 
the severe criticism that India does not use a similar yardstick to criticize the NPT for 
being discriminatory when it comes to its own 'extended neighbourhood'. One scholar, 
in his perceptive article, observes: 
Here, on the one hand, India has repeatedly argued that the prevailing non-
proliferation regime constitutes 'nuclear apartheid' and that it will, therefore, continue 
to develop a nuclear weapons programme outside the purview of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), much to the chagrin of the existing nuclear powers. On 
the other hand, it has made little effort to disguise its concern when countries such as 
Iran, Syria and North Korea have attempted to contest the discriminatory principles 
enshrined in the NPT, because it wants to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons in its 
extended neighbourhood. This apparent 'hypocrisy' has been mistakenly attributed to a 
desire to curry favour with the US.96 
Both India and Pakistan, instead of indulging in mock nuclear exchanges, 
must concentrate on the social and economic problems of their people, and promote 
the economic development and social welfare of the neglected strata of their societies, 
including minorities and the hapless ones at the grassroots level. India must refrain 
from overreacting to Pakistan's nuclear programme, for India is fully capable of 
meeting any threat from Pakistan. What is important is that the two countries should 
find a reasonable, rational, and pragmatic solution to the nuclear problem. 
 
96  Sagar, 'State of Mind', p.805. 
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South Asian region consists of seven countries - India, Pakistan, Bhutan, 
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Maldives. Among all these countries India and 
Pakistan are two huge geographical entities of the South Asian region which, since 
their independence, have been involved in arms race and nuclear proliferation and 
have nuclearized the region. 
In the South Asian region it is important to discuss the case of India and 
Pakistan as these are the two opponent and leading countries. India is a natural sub-
continent and has a vast island as compared to Pakistan.1 Both the countries have got 
their independence in 1947 from the British colonialism, after that they have been 
involved in deep and continuous political struggle/fight with each other since the and 
are bounded by several internal and external security problems.2 They have fought 
three wars (1947, 1965, 1971) which raised a serious concern of a nuclear war in 
South Asia as both countries have nuclear capabilities. 
  The first war between India and Pakistan took place in 1947 over Kashmir. In 
October 1947, Pakistani tribals, mainly pathans, attacked from the northwest reaches 
of Kashmir in order to detain/hold the territory. The Maharaja of Kashmir pleaded to 
India for urgent aid, concurring to give up the State of India in return. India installed 
its arms forces in Kashmir and let down the advance of the tribal force.3 
In November 1947, Indian army counter-attacked and successfully broke 
through the enemy defenses. In December1947, Indian army suffered a delay because 
of logistical problems. The problems allow/permit the forces of Pakistan-occupied-
Kashmir (Azad Kashmir) to take the proposal and force the Indian troops to move 
back from the border areas. In 1948, the Indian side builds up another offensive to 
retake some of the ground that it had lost.4 Regular units of the Pakistani army 
1  Prakash Chandra, International Relations: Foreign Policies of Major Powers and Regional 
Systems, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1994, pp.283-284. 
2  Jafar Raza Bilgrami, The Arms Race and Disarmament, New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publication, 
pp.16-18 
3  Sandeep Gopalan, “India – Pakistan Relations: Legalization and Agreement Design”, Journal of 
Transnational Law, date 5-1-2007. www.highbeam.com/doc/IGI-1701141115.html , last accessed 
on 2011 
4   “India Pakistan Wars”, the Columbia Encyclopedia, is available at 
www.infoplese.com/ceb/hitory/A0858804.html,  last accessed on 5-3-2011 
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became more actively involved so, no doubt, fearing that the war might move into 
Pakistan proper. As the conflict rose, the Indian leadership was fast to identify that the 
war could not be brought to a close unless Pakistani support for the Azad Kashmir 
forces could be stopped. Accordingly, on the recommendation of Governor General, 
Earl Louis Mountbatten (Britain's last Viceroy to India in 1947 and Governor General 
of India, 1947-1948), the Indian government sought United Nations mediation of the 
conflict on December 31, 1947. There was some opposition to this move within the 
cabinet by those who did not concur with referring the Kashmir dispute to the United 
Nations. On January 1, 1949, the UN mediation process brought the war to a close.5 
The military representatives of India and Pakistan met together in Karachi in July, 
1949, under the sponsorship of the Truce Sub-Committee of the United Nations 
Commission for   India   and   Pakistan   and   signed   an   agreement   regarding   the 
creation of a cease-fire line in the State of Jammu & Kashmir.6 
In 1965, the second war between India and Pakistan was also fought over 
Kashmir. In August 1965, the war began with the penetration of Pakistani-controlled 
rebels/insurrectionary into Indian Kashmir. Conflicts with Indian forces started as 
early as August 6 or 7, and the first major engagement between the regular armed 
forces of the two sides took place on August 14. On 15th August, the Indian forces 
achieved a major victory after a prolonged weaponry bombardment and took into 
custody three important positions in the northern sector. The Pakistani's counter-
attacked, moving concentrations near Tithwal, Uri, and Poonch. Their move, in turn, 
aggravated a powerful Indian thrust into Azad Kashmir.7 
On September 1, the Indian gains led to a major Pakistani counter-attack in 
Southern Sector in Punjab where Indians bear heavy losses. The absolute strength of 
the Pakistani force led Indian commanders to call in air support. On September 2, 
Pakistan reacted with its own air beat in both Kashmir and Punjab. On September 20, 
the war was at the point of a impasse when the UN Security Council unanimously 
passed a Resolution that called for a cease-fire. On September 21, India accepted the 
5  Ibid. 
6   “Agreement between Military Representatives of India and Pakistan Regarding the 
Establishment of a Cease-Fire Line in the State of Jammu & Kashmir (Annex 26 of UNCIP Third 
Report – S/1430 Add 1 to 3) 29 July, 1949,” http://www.ipcs.org/INDO-PAK-10-Docu.pdf.  Last 
accessed on 11-3-2011. 
7   “India Pakistan Wars”, The Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, Columbia University Press, 
2007, http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/history/A085880.html  last accessed on 11-3-2011. 
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cease-fire Resolution and Islamabad on September 22, and on September 23, the war  
was ended.8 Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri of India and President Ayub Khan of 
Pakistan met in Tashkent, USSR, (now in Uzbekistan) and signed the Tashkent 
Agreement. This agreement required that both sides withdraw by February 26, 1966, 
to positions held prior to August 5, 1965, and observe the cease-fire line agreed to on 
June 30, 1965.9 
  In 1971, the third war occurred between India and Pakistan. During 1970-71 
demands for autonomy were made in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). But Pakistan 
took military actions to repress the independence movement. As a result, nearly 10 
million refugees fled to Indian state West Bengal. By mid-summer, India decided to 
help/support Bangladesh in its independence movement, in the absence of a political 
solution to the East Pakistan crisis. To the East Pakistani armed resistance fighters 
India provided organized and trained refuge to the Mukti Bahini (meaning Liberation 
Force in Bengali). In the Eastern Sector, Pakistan was not able to discourage Indian's 
activities hence, on December 3, 1971, it launched an air attack in the Western Sector 
on a number of Indian airfields, including Amritsar in Punjab, Ambala in Haryana, 
and Udhampur in Jammu & Kashmir. The attacks did not succeed in imposing 
substantial damage. By the next day the Indian Air Force struck back and quickly 
achieved air superiority. In East Pakistan, the Indian Air Force destroyed the small air 
reliant and put the Dhaka airfield out of commission. In the meantime, the Indian 
Navy effectively blockaded East Pakistan. On December 16 Dhaka fell to combined 
Indian and Mukti Bahini forces, bringing a quick end to the war.10 
Further, on December 3, the Pakistani Army also launched armoured 
operations in Rajasthan and ground operations in Kashmir and Punjab, and. In 
Chamba area of Kashmir Pakistan forced India to move back from its positions. 
Along the cease-fire line India made some small gains in other parts of Kashmir,. The 
major Indian counter-offensive came in the Sialkot-Shakargarh area, south and west 
of Chamba. Ultimately, in mid-December, a UN cease-fire was agreed after the defeat 
of the Pakistan. Pakistan was thrown into a serious political chaos as Pakistan 
received stern blow in the war as it lost the eastern half, an army of about one lakh 
soldiers. Mujibur Rahman as Prime Minister emerged as a leader of Bangladesh, and 
8  Ibid. 
9  Indo-Pakistan Relations: Legalization and Agreement Design, No. 3. 
10   “The 1971 War”, n. 7. 
122 
 
                                                          
Chapter  4 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto as a leader of Pakistan.11 The leader of both the countries, on July 
2, 1972, namely Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India and President Zulfiqar Ali 
Bhutto of Pakistan signed the Shimla Agreement that resulted in the recognition of the 
new nation of Bangladesh. For the establishment of long-lasting peace in the 
subcontinent It was agreed under this agreement that both the states put an end to the 
conflict and argument and would work for the promotion of a friendly and pleasant 
relationship .  By this agreement tensions between the two countries were reduced and 
by Pakistan's recognition of Bangladesh in 1974, but tensions have periodically 
reappeared.12 
Kargil Conflict 1999 
In 1999, Kargil conflict broke out between India and Pakistan. As it is 
discussed above that India and Pakistan before Kargil conflict have fought three wars 
since 1947. This number rises to four if one considers the Kargil conflict as a war. 
Because the number of people killed on each side go beyond the level that is often 
regarded enough to declare a conflict as a war.13 
In the winter of 1999, Pakistan sent several thousand militants and troops 
across the Line of Control (LOC) into the Kargil heights.14 Pakistan was confident 
that it's conventional and nuclear forces would deter a large-scale Indian reprisal and 
it also hoped to gain global attention for the Kashmir issue by this action.15 
The Pakistani penetration met with no resistance in the unoccupied 
mountainous region of Kargil, after crossing the LOC, thus, they pushed farther into 
the region and dug in. From their positions the Pakistani troops threatened not only 
Highway IA, the lifeline between Kashmir and Ladakh, but also India's hold on 
Siachin. 
India discovered the movement of Pakistani penetration in Kargil in May 
1999,  and responded by sending military troops into the region. After that, several 
weeks of intense fighting continued between Pakistani infiltrations and Indian troops, 
11 Ibid. 
12  India-Pakistan Relations, n. 9. 
13  Nathern E. Busch, No End Sight: The Continuing Menace of Nuclear Proliferation, New Delhi: 
Manas Publications, (in collaboration with the University Press of Kentucky), 2005, p. 175. 
14  Ibid., p.178. 
15  Ibid., p.177. 
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which included heavy Indian weaponry and air attacks. Air attacks were necessary 
because on the mountain of Kargil Pakistani penetration had occupied top positions.  
If Pakistan did not withdraw its troops from Indian-controlled Kashmir by 
mid-1999, the Vajpayee administration threatened to extend fighting beyond the LOC. 
India indicated its intention to escalate the conflict by massing its troops along the 
LOC and the international border and send off naval ships in preparations for a naval 
blockade of Pakistani ports.16 
"As outbreak of a lager conflict appeared impending and Pakistan increasingly 
came under strong international criticism, Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif 
asked the United States' President Bill Clinton to mediate between the two sides”.17 A 
meeting took place on 4 July, between Sharif and Clinton which also included the 
members of the U.S. National Security Council. From the Indian Territory Clinton 
advised Pakistan to immediately withdraw its troops. One of the arresting features of 
this meeting was that "Sharif seemed astonished" when Clinton informed him that 
"the United States' intelligence had detected preparations by the Pakistani military to 
deploy nuclear weapons.”18 In the end, from Kargil Sharif agreed to withdraw 
Pakistani troops. 
“On July 11, the Indian and Pakistani Directors-General of Military 
Operations met and reached an agreement on Pakistan's withdrawal”.19 Pakistani 
troops began to withdraw by the mid-July. During the conflict, if India crossed the 
LOC Pakistan threatened to use the nuclear bomb. For possible use Pakistan was 
preparing its nuclear weapons, reported by U.S. Intelligence. “According to some 
reports, India also put its nuclear forces on alert during the conflict.", Former Chief of 
Staff of the Indian Navy Retired Admiral L. Ramdas, reported that "over a dozen 
people in responsible positions on both sides advocated the use of nuclear weapons 
during the conflict”.20 If the United States had not intervened during the conflict, It is 
very hard to tell now as to what would have happened and also if the Indian troops 
had not gained a military advantage before the U.S. intervention. But it is quite 
16  Ibid., p. 178. 
17  Ibid. 
18  Ibid. 
19  Ibid. 
20  Ibid. 
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possible that the conflict would have risen further, greatly increasing progressively 
more the dangers of a nuclear exchange between the two countries.21 
Basically two countries are involved in Nuclear Disarmament in South Asia  
i.e. India and Pakistan as it is also mentioned earlier. The arms race during the cold 
war had been between two blocs at the global level i.e., eastern bloc and western bloc. 
In South Asia the nuclear arms race has been between India and Pakistan.  In 1974, 
India conducted   ‘peaceful’ nuclear explosion which speeded the nuclear arms race 
between the two countries. In 1998, both these countries conducted nuclear tests. 
There are a large number of nuclear arms control treaties signed between USA 
and the USSR/Russia as compared to the nuclear arms control treaties between India 
and Pakistan.  
Stands which both India and Pakistan have taken on Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty also constitute a part of the study of 
nuclear arms control in South Asia. India issued the Draft Nuclear Doctrine which 
also constituted provisions for disarmament and arms control in 1999. 
Immediately after the end of the Cold War, many considered that the problem 
of the past was nuclear proliferation. But the trends did not turn out as expected. India 
and Pakistan went nuclear in 1998 and opened a Pandora ’s Box. In the post-Cold 
War era nuclear proliferation, however, has tended to remain confined to three regions 
of the world: South Asia, Middle East, and East Asia. These are the region where 
states are locked up in intense regional rivalries. India and Pakistan seem perpetually 
on the verge of a war. Broadly conflictual relationship has continued in between India 
and China.22 
This dissertation looks and examines the drivers of nuclear proliferation in so 
far as the key states in the region are concerned. It examines the role that the rivalries 
with their neighbours have played in the spread of nuclear weapons in the region. The 
South Asia states have acquired or sought to acquire nuclear weapons for traditional 
national security reasons. But the dissertation goes further in exploring the role that 
the regional conflicts have played in shaping the basic security imperative of the 
states in the region. 
21  Ibid. 
22  George Perkovich, "Bush's Nuclear Revolution: A Regime Change in Nonproliferation," Foreign 
Affairs, March/April, 2003. 
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For the great powers the issue for the state always was how to manage the 
atom. Nuclear proliferation has been declared as a major policy goal of the nuclear 
weapon states, led by the United States. To support this policy goal, an elaborate 
nuclear non-proliferation regime has been put in place over the years presuming that 
the spread of nuclear weapons into many hands would further put in danger prospects 
for international peace and security.23 There are a series of treaties banning the 
deployment of weapons of mass destruction from set geographical boundaries such as 
the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, the treaty of Tlatelolco 
of 1967, and the Seabed Arms Control Treaty of 1972. And then there is the NPT that 
came into force in 1970. It is the more important institution, for it openly lays out the 
extract of the "nuclear bargain" between the nuclear "haves" and "have-nots." In the 
system of international safeguards, the other locus of rules and decision-making 
procedures of the nuclear non-proliferation regime can be found, which is 
administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Less instant, but no 
less critical, rules and decision-making procedures can be found in each country's 
laws –especially the nuclear policies of other states having significant impact of the 
great powers. Two other sources of rules and decision-making procedures emerged in 
the form of informal coalitions of nations, such as the Zangger Committee and the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group, that voluntarily put a ceiling on the export of equipment and 
materials that could be used to develop nuclear weapons. 
The consequences, till date, of such an elaborate nuclear non-proliferation 
regime have been rather mixed. Many economically powerful countries like Germany 
and Japan have so far abstained from acquiring nuclear weapons. Some other 
countries like Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, South Korea, and Taiwan did try to 
acquire nuclear weapons but gave them up mid-way. Finally, South Asia remains 
highly dangerous because nuclear proliferation in these regions continues largely 
unabated. 
Irrespective of its mixed results, the nuclear non-proliferation regime is widely 
recognized as one of the most successful arms-control regimes ever. And the NPT has 
been the bastion of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the key international 
standard-setting document for conduct in the nuclear era. 
23  Richard N. Rosecrance (ed.), The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1964. 
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India and Pakistan Stand on NPT 
The five South Asian countries - Bangladesh, Maldives, Bhutan, Nepal, and 
Sri Lanka are parties to NPT. They had dedicated not to obtain or develop nuclear 
weapons. Only India and Pakistan the two countries in South Asia have not signed 
and approved NPT.24 A conversation about these two countries is made as under. 
The super powers were involved in discussions for a Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty by 1966.  At this time India demanded inter-alia that “a fair treaty 
must obligate existing nuclear weapons states to freeze and then eliminate their 
nuclear / arsenals, and must provide "security guarantees" to non-nuclear weapon 
states, "India white professing its own abjuration of nuclear weapons, refused to 
surrender the right to develop and detonate peaceful nuclear explosives as long the 
recognized nuclear weapon states, retain the right to conduct nuclear detonations”.25 
At the draft stage India itself made its stand very clear, She held the view that 
NPT did not safeguard her interests; it also did not promote disarmament. Therefore, 
India held that it would not sign the treaty and also not produce nuclear bomb but 
would follow her atomic programme for peaceful purposes. India repeated this stand 
many times.26 When the Draft of NPT was read for signature India refused to sign it. 
A study of India's stand on NPT is as follows: 
Firstly, India took the stand that NPT included the inequality of compulsion 
between Nuclear Weapon States (NWS)) and Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS). 
The treaty did not control the vertical proliferation, but put limitations on horizontal 
proliferation. Hence, the equal and mutual compulsions of NWS and NNWS it 
avoided. In spite of the fact, that the sufficient stocks of nuclear weapons were having 
by NWS. Within the NWS NPT remained unsuccessful to control the proliferation of 
nuclear weapon. But the treaty was lacking in how the controls applied to the NNWS 
could also be applied to the NWS. 
Secondly, India found NPT discriminatory as it involved discrimination in the 
use of international safeguards by creating two different sets of standards one for the 
24  Shaista Tabassum, Nuclear Policy of the United States in South Asia: Proliferation or Non-
Proliferation (1947 – 1990), Karachi: Royal Book Company, 2003, p. 66. 
25  George Perkovich, n. 22, p. 30. 
26  H.D. Tiwari, India and the Problem of Nuclear Proliferation, Delhi: R.K. Publishers, 1988, p. 
140. 
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NWS and the other for NNWS.27 She held the opinion that "the guiding principle that 
should be followed in regards to safeguards is that they should be universally 
applicable and be based on objective and non-discriminative criteria. However, NPT 
placed all safeguards and controls on the NNWS and none whatsoever on the NWS. 
India, however, had no objections to the presence of the IAEA in relation to 
safeguards".28 As compared to the NPT safeguards she found that the IAEA 
safeguards system as more inclusive and non-discriminative. 
Thirdly, NPT had referred to the security insinuation for the NNWS. In India's 
view, the problem of the security of the NNWS from the use or threat of use of 
nuclear weapons arose from the possession and continual stock piling of nuclear 
weapons. India firmly considers that only through comprehensive nuclear 
disarmament the real guarantee of security in this regard could be provided. 
But to possess the nuclear weapons NPT allowed the NWS to possess it, 
whereas, NNWS were not allowed to create or obtain nuclear weapons. Moreover, 
India held the view that the security pledge offered by the NWS to the NNWS should 
not be made a condition for signing NPT as it was different to the UN charter. India 
demanded that this matter should be dealt with independently. 
Fourthly, and lastly, for the NNWS, NPT denied the peaceful use of atomic 
energy, for this reason also India did not sign the NPT as it discriminated in the 
NNWS's right to have peaceful nuclear explosions. India powerfully criticized the 
treaty for this reason.29 
Pakistan's stand on NPT was shaped by its security concerns vis-a-vis India. It 
believed that NPT as an unequal document. She, like India, refused to sign NPT. It 
took the stand that the NPT would have little appeal and exercise less weight if the 
near nuclear states do not subscribe to it. It was also in favour of total abolition of all 
types of weapons of mass destruction including nuclear, chemical and biological 
weapons of all super powers. It also believed the complete elimination must be the 
scope of NPT and it must include a fixed time table for the future.30 
27  Ibid., pp. 140-141. 
28  Ibid., p.141. 
29  Ibid., pp.143-144. 
30  Shaista Tabassum, n. 24, p. 63 
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Pakistan took the stand that NPT should be at the same time approved by both 
Pakistan and India. Similarly, the full scope safeguards for all nuclear installations 
both, the countries should simultaneously accept it. They should also mutually agree 
for the inspection of each other's nuclear facilities.31 
In 1995, When NPT came up for extension, as it had worked very well 
widespread opinion among policymakers and experts were that the NPT needed to be 
extended. This was premised on the belief that an extension of NPT for unlimited 
duration would not only preserve all the gains made by the nuclear proliferation 
regime as a whole but would also make sure that future progress gathers momentum. 
The significance of the NPT for the nuclear non-proliferation regime existed in it 
being the sole global instrument through which non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) 
can make a legal commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons. 
Regimes do not function in a vacuum and their effects differ the states. The 
same most likely has happened with the nuclear non-proliferation regime.  The non-
proliferation regime failed to work effectively in some parts of the world such as 
Middle East and South Asia. Ironically, it was in these two regions, if this regime was 
most needed to operate well. In these regions nuclear proliferation has always been 
highly likely due to various structural factors. The protracted conflicts exhibiting a 
high level of security dilemma are these regions. Moreover, the nuclear security 
umbrella of either of two great powers, the major states in these regions also did not 
enjoy. The great power alliances were strong as in other parts of the world as 
compared to these regions with the result the states in these regions had to fend for 
themselves for their own security without an explicit assurance of support from either 
of the two great powers. In short, the regions are high-conflict zones with a high 
propensity for nuclear proliferation. 
In this region if nuclear non-proliferation was really a primary strategic goal 
for great powers, the lack of enforcement of the non-proliferation regime by the great 
power is visible, we also see inconsistent nuclear proliferation policies. And this 
strengthens the nuclear proliferation dynamic in the nuclear proliferation prone region 
by becoming a permissive cause of nuclear proliferation in the region. This, however, 
could not become any different because of the structure of international politics. 
31  Ibid., p.65. 
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Influence at the expense of the other for their own security was the first priority of 
great powers in an anarchic international environment as to increase their share global 
power. And non-proliferation could only have been a second-tier priority.  
Therefore, as the creation of a non-proliferation regime could have come about 
as part of a earnest desire on the part of nuclear weapon states to prevent the extension 
of the nuclear club, lack in their nuclear monopoly and its maintenance as an effectual 
international regime became a casualty of the ground realities of great power politics. 
  Briefly, during the Cold War the containment of nuclear proliferation clearly 
depended on the cooperation between the two great powers. So, if the two great 
powers viewed the important strategic goal, was the prevention of nuclear 
proliferation, for the effective working of the non-proliferation regime, it was possible 
that they would have made an effort to come together. But during the Cold War, the 
relationship with each other was the main concern of both the super powers. Every 
other goal was made submissive to this larger global dynamic. The result was that the 
great powers policies of non-proliferation ended up giving up a boost to the 
proliferation dynamic in the region. 
The high-conflict zones have a direct causal relationship with nuclear 
proliferation and thereby, the failure of the non-proliferation regime, I argue that great 
power politics acted as intervening variables in such regions and its impact on nuclear 
proliferation policies of great powers, gave a boost to nuclear proliferation and led to 
a collapse of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The success or failure of any treaty 
regime depends on how it is enforced by the great powers, the anarchic international 
environment, are the "guardians" of a treaty. In case of the non-proliferation regime, 
where it was most needed, the strategy of great powers came in their way of making 
an extremely important treaty work effectively in regions. 
In the South Asia region  where the influence of the non-proliferation regime 
has failed to work  and which have often been seen as the epicenters of nuclear 
proliferation today, but the root problems go  back to the Cold War reaction of the 
great powers to nuclear proliferation in these region. The region remained in a state of 
instability in so far as the great power rivalry was concerned.  Both the great powers 
around the globe were trying to maximize their influence especially in the region, 
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thereby trying to increase their relative power. And therefore, in these regions the 
cause of nuclear non-proliferation, became a second-tier priority. 
 Nuclear proliferation policies in the high-conflict zones, pursued by the great 
powers did give a boost to the nuclear proliferation dynamic in these regions or 
alternatively nuclear proliferation could have been controlled, if the great powers had 
pursued different proliferation policies, then it would be reasonable to argue that it is 
the great power politics leading to a lack of implementation of the non-proliferation 
regime that is responsible for the failure of the regime in these regions. 
During the Cold War the professed intentions of the great powers, nuclear 
non-proliferation was not an important strategic goal for great powers, and they did 
not really cooperate to counter the threat of proliferation. If the other parts of the 
world have been relatively proliferation-free also gets weakened, it shows that the 
great powers did not even cooperate to counter nuclear proliferation in the region 
which was most proliferation-prone, then it has been because of the non-proliferation 
regime. In the most difficult region, if the great powers were not even able to make 
nuclear proliferation their top priority at the expense of their other strategic goals, 
then there is little possibility to enforcing this regime in those parts of the world 
where there were a number of factors working in favor of non-proliferation. 
Indo-Pak Wars and Crisis 
We find that if there is one single factor that appears to have remained 
continually prominent in Indo/Pak relations over the years, in South Asian region, it is 
mutual distrust and the politics that support it. Both the countries at the same time 
face serious national challenges of socio-economic development, at the very 
minimum level which require an environment of peace and stability and preferably 
detente and friendship at the optimum level. On the negative elements of hostility 
conventional wisdom tends to focus essentially by emphasizing the three wars and the 
Kargil conflict, which have been fought between the two countries. This perception 
was supported by the present crisis and the increasing focus on nuclear proliferation. 
Two points merit note here. Firstly in between the two countries there had been a 25 
years peace period. Undoubtedly a breakable, tenuous and often tension-filled peace 
with occasional crossfire, but peace yet has lasted over the longest enduring period in 
this region's history.  
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Secondly is that enmity, conflict and disagreement are essentially the products 
of observation heavily influenced by mistrust with as much objectivity as possible, it 
is this aspect that needs to be addressed as honestly. The uselessness of strife and the 
great damage the wars and the armament and nuclear race impose on their economies 
were admitted by both the politicians of the countries. The politicians understand that 
with millions of people below the poverty line in both countries we could improve the 
quality of life by diverting the scarce resources spent on the large armies and 
weaponry. Through bilateral talks, positive gestures between India and Pakistan have 
been tried by opening up trade routes and suggesting closer links.32 These attempts to 
reinforce the bond between the two neighbors have been impecunious by new tension 
and conflicts. 
The heritage of incredulity and mistrust predates the independence of the two 
countries. After independence in 1947, the mistrust gathered momentum with the split 
of the freedom movement, which also created the structural problems and 
contradiction and which carries on to build up mistrust.33 Both Pakistan and India 
tried hard to gain advantage in the partition that occurred in the period before and 
after partition. The process of independence itself led many casualties on each side 
and migration of people between the two countries which resulted to resentment 
arising out of communal riots. 
The basis of two nation states lies at the root of the structural problems that 
mutually exclusive ideology and religion constitute. A system of rational ideas on one 
side and on the other side religion as the basis of the nation state is the concept of the 
two-nation theory. Thus Pakistan is ruled by a military regime where 90% of the 
populations are Muslims, India is a democratic nation where 80% of the population is 
Hindu.34 These points of dissimilarity create dissonance and pose threatened values.35 
There was a biggest challenge for both states to live in harmony, therefore, is to find 
some combining element in their ideology and to accept each other's differences and 
denomination. It should be to make peace and to obtain stability, by doing so they 
could remove focus from the dynamic ideological and religious identities towards 
32  Sumantra, Bose, 'Kashmir: Sources of conflict, dimensions of Peace', International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, Survival, vol.  41, Autumn 1999, p. 150. 
33  Pankaj, Mishra, The Birth of a Nation', The New York Review, October 5, 2000, p. 33. 
34  Karl, Froistad. Naerbilde av India 'Pictures of India'. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2000,  p. 62. 
35  Jasjit Singh, India and Pakistan, Crisis of Relationship, New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1996, p. 
102. 
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solutions pretentious/affected by common interest. That seems very difficult to 
achieve because each country's political direction was influenced by the number of 
religious groups. Hence these different powers are influenced and have delayed the 
decision-making process and perspective. Common focus should be to increase 
bilateral and multilateral trade and to reduce poverty. Pakistan never managed to do 
the same, unlike India, which made rapid progress towards democracy. From the very 
beginning Pakistan has suffered from philosophy of Pakistan and  inner contradiction 
between its leadership. 
The moving spirit behind the creation of Pakistan, the father of the nation, 
Qaid-e-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah, died in September 1948 just after 
independence. His successors in the Muslim League never managed to guide the 
nation towards a stable democracy.36 It seems that political arena was influenced by 
strong ethnic and regional groupings and was discouraged to unite the people of 
Pakistan ideologically and agree on a political line to follow. They do appear to suffer 
from identity crises. This was proved in October 1999, when General Musharraf and 
his regime removed from power Prime Minister Sharif and his Government.37 
However, the military regime has given three years by the High Court in Pakistan to 
achieve their ambitious aim -a democracy with real popular influence, free from 
corruption. The almost total absence of interdependence between the two states 
another major structural factor, which has militated against any erosion of mistrust. In 
fact, in Pakistan mistrust itself has led to a strong resistance in between the two 
countries Pakistan was not in favor of the possible creation of any interdependencies 
inspired by several agreements to increase cultural, social and commercial 
interaction.38 One theory is that the fears apparently trunk from the perception of 
domination by the larger state, a sense of defenselessness from the risk of cultural 
assimilation and therefore the fear of loss of identity. It has to be emphasized that 
because of India's hegemony, Pakistan is sensitive, which boost up the absence of 
interdependence. 
The another aspect is that Pakistan's domestic social-political challenges are so 
immense that by  uniting emotional issues Pakistan attempts to 'run away' from the 
problem by turning the focus toward such as the relationship to India and this leads to 
36  Mishra, n. 33, pp. 32-37. 
37  The Economist 'Pakistan's ransom', December 16, 2000. 
38  Jasjit Singh, n. 35, pp 101-103. 
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the mistrust. The mistrust as Pakistan have also exist in India, but it is not of such 
significance as in Pakistan as a device/ tool of domestic politics.39 Therefore, the two 
countries have not realized the interdependence between themselves, which could 
help in removing mistrust and the sense of threat from India, which was raised so 
often by many people in Pakistan. 
The Agreement on Non-Attack on Each Other's Nuclear Installations and 
Facilities of India and Pakistan 
On 40th Commemorative Anniversary session of the UN General Assembly 
Pakistani President Zia-ul Haq initiated the beginning of an important move, which 
finally resulted in Indo-Pakistan bilateral agreement on non-attack on each other's 
nuclear installations and facilities. While addressing this Session of the General 
Assembly General Zia-ul Haq, outlined a five point offer which provided that both 
India and Pakistan should; 
(1) Simultaneously sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; 
(2)    Accept the mutual inspection of each other's nuclear facilities; 
 (3)  At the same time accept the full scope of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency; 
 (4)    have a joint declaration give up the acquisition or development of nuclear 
 weapons; and 
(5)     agree to the establishment of a nuclear weapon free-zone in South Asia. 
Zia affirmed Pakistan's willingness to attend any conference to achieve this 
end on the basis of reciprocity and respect for sovereignty.40 
But the above given proposals was rejected by India because she, in general,   
felt   that   to   do   so   would   amount   to   its   acceptance   of the discrimination in 
favour of Nuclear Weapon States. 
    On   the   ground   that  NPT   was discriminative and biased, India   had   long   
opposed it  . Therefore, it was not possible for India to say yes to Pakistan's proposal 
to sign NPT. Moreover, India had kept its nuclear option open vis-a-vis other powers, 
39  Ibid, p. 103. 
40  Mohammad B. Alam, India’s Nuclear Policy, Delhi: Mittal Publications, 1988, p. 42. 
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especially, China, due to this reason also India could not accept Zia's proposals.41 
Proposal of mutual inspection of each other's nuclear facilities of Pakistan was also 
opposed by India on two grounds. First, "mutual inspection would be a totally 
asymmetrical bargain from the Indian point of view". Second, "neither side had the 
necessary technical capacity to conduct a perfect inspection of the other. Neither of 
the two countries could be sure that the other had not tucked away a few nuclear 
weapons somewhere’’.42 In fact, India was doubtful of Pakistan's nuclear weapons 
programme. She was increasingly concerned about Pakistan's secret nuclear weapons 
activities. It was widely believed in India that Pakistan in order to cover up her 
nuclear programme it would follow a vague nuclear policy. Under this vagueness. 
Pakistan could develop all the necessary facilities, perhaps not assemble the bomb, 
surely not hold the tests and at the same time could take steps leaving no one in doubt 
that it was obsessed with essential capability to make the bomb at a short notice. 
Pakistan on  her  part  oppose d these   allegations. She repeated that Pakistan 
was having a desire of a peaceful nuclear programme.43 The Prime Minister Rajiv 
Gandhi of India and President Zia-ul Haq of Pakistan together agreed not to attack 
each other's nuclear amenities on 18th December 1985. The declaration was a 
welcome step in view of the adverse relationship between India and Pakistan, which 
in the past had resulted in deadly wars.44 
On 31st December 1988, the Foreign Secretaries of the two countries signed 
the bilateral agreement on the interdict of attack on each other's nuclear installations 
and facilities between India and Pakistan. This agreement contained three articles. It 
provides that both the countries shall not take any action which can cause injure or 
destruction to nuclear installation or facility of the other country. Both the parties to 
the agreement shall not undertake, promote or participate in any such action in any 
way. 
The agreement also provides that whenever there is any change each country 
shall yearly inform the other country about the latitude and longitude of its nuclear 
installations and facilities.45 
41  Ibid., p.43 
42  Ibid. 
43  Ibid., pp. .41-42. 
44  Ibid., p.44. 
45  Kanju, Indo-Pak Nuclear Cold War, New Delhi: Reliance House, 2000, pp. 189-190. 
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The proposals have been made by India (in past) to extend this agreement to 
cover population centers and targets of economic value. These are counter value 
targets, as opposed to counter-force targets such as air bases, missile silos and nuclear 
weapons production facilities. But the Indian offer was rejected by Pakistan to extend 
the treaty. Inquisitively, Pakistan argued that the no-first use of nuclear weapons 
would be synonymous to accepting a nuclear weapon capability.46 
The Indo-Pak Agreement is a unique agreement that the other unfriendly 
countries have not followed yet. This agreement expands in a sense, the scope of the 
Article 56 and 1 5 of the first and second Protocols to the Geneva Convention. 
These articles of the Geneva Convention explain that works or installations 
containing dangerous forces, namely dykes, dams and nuclear electrical generating 
stations, should not be made the objects of attack. 
The scope of the Indo-Pak Agreement is to some extent broader than the 
Geneva Convention's prohibition against nuclear electrical generating stations. As it is 
discussed above, the nuclear installations and facilities against which attack is 
prohibited in Indo-Pak agreement include much more scope than that mentioned 
under Geneva Conventions' two Protocols.47 
Joint Declaration on Complete Prohibition of Chemical Weapons by India and 
Pakistan 
The Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan on August 19, 1992, met in New 
Delhi and signed a declaration on complete prohibition of chemical weapons. Both 
the countries approved under the declaration that they would not develop, produce or 
otherwise acquire chemical weapons or use such weapons under any situation like 
war, and that they would work together with each other in finalization and adoption of 
a Comprehensive Chemical Weapons Convention which certify the security of all 
states and give confidence to the full utilization of attainment in the field of chemistry 
for peaceful purposes, especially of economic development of developing countries. 
The declaration made by the two countries that they would exercise their right to 
46  Satyabrata Rai Chaudhary, Nuclear Policies: Towards a Safer World, New Dawn Press Group, 
2004, p. 359. 
47  Ibid., pp. 190-191. 
136 
 
                                                          
Chapter  4 
develop their chemical industry and related applications and products only for 
peaceful purposes and for the welfare of their people.48 
Both India and Pakistan restate the need for the early conclusion within the 
framework of the Conference on Disarmament of a global convention for the absolute 
and effectual prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of 
chemical weapons and their destruction. They also reiterated their resolve to become 
original States party to the proposed convention in the Conference on Disarmament. 
This was an important declaration on disarmament and arms control measure 
in South Asia. It contributed not only to the security of the countries of the region but  
the security of India and Pakistan. This declaration, in a sense was simulation of the 
two international conventions i.e. Chemical Weapons Convention and Biological 
Weapons Convention because most of the requirements of Indo-Pak declaration 
resemble these conventions. 
On 17 June 1915,a declaration was singed at Geneva, under this declaration, 
both India and Pakistan also reiterated their commitment to the Protocol for 
Prohibition of the Use in War of suffocating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of 
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, and recalling the relevant Resolutions of the 
General Assembly upholding the validity of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. 
Further, the two countries under the declaration also made their pledge to 
enduring peace and security in the region. They realised that a complete and effectual 
prohibition of chemical weapons would contribute to the security of all states.49 
SESA Action Plan of South Asian Nation 
Bangladesh, India, Maldives, Pakistan and Sri Lanka , the five marine 
members of South Asia, in March 1995,they adopted the South Asian Seas Action 
plan at a meeting of plenipotentiaries in New Delhi which came into force in January 
1998. Both India and Pakistan are party to the South Asian Seas Action Plan. This is a 
nuclear related agreement which provides a framework under which limited 
environmental release and effluent data from TAPS and KANUPP could be shared. 
The South Asian Sea Action Plan, under one of its key element, promotes 
"collaboration among regional scientists and technicians and their institutions through 
48  Kanju, n. 45, p. 187. 
49  Ibid., pp. 188-189. 
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the establishment of coordinated regional marine pollution monitoring 
programmes".50 
This plan also provides for a "Regional Programme of Action for the 
Protection of the Marine Environment of the South Asian Seas from Land-based 
Activities. The proposed activities include the Development of Marine Pollution in 
the Coastal Waters of the South Asian Seas and the Regular Exchange of Relevant 
Data and Information".51 
The two projects in the marine pollution area were initiated by BARC in India 
. One includes the use of radio-tracers in the Hooghry in West Bengal near Calcutta. 
In this study, the BARC has released and tracked 8 Curies of a radioactive Scandium 
isotope in the form of Scandium glass from disposal sites of material dredged from 
Calcutta port. Given this attention in the marine coastal environment, the BARC could 
be a appropriate partner for supporting the South Asia Seas Action Plan. 
The South Asian Co-operative Environment Programme (SACEP) has been 
designated as the Secretariat for the implementation of the Action Plan. Through the 
initiative of the United Nations Environment Programme-Regional Office of Asia 
Programmes, SACEP was established. The member countries of SACEP are 
Afghanistan (passive/ inactive member), Bangladesh, India, Maldives, Bhutan, Nepal, 
Pakistan and Sri Lanka.52 
 India and Pakistan’s stand on CTBT 
By 1994 when the deliberations for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 
started in the Conference on Disarmament, in 1996 India began playing a role which 
became the focus of global attention. By 1994, when the CTBT deliberations were in 
progress in the CD, the scientists from BARC put pressure on the Indian government 
to permit for the tests as this treaty would seal off the testing option.53 
50  Gaurav Rajan and Kent Biringer,  Nuclear Related Agreement and Cooperation in South Asia, 
The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, 
http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd55raje/html.  last accessed on 13-4-2011. 
51  Ibid. 
52  Ibid. 
53  Bharat Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security; the Realist Foundations of Strategy, New 
Delhi: Macmillan India Ltd., 2002, p. 373. 
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India took the stand that the CTBT should specify a plan of time-bound global 
disarmament in May 1995. It did so because in its' view the NPT failed to deal with 
disarmament which is one of its basic aims.54 
 On January 25, 1996 Indian Ambassador Arundhati Ghose stated to the CD 
that the CTBT "should be securely anchored in the global disarmament context and be 
linked through treaty language to the elimination of all nuclear weapons in a time-
bound framework".55 In fact, the connecting of the CTBT with tune-bound global 
disarmament was never imagining when the treaty was proposed. After the end of the 
cold war there has been considerable reduction of nuclear and tactical weapons.56 
On June 28, 1996, a draft of CTBT was put forward to the CD by Netherlands 
which required that it should be approved by five super powers including Pakistan, 
India and Israel among other countries, as it has also been mentioned before. Thus, it 
was essential for India to approve the draft treaty. 
Apart from that on August 20, India vetoed this draft treaty and banned it from 
entering into the UN General Assembly as a CD accepted document.57 For entering 
the draft treaty into the General Assembly the five nuclear powers made moves to 
bypass this Indian veto.58 The Indian Ambassador Ghose, while making a remark over 
this stated that: 
“India condemned the US-China backroom deal, by which China's concerns 
on verification procedures were accommodated”. She added "the entry into force 
clause has been modified at the insistence of a small number of countries with the 
clear aim of imposing obligations on India and placing it in a position in which it did 
not wish to be. Such a provision has no parallel. It is unprecedented in multilateral 
negotiations and international law that any sovereign country should be denied its 
right of voluntary consent or adherence to an international treaty".59 
In feet, India demanded that the CTBT should specify/state a plan for global 
disarmament. It also wanted a treaty to ban weapons research not involving nuclear 
tests such as computer imitation, laboratory research and experiments. These 
54  Satyabratta, n. 46, p. 461 
55  Ibid. 
56  Kanju, n. 45, p. 38. 
57  Satyabrata, n. 46, p. 462. 
58  Ibid., p. 162. 
59  Ibid., p.462. 
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conditions did not meet on the June 28 draft treaty, which was rejected by nuclear 
weapons states; hence, India vetoed the draft treaty on August 20.60 
Due to India's veto of the draft treaty in the CD, Australia asked the General 
Assembly to consider a resolution calling for the General Assembly to adopt the draft 
CTBT. Then, on September 10, India did not create hurdles but voted against it, when 
CTBT was finally put to vote. After that when treaty was opened signature India also 
did not sign it.61 
On the CTBT, the stand of India, which reflects its opposition to the treaty is, 
in fact, linked with its traditional political posture on disarmament and non-
proliferation. It has been a harsh critic of negligence of the NWS in their efforts 
towards nuclear disarmament and has held the view that both vertical and horizontal 
proliferation of nuclear weapons should be dealt with at the same time. Therefore, the 
only fair and effective way to control the nuclear proliferation, India gives preference 
to the fact that there should be a system of equality in disarmament and non-
proliferation and sees the global elimination of nuclear weapons. For such an idea the 
CTBT, which does not effectively prevent nuclear tests, is inadequate to prevent NWS 
from improving their nuclear stock piles.62 
The role of Pakistan in the CTBT manifested its' support for the treaty in 
principle. Pakistan did not resist the CTBT negotiations in the CD. It, not like India, 
assisted the draft CTBT of August 20, 1996, submitted by Netherlands to the CD. 
when the CTBT was put to vote in the General Assembly, Pakistan, unlike India, 
voted in favour of the treaty on October 10,1996. 
In fact, it has tied up its posture on CTBT to that of India and has left the 
responsibility of first move to India. In case of NPT, Pakistan refused like India to 
sign the treaty and took the stand that both Pakistan and India should at the same time 
sign the treaty. It reveals that Pakistan, to a large level, has tied up its' posture on 
international nuclear arms control and non-proliferation treaties to that of India.63 
Pakistan went very close to signing the CTBT, due to the influence of Japan in 
March 2001. However, the latter denied signing because, at that time, India conducted 
60  Ibid. 
61   “Prospects of Arms Control and CTBT in South Asia,” is available at 
http://www.epdom.jp.pdf/OpEd/Islamabad.pdf.    last accessed on 29-4-2011 
62  Ibid. 
63  Ibid. 
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the test of Prithvi Ballistic Missile. Further, Pakistan has attended some conferences 
as an observer-Article 14 Conference on the CTBT, Preparatory Commission 
Meetings and Conference on make easy Entry into Force of the Treaty-which shows 
its attention in the CTBT and it's effort to do the ground work for joining the treaty.64 
Disarmament and India Nuclear Doctrine Draft and the reaction of Pakistan 
In August 1999, Draft Nuclear Doctrine (DND) of India was formulated by 
the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) and was released.65 However, this 
Doctrine was not granted as well as it was also not a policy document of the 
Government of India.66 
  After three months, the true nature of the DND was declared by Foreign 
Minister Jaswant Singh. Answering a question about whether it was India's official 
nuclear doctrine he replied: 
"The National Security Advisor Board is a group of non-official strategic 
experts and analysts. It was tasked by the National Security Council to prepare a 
number of papers, including one on a possible Indian Nuclear Doctrine. This it 
prepared and submitted to the National Security Adviser, also releasing it publicly for 
a larger debate. That debate is now underway. It is, thus, not a policy document of the 
Government of India.’’67 
When the doctrine was first released, Since August 1999, the DND has not 
been put before any parliamentary committee nor has it been given a formal title.68 
The DND preamble, inter-alia includes that, "This document outlines the 
broad principles for the development, and employment of India's nuclear forces. 
Details of policy and strategy concerning structures, deployment and employment of 
nuclear forces will flow from this framework and will be laid down separately and 
kept under constant review".69 
The major points of the Draft Nuclear Doctrine are recapitulated as under: 
64  Ibid. 
65  Mohammed B. Alam, “Research Note of India’s Draft Nuclear an Overview”, Journal of Third 
World Studies,  Fall 2003, http://www.hghbeam.com/doc/IP3-522116461.hrmt.  Last accessed on 
30-4-2011 
66  P.R. Chari, India’s Nuclear Doctrine: Confused Ambition, p. 126, see 
http://www.esn.miis.edu/npr/pdfs73chari.pdf. last accessed on 25-4-2011. 
67  Ibid., p.127. 
68  Alam, n. 65. 
69  Kanju, n. 45, p. 183. 
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1. India's DND is based on the principle of changing security through reliance  on 
the reputed efficacy of nuclear deterrence. The DND, however, admits that      
such deterrence can foil in which case India promises adequate penal retaliation. 
2  India's nuclear arsenal must be such that it will always provide maximum 
credibility, survivability and effectiveness. Therefore, the size of the arsenal  was 
not fixed but its nature must be vigorous and flexible enough to respond to 
change in the security environment, such as changes in the  weapons postures 
of professed rivals, to changing security needs and to  technology advances. . 
3. The nuclear deterrence requires that India maintains (a) survivable, sufficient 
and operationally prepared nuclear forces, (b) effective intelligence, and early 
warning capabilities, (c)  a robust command control  system,(d) comprehensive 
planning and training for operations in line with the strategy, and (e) the will to 
employ nuclear forces and weapons. 
4.     The use and threat of use of nuclear weapons against India, India's nuclear 
capacity must deter. However, India will not have choice to the use or threat of 
use of nuclear weapons against Non-Nuclear Weapon States if they are not 
aligned  with Nuclear Weapon States. 
5. India will not be the first to promote a nuclear strike, but will respond with 
punitive reprisal, meaning massive enough to be inappropriately damaging to 
 the adversary. 
6. The nuclear arsenal will be strongly controlled by the political centre, namely 
the Prime Minister, but will also be of a highly mobile and dispersed nature. 
7.    In accordance with the concept of credible minimum deterrence India's nuclear 
forces will be survivable, effective, responsive, flexible and diverse to the 
requirements. These forces will be based on a triad of aircraft, mobile land-
based missiles and sea-based assets. 
8. The other assets and space based shall be formed to give early warning 
communications, damage/detonation assessment. 
9.   The weapons system is of paramount importance, and there safety and security. 
All precautions will be taken to make sure against sabotage, theft and 
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unauthorised use of nuclear weapons the DND says nothing on how this is to be 
achieved. 
10.  In research and  development capabilities or activities in regard to nuclear 
weapons and related areas India will not accept any constraint whatsoever.70  
Disarmament and arms control obtain special attention in the DND. The 
weapons of mass destruction and nuclear weapons are a threat to humanity, and peace 
and security is stated in the preamble. Although the previous have been eliminated by 
international treaties, but the latter remain instruments for national and collective 
security, "the possession of which has been sought to be legitimized through the 
permanent extension'' of the NPT in 1995. For their future Nuclear Weapons States 
have declared that they will continue to depend on nuclear weapons. These 
developments amount to virtual desertion of nuclear disarmament. 
In such a world where a few nuclear powers have legitimized nuclear weapons 
for an indefinite future India will protect its autonomy of decision making and in 
strategic matters. However, India will aim at promoting peace and security around 
it.71 
There are some other provisions made in the DND for disarmament and arms 
control which are as follows: 
India   believes    in   the   goal   of   complete,    global,    demonstrable   and    
non-discriminative nuclear disarmament. For a nuclear weapon-free world India shall 
continue its efforts to achieve it. India’s basic commitment is no first use of nuclear 
weapons, India shall press the nuclear weapon state to conclude an international 
agreement banning first use of nuclear weapons.72 
The formal nuclear doctrine was not issued by Pakistan and there was 'no first 
use policy' in it. It has chosen not to publicly pronounce a comprehensive nuclear 
doctrine partly because it does not see a political or status usefulness for the nuclear 
capability, relatively, it visualize the nuclear capability as having a purely security, 
defensive related-purpose. Pakistan's threat acuity are seen as stemming primarily 
from India, both at the level of all-out conventional war, limited war and low intensity 
70  Ibid., pp. 183-185.  
71  Ibid., p.181. 
72  Ibid., p.186. 
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conflict (LIC). Pakistan seeks to create deterrence against all out conventional war, 
within the nuclear framework. 
  On the deterrence issue, Pakistan has stated that while it looks to maintain 
nuclear deterrence at the fewest possible level, the level at which it will finally be 
sustained will be determined in accordance with any enhanced steps taken by India.73 
While Pakistan has continuously repeated its commitment to a minimum level 
of nuclear deterrence, it has linked the stability of such deterrence to certify that 
Pakistan does not find itself in a position of strategic susceptibility in areas such as 
fissile materials, ballistic missiles and conventional forces. The wide dissimilarity in 
fissile material accumulation of India and Pakistan, Pakistan believes that it could 
erode the stability of nuclear deterrence. The impact of such equilibrium could further 
deteriorate once India acquires the S-300 ABM system and additional anti-aircraft 
system from the Russian Federation. Although Pakistan was not prepared to get into 
an arms race with India, it would be compelled to take necessary steps to protect the 
credibility of its deterrence if India continued to move up the nuclear level.74 
On November 25, 1999, while responding to India's DND, Foreign Minister 
Abdus Sattar of Pakistan on November 25, 1999, stated that “No issue is more vital 
for the security of Pakistan than what should be Pakistan's strategy in the face of 
India's declaration of intent to build a massive arsenal of nuclear weapons and 
delivery systems'". Mr. Sattar continued that "minimum nuclear deterrence will 
remain the guiding principle of Pakistan's nuclear strategy. The minimum cannot be 
quantified in static numbers. The Indian buildup will necessitate review and 
reassessment. In order to ensure the survivability and credibility of the deterrent 
Pakistan will have to maintain, preserve and upgrade its capability. But we shall not 
engage in any nuclear competition or arms race.”75 
According to the head of the National Command Authority's (NCA) Strategic 
Planning Division in Pakistan General Khalid Kidwai, "Pakistan reserves the right to 
use nuclear weapons if the very existence of the country is at stake". Kidwai told a 
73  Shireen M. Mazari, Understanding Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine, see  
http://www.issi.org/journal/2004-files/no-3/article/ia.html  last accessed on 20-8-2011 
74  Ibid. 
75  “Pakistan Responds to India’s Nuclear Doctrine”, Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No. 41, 
November 1999, The Acronyum Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, is available at 
http://www.acronym.org.uk/41pakis.html. last accessed on 24 August, 2011. 
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team of physicists from Italy's Landau Network, an arms control institution, in late 
2001 that "nuclear weapons were solely aimed at India. They would be used if India 
conquers a large part of Pakistan's territory, destroys a large part of Pakistan's land or 
air force, economically strangles Pakistan or pushes it to political destabilization.”76 
The measures taken by India and Pakistan in South Asia for nuclear 
disarmament and arms control were inadequate as compared to those at the 
international level. Although, some steps like NWFZ were taken before Indo-Pak 
nuclear tests while others like Lahore Declaration were taken after this event. Two 
measures-Pressler Amendment and Symington Amendment-were significant steps 
which were enforced in the region by an external power-US. Further, in all the 
conversations, NWFZ proposals deserve particular attention here. NWFZ was 
continuously proposing by Pakistan in South Asia but India had been opposing it or 
emphasizing for the participation of all regional countries for a possible solution. The 
stand taken by India sufficiently indicates her intentions of going nuclear; it seems 
probably, due to this reason that India did not accept the NWFZ proposals of Pakistan. 
The super powers negligence to keep away from getting involved completely in this 
issue so that they could preclude/ prevent the nuclearization of the region. The stands 
of  Indo-Pak on NPT also disclose their real intensions to become nuclear powers. In 
fact, the issue of nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia is internally woven with 
nuclear non-proliferation at the global level. Therefore the solution lies in some kind 
of joint agreement among the super powers and as well as India and Pakistan NNWS 
for nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear weapons free world. 
The above study aims at two issues. First, what have been the organized 
efforts to achieve nuclear proliferation in their region of South Asia and why has the 
non-proliferation regime failed in working in the region as the states in the region 
have tended to pursue nuclear weapons in disobedience of the international 
community? Secondly and related, where the nuclear non-proliferation regime was 
most needed?  Why it not work there. In order to answer the questions, I focus on the 
proliferation-prone region of the world, South Asia. Factors favoring nuclear 
tolerance/ restraint are remarkably absent in these region, not like other regions of the 
world. Moreover, previous studies have identified South Asia as a high-conflict zone. 
76   “Pakistan See New Aggression in India’s Nuclear Doctrine”, Daily Times, Pakistan, January 24, 
2003, (http://www.daily.times.com.pk/default.esp?page=story-24=1-2003-pg7-39). Last accessed 
on 31-8-2011. 
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South Asia, is characterized by protracted conflicts and enduring rivalries 
among two or more significant actors in the region. The investigative constructs of 
protracted conflicts and continuing rivalry capture somewhat similar phenomena: a 
long-standing intense conflict involving two or more parties with a history of war and 
crises. As states view their opponent's gains as losses for themselves, such conflicts 
tend to assume "zero-sum" characteristics. Security dependence on each other is low 
with mutual distrust characterizing such relationships, giving rise to intense 
concentrated security dilemmas. 
The key states within South Asia such as India and Pakistan, has been dense 
proliferators for many years. In 1998 India and Pakistan changed that status by openly 
going nuclear. Therefore, it was for these regions that if the great powers needed 
effective non-proliferation policies, they should have made it their top most policy 
priority, if they were serious about preventing nuclear proliferation.  
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SUPER POWERS INTEREST IN SOUTH ASIA 
After discussing the historical background of nuclear proliferation in the 
world, it seems necessary to briefly review the geo-strategic, economic and political 
significance of the South Asian sub-continent and some other factors linked with the 
interests of super powers towards nuclear proliferation in South Asia. South Asia was 
geopolitically indispensable to the United States in order to maintain the balance of 
power in the region. 
Importance of South Asia to Super Powers 
South Asia is a most volatile, complex and politically explosive region and it 
remains the most enigmatic and mystifying in the world. It is also one of the most 
fertile and socially divided regions.1 It is home to about 1.4 billion people, more than 
20 percent of the world population. It is the region that lies between the sea routes of 
the Indian Ocean (Persian Gulf and the Asia- Pacific) and land routes of Central Asia 
connecting Europe to the East.2 It is a large reservoir of natural and human resources, 
which makes it a prime destination for finance capital, a profitable/ commercial 
market and a source of cheap raw material. It also sits at the confluence of the richest 
sources of oil, gas, rubber, manganese, gold, tea, cotton, copper, rice and jute and is 
the transit point for most of the resources and manufacturers that interconnect the 
world. As well as, it is the most heavily militarized and bureaucratic zone in the world 
and it has a variety of complex and violent primeval ethnic groups.3 These are the 
factors which make the region as a source of attraction and interest for the external 
powers. 
South Asia is a large land mass. All the countries in South Asia are 
developing and facing problems like; ethnic conflicts, illiteracy, poverty, and 
insecurity. From another point of view, South Asian region has become one of the 
fastest growing regions in the world. India and Pakistan are the only nuclear weapon 
countries in the region. Nuclear arms race is constantly going on between these 
countries and the real bone of controversy/conflict between them is to gain control 
1. Ratna Tikoo, Indo-Pak Relations: Politics of Divergence and Convergence, Delhi: National 
Publishing House, 1987, p. 220.  
2. Kim Beazley and Ian Clark, The Politics of Intrusion: The Superpowers and the Indian Ocean, 
Sydney: Alternative Publishing Cooperative, 1979, pp. 11-12.  
3. Ibid.  
147 
 
                                                 
Chapter  5 
over the territory of Kashmir. Since independence, Kashmir dispute has remained on 
between India and Pakistan. 
South Asia has been a region of great importance to the super powers. The 
region has always been the ground where great powers rivalry has been played and 
managed. The primary significance of the states of South Asia lies in their role in the 
competition between the United States, the Soviet Union and China for global and 
regional influence. The region has been recognized as a geographical area of major 
strategic importance through which passes the routes linking Europe, Africa and Asia. 
The region of South Asia is important because of its connection with the important 
sea-lanes of communication in the Indian Ocean and its place in-between two 
politically volatile and economically critical regions i.e., the Persian Gulf and South-
east Asia.4 
India and Pakistan was the major player of this region, which were divided in 
terms of polarization between the Soviet Union, the USA and China. In this situation, 
India has functioned as an important ally of the Soviet Union and Pakistan has 
functioned as a broker for the West in relation to moderate Muslim countries in the 
Middle East and the Gulf areas and was related to China.5 
In way of cold war politics between the Soviet Union and the USA, both have 
tussle with each other for gaining traction in the South Asian region. In course of their 
foreign policy utilized the super power rivalry to their advantage by India and 
Pakistan. Pakistan brought the external powers into the sub-continent as Pakistan’s 
willingness to accommodate the American interests not only but also reinforced its 
confrontationist anti-India posture.  Ultimately, both brought protagonists of the cold 
war into the region, as Indian acted to seek aid from the Soviet Union. In South Asia 
the super powers have played a major role in its economic as well as political 
development. They have helped in resolving some tensions as well as created some 
tensions; they also have created problems but have kept them from rising/mounting 
into uncontrollable propositions.6 
4. Ibid.  
5. W.H. Parker, Mackinder: Geography as an Aid to Statecraft, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982, pp. 
32-56. 
6. Satu P. Limiya. The U.S. Indian Relations: The Pursuit of the Accommodation, Boulder, 
Colombo: Western View Press, 1993, p. 93.  
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In 1940s 
In Indian Territory, Kashmir was invaded by Pakistan in 1948, as a result War 
broke out between the two countries. However, both sides agreed to the ceasefire line 
in 1949.7 In 1947, Britain helped India to build 15 ordinance factories. She also 
supplied weapons to India and later France helped India in this regard. 
In 1950s 
However, Pakistan tried to maintain relations with the super powers, as he 
wanted to counter the Indian threat by building up its military strength. This was 
apparent/ obvious in 1954 when it entered into a Mutual Security Pact with the US.8 
It was a golden opportunity for, US policy of Containment of Commission in 
South Asia and Pakistan proved very useful for it in this regard.9 The former gave the 
latter the first high performance jet aircraft, including12 F-104 Interceptors and F-86 
Sabres and hundreds of World War I Korean War vintage tanks.10 
In fact, for dominating South Asia the American external interests were to 
exclude an aggressive country in the region. In order to build a global alliance system 
to include/have the Soviet Union during the cold war era, and wanted to join India, 
the dominant state in South Asia. However, the US was forced to choose Pakistan as 
an ally for containing the Soviet Union in South Asia because of India’s non-
alignment policy. The rise and fall of Pakistan’s strategic value to the US, the US- 
Pakistan relations fluctuated according to it.11 
As Britain helped India in 1947 it also helped India, in 1955, in the field of civil uses 
of atomic energy for its first Apsara Research Reactor. In the same year, for the 
construction of the ‘Swimming Pool’ research reactor under construction at Trombay, 
it provided India enriched uranium and other technical know-how.12 However, the 
assistance, in civil uses of atomic energy, indicates the economic interests of the super 
7. Indo-Pak Conflict and the Role of External Powers, http://www.idsa-india.org/an-oct8-8.html. 
Last accessed on 5 July, 2014.  
8. Nisha Sahai Achuthan, Soviet Arms Transfer Policy in South Asia; 1955-81, New Delhi: Lancer 
International, 1988, p. 25.  
9. Ibid, pp. 25-26.  
10. Ibid.  
11. Satu P. Limiva, n. 6, p. 93.  
12. Volha Charnysh, “India’s Nuclear Programme. Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.” September 3, 
2009. http://vv.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/India.pdf . last accessed on 12 
July, 2014. 
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powers. Such kind of assistance have been provided by super powers from time to 
time to India and Pakistan  
The super powers in 50s–namely the UK, the USA and France (including 
Canada) tried to cooperate with India in its atomic energy programme and they also 
concluded agreements with India in this regard. The Soviet Union shared with India 
its atomic technology, it also reached an agreement in 1961 with India in the field of 
civil uses of atomic energy with reference to research purposes.13 
In 1960s 
Canada was the principal supplier of Atomic fuel and reactor technology to 
India, till the 1960s. India was close to its goal of self- sufficiency in nuclear fuel 
which was led by Canadian help. This factor made India free from its dependence on 
the US. During the period, the US strongly advocated the 1968 NNPT which India 
refused to sign. Also in 1961 the US and the USSR showed a rare cooperation in 
Ireland proposal of stopping the spread of nuclear power, into the 1968 NNPT. In 
fact, when Indian dependence on the US nuclear fuel was reduced, Ireland had made 
this proposal. Towards the nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia it reveals the 
interests of super powers, particularly the US.14 The Soviet Union provided in 1959, 
to India transport planes and helicopters. It also finalized with India the deal for the 
sale of Soviet aircraft and communication equipment to India in 1960. Due to its cold 
war rivalry with the US it is obvious that Soviet Union provided this aid to India. In 
fact, the Indo-Soviet relations coincided with the deteriorating Sino-Soviet and Sino-
India relations.15 
The Chinese attacked India in 1962; however, it was difficult for US not to 
support a communist state which placed the US in a delicate position. In fact, when 
Sino-Indian war started, India’s importance in American global security reached its 
climax. Thus, to help India the US sent twelve C- 130 Hercules transport planes with 
the crew. In 1963, the US assisted India in its atomic energy programme. It also 
signed an Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy with 
13. Gin Deshingkar, “Indian Politics and Arms Control: Recent Reversals and New Reasons for 
Optimism” in Eric Arnett (ed.), Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in South Asia after the Test 
Ban, Oxford University Press, 1988. p. 31. 
14. Ibid, p. 32.  
15. Ibid.  
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India. It seems that because of its inter-rivalry with communist China the US provided 
this assistance to India.16 
Pakistan wanted to protect itself from any possible attack from Indian and as a 
result it had foreseen the utility of developing relations with China, and treated China 
as a shield for itself in 1962. 
 Historically, in the beginning Sino-Indian relations remained peaceful. 
However, in the late 1950s, the dispute came into the open over Tibet, between the 
two countries and border demarcation. By the intervention of the USA and the USSR 
these disputes were intensified, and ultimately resulted in the 1962 border conflict, 
which left lasting enmity between China and India that took three decades to 
recover/recuperate from.17 
It was obvious/clearly to follows from the above that it was due to these 
factors that Pakistan has been assisted by China in its nuclear weapons programme 
and providing other military assistance which has always been a major source of 
concern for the United States. Along with its 1964 nuclear explosion and assistance to 
Pakistan, this threat perception of China compelled India to opt for a nuclear weapons 
programme as this factor has been also pointed out earlier. During the war between 
India and Pakistan the 1965, the super powers, took deep interest, and fully involved 
them in South Asia. The US got the information from India that under a mutual 
agreement with the US, Pakistan was not supposed to use the American weapons 
against India but it had used.18 This led the US to impose an arms prohibition/ban on 
both the aggressive on September 8, 1965.19 US declared its neutrality in the Indo-Pak 
conflict on the next day. This can be compared with the US interests in the 1962 Sino-
India war when the US provided military and nuclear assistance to India.20 
Pakistan was supported by China and provided military assistance to it in 1965 
war as the latter had moved towards the former, in order to avoid dependence on one 
supplier of arms. It became a matter of concern to the USA that the interest shown by 
16. Nake Kamrany. Peaceful Competition in Afghanistan: American and Soviet Models for Economic 
Aid, Washington D.C: Communication Services Company, pp. 53-54.  
17. Huo Han. Sino-Indian Relations and Nuclear Arms Control, pp. 39-40, httn://www.wn.com/sino-
indian-relations, last accessed on 15 June, 2014. 
18. Tikoo, n. 1, pp. 27-28.  
19. Ibid., p. 28.  
20. Ibid.  
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China in South Asia. That’s why, the USA lifted the arms embargo, particularly in1 
967 and agreed to sell non-lethal weapons to both India and Pakistan.21 
“During the mid I 960s, when the US was escalating the Vietnam war and US- 
China relations remained tense, top policy makers defined Pakistan as a problem” in 
this regard. Not only were the Pakistani’s lessening security ties with the US and 
keeping their distance from US Vietnam policy, the US believed that they were 
getting too close to China.... Well before the US was concerned about Chinese nuclear 
sharing with Pakistan, US government officials worried about the close China-
Pakistan relationship”.22 
Also in 1968, US was concerned about the relations between China and 
Pakistan, US was also troubled by signs of close and highly secret cooperation 
between China and Pakistan. In between China and Pakistan the border and military 
cooperation was growing and the latter military had given the former access to the US 
F-104 supersonic fighter aircraft, in violation of the acceptance of agreement with 
Pentagon.23 
A neutral stand was adopted by the Soviet Union, in 1965 war, and offered its 
offices for a peaceful settlement between India and Pakistan. Thus, the 1965 war 
factor also influenced the nuclear policies of the super powers towards South Asia. 
In 1970s 
In August 1971, Soviet Union signed with India the Treaty of Peace, 
Cooperation and Friendship. In December 1971the super powers were deeply 
involved in South Asia during Indo-Pak war. Through the Straits of Malacca into the 
Bay of Bengal the US sent its Task Force 74 headed by the nuclear powered carrier 
enterprise and a half dozen other ships. Among others, Pakistan got military support 
from US which included three guided missiles and a nuclear attack submarine. 
Subsequently, a force of six vessels to the Indian Ocean was dispatched by the 
21. Hua Han, n. 17, p. 30.  
22. China, Pakistan and the Bomb. The Declassified File on the US Policy, 1977-97, 
http://www.gwul.edu/~msarchive/NSBEB114index.html. last accessed on 7 August, 2014. 
23. George C. Denney. Deputy Director of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State to 
Secretary Rusk, “Pakistan and Communist China Strengthen Cooperation. 4 December 1968, 
Secret Source: US National Archive, Record Group 59, Records of the Department of State, 
Subject-Numeric Files. 1967-1969. http://www.gwul.edu/-msarchive/NSBEBB 114/index.html.  
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Soviets.24 At one time, it looked as if a direct confrontation between the two external 
powers would take place in South Asia. It was for the first time over the Indo-Pak 
conflict, that the two super powers were directly involved in the Indian Ocean. As the 
US had deployed the nuclear submarine and missiles in the sub-continent, thus, there 
was a danger of a nuclear war between the two super powers in South Asia which, 
evidently/ apparently, might have destroyed the sub-continent.25 In fact, it may be 
argued at this point of discussion that for greater influence, the super powers wanted 
to become the dominant power over the South Asian region in this regard. So, these 
were playing their game in the Indo-Pak conflicts. These interests have greatly 
determined and moulded their nuclear, disarmament policies and arms proliferation 
towards South Asia. 
Soon after the 1971 war, the Indo-Pak sub-continent experienced a rise in 
defense expenditure. Both the countries (India and Pakistan) tried to achieve 
domination on armaments.26 In 1973, the US decided to modify its policy of arms 
restriction/ ban on Pakistan by permitting the sale of non-lethal spare parts and 
equipment.27 
India conducted the nuclear test in 1974, which was defined by India as 
Peaceful Nuclear Explosion, This raised serious concerns for the super powers. And 
immediately after the 1974 Pokhran test the US stopped the supply of fuel to India.28 
In July 1976, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission held up a shipment of 12 
tonnes of nuclear fuel to India. India upheld opposition to it. The US wanted to put 
some pressure on India. The US saw this stand as a threat to the security of South 
Asia and attempted to force India by threatening a termination of fuel supplies and an 
abortion of 30 years agreement on nuclear cooperation with India. 
The US administration took interest in the region and tried to prevent nuclear 
proliferation because of the Pokhran test and subsequent Pakistan intensions to go 
nuclear. But, the advent of the Iranian revolution and the Soviet adventurism in 
24. Dieter Brown. The Indian Ocean: Region of Conflict or Zone of Peace?, London: Oxford 
University Press, 1983, p. 31.  
25. Ibid.  
26. Ibid., pp. 32-34.  
27. Ibid., p. 34.  
28. K.P. Vijayalakshmi, “Evolution of Indo-US Civil Nuclear Cooperation”, in Nalini Kant Jha (ed.) 
Nuclear Synergy Indo-US Strategic Cooperation and Beyond. New Delhi:  Pantagon Press, 2009, 
pp. 43-55.  
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Afghanistan fuelled the long-standing Western fear of Soviet expansionism and gave 
an acute sense of urgency/necessity to the need to retaliate and stop the advancement 
of the communists. The US regional and global interests compelled it to re-establish 
with Pakistan.29 Thus, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 re-
established Pakistan’s strategic value to the United States which was demoted because 
of detente and cooperation with the Soviet Union earlier. Hence, the US converted/ 
renewed its interests in Pakistan and it offered to renew economic and military aid to 
Pakistan.30 
In 1980s 
As in 1981,to provided economic and military aid to Pakistan, the US passed 
the special law waiving the Symington Amendment.31However, in 1988, Pakistan 
again lost its importance to the United States when the Soviet Union withdrew its 
troops from Afghanistan. 
During 1980s both the countries, (USSR and USA) were busy in their cold 
war politics. On the issue Afghanistan, the US was in great need of Pakistan for its 
support. On the other side, the nuclear weapons programmes of India and Pakistan 
were developing onwards. But in the 1980s Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme 
was developing on greater scale. The US nuclear non-proliferation policy was 
demanding to check this growth. However, during this period Pakistan was having 
great strategic value for the US. Hence, under the strong pressure of non-proliferation 
lobby in the US Senate, according to the Pressler Amendment which was passed by 
the US Senate in 1985, under which the US President had to certify that Pakistan did 
not have any sort of nuclear weapons and this was essential to provide military 
cooperation to it.32At the same time, the US was having strong evidence as Pakistan 
was pursuing a nuclear weapons programme. But due to Afghan war the US did not 
want to make its relations hostile with Pakistan.33 Hence, under such tight corners the 
US passed this amendment. 
29. Ibid., pp. 50-54.  
30. A.Z. Hilali, Cold War Politics of the Super Powers in South Asia.  
http://www.qurtuba.edu.pk/thedialogue/1_2/4Mr%20Hilalipdf. Last accessed on 10 August, 2014. 
31. Dieter Brown, n. 24 , pp. 32-33.  
32. Shaista Tabassum, Nuclear Policy of United States in South Asia: Proliferation, Royal Books 
Company, pp. 143-145.  
33. Ibid., pp. 145-146.  
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That’s why, it fulfilled the interest of the US as it could check continued 
cooperation of the Pakistan in its fight to expel the troops of the Soviet Union from 
Afghanistan. On the other hand, Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions were also not given a 
free hand.34 
Further, from 1985 to 1989, as there are several reports about Pakistani 
nuclear weapons programme for instance in 1985 ABC News reported that US 
believed that Pakistan had successfully tested a firing mechanism of an atomic bomb 
by means of a non-nuclear explosion and that US Kryton had been acquired by it.35 
Pakistan was not pursuing any nuclear weapons programme as it was still certified by 
the American President. This indicates that it was in the interests of the US to avoid 
confrontation with Pakistan in this regard. 
On the other hand, till the 1980s, the US and India held the fundamentally 
differing /contradictory conceptions of the world order and the cold war politics drew 
them apart. American nearness with Indian adversaries – Pakistan and China – also 
led to the distance between the two democracies. However, also during this period the 
US instead of containing Soviet influence in South Asia became more concerned 
/worried about containing the growing influence of China, both economically and 
militarily, in East Asia. 
Actually, China developed enmity with the Soviet Union during 1970s and 
was already having intense rivalry with India. Hence, especially during 1980s, China 
developed close relations with Pakistan, and aided Pakistan’s nuclear weapons 
programme as there are several reports and evidences in this regard. However, in 
support of their defense both the countries (China and Pakistan) had been denying 
these reports and putting their own argument. 
Significantly, since 1981 to 1984 it remained a matter of concern for the US 
because of the Sino-Pak nuclear cooperation. It was due to Sino-Pak nuclear 
cooperation that the US sought to discourage Chinese nuclear sharing with Pakistan in 
1981.36 However, at the same time, against the Soviet presence in Afghanistan the US 
intensified cooperation with Pakistan and, like its predecessor, gave a pass on suspect 
nuclear activities so that it could funnel support for Afghan rebels through Pakistan. 
34. Ibid., p. 107.  
35. Pakistan Nuclear Weapon – A Chronology is available at the website 
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/Pakistan/nuke/chron.html. Last accessed on 5 May, 2015. 
36. China, Pakistan and the Bomb: The Declassified File on US Policy 1977-1997, No. 26.  
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The US suspected that China was aiding Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme in 
1982, but the later denied that it was assisting/ sustaining any country in developing 
nuclear weapons. To build a bomb for Pakistan, China had played a significant role it 
was claimed by US in 1983. In this regard China cooperated with Pakistan in the next 
year also, which was suspected by the US as ‘Sino-Pak nuclear weapon cooperation’. 
In 1986, China signed with Pakistan a Nuclear Cooperation Agreement which was 
explained by both as “peaceful nature of Sino-Pakistan nuclear cooperation”. In 1986, 
the former assisted the latter in its Hataf series of missiles. China had assisted 
Pakistan in its nuclear weapons programme, at the same time, the US was worried 
about. “Chinese missiles sales with respect to Pakistan” and reiterated that. But again 
this allegation was denied by China. In fact, throughout the 1990s Sino-Pak – nuclear 
cooperation continued.37 
The cold war was drawing to an end in 1989, and the Soviet Union was in the 
process of disintegration. Uncertain of the changing international relations, the US –
abstained from making fundamental changes in its policy towards South Asia. 
Consequently, there was more continuity than change. 
During the cold war era, the US efforts to improve its relations with India 
were obstructed by its strategic goal of containing the Soviet Union, because India 
would not improve its relations with Washington at the cost of its relations with 
Moscow. However, end of the US containment policy towards Moscow freed both the 
US and India from the Moscow factor and allowed them to improve bilateral security 
relations. On the other hand, towards South Asia Russian policy also underwent some 
fundamental changes, as it made efforts to develop relations with Pakistan.38 
In 1990s 
In 1990, after the collapse of USSR, the cold war came to an end. Some 
writers believe that world has reduced to a unipolar world and some suggested the 
idea of a multi-polar world. In fact, the global scenario changed, since 1991, and 
super powers began to play a greater role towards disarmament and arms control. At 
the global levels various efforts for disarmament and arms control have been made. 
37. Ibid.  
38. David S. Chou, U.S. Policy Towards India and Pakistan in the Post-Cold War Era, 
http://www.2.tku.;edu.tw/~journal/8-3/832.pdf.  Last accessed on 10, November, 2014. 
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Hence there is a need and necessity to explain whatever role the super powers have 
played after the end of cold war towards disarmament and arms control. 
The super powers focused on the Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) in 
South Asia in 1991. In the same year, the US proposed after several rounds of talks 
with Pakistan, that Russia, China, India and Pakistan should hold a conference to 
discuss a NWFZ in South Asia.39 
In November 1991, in the same year, on the issue of nuclear non-proliferation 
the US held talks with India in New Delhi. At the same time, Pakistan promoted 
proposal for the NWFZ in the region. The US was in favour of finding some ways to 
comprise India in the “non-proliferation arrangement” and accept the IAEA safeguard 
arrangements. The US wanted India to accept China’s participation in the proposal 
visualized by the Pakistan-sponsored NWFZ proposal, which had since been backed 
by the Soviet Union also. On the other side, India’s main objection was that “the 
application of the safeguards provision would be discriminatory, considering that 
China being nuclear power, would seek exemption of its military installations from 
the inspection”. Further, the US urged India to enter into multilateral conferences if it 
did not want to commit itself to Pakistan’s proposal of NWFZ or NPT.40 
The US made efforts to curb Indo-Pak nuclear programme in 1992. In July the 
same year, the US authorized the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to “set up 
surveillance and carry out covert action against the weapons programmes 
conventional and non-conventional”-of Pakistan and India, including Iran, Libya and 
North Korea.41 In the same month, India tested Agni missile. The US declared/ 
affirmed that it believed that ballistic missiles in areas where there was constant 
tension were not favorable to peace in the region.42 
On the other hand, in May the role of China towards disarmament was not 
positive as China exploded one of the most powerful underground nuclear bombs of 
“1000 kiloton”. On the one side it supported the NWFZ proposal of Pakistan and was 
expected to take part in the proposed talks on NWFZ in South Asia, on the other side, 
39. Ibid.  
40. Asian Recorder: A Weekly Digest of Asian Events, New Delhi, January 1-7, 1992, Volume 
XXXVIII, Number 1, p. 22082.  
41.  Asian Recorder: A Weekly Digest of Events, 1992, Volume XXXVIII, November 29, July 15-17, 
p. 22449. 
42. Asian Recorder: A Weekly Digest of Events, 1992, Volume XXXVIII, November 27, July 1-7, p. 
22410.  
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“by exploding the nuclear bomb had told India that it could be pushed around only as 
long as it is willing to be” and made a ridicule of the nuclear non-proliferation efforts 
in South Asia.43 However, China proposed for a mutual troop reduction on the Sino-
Indian border for that it adopted Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) with India.44  
In 1993 and 1994, such type of steps was taken by China. In 1993, China also signed 
an Agreement for Substantial Troops Reductions with India.45 
In May 1993, the US urged to end Pakistan’s nuclear weapon programme. In 
fact, with respect to Pakistan the proliferation of nuclear weapons was a source of 
tension for the US. The US intelligence alleged that Pakistan had received M- 11 
missiles from China; however, China had denied these allegations.46 
          In August, the US announced to have imposed economic sanctions on China, 
because of selling missile technology to Pakistan it was claimed that it had breached 
the NNPT, so the US put sanctions on the sale of some technological advanced 
equipment to China. On the other hand, China while not denying these allegations 
described the action as entirely unjustifiable and denied that it had breached the 
NNPT.47 Moreover, in August, the US intelligence reported that Pakistan was 
importing medium range missiles from China, the US imposed sanctions on 
Pakistan.48 In the same month, Russia in its efforts towards non-proliferation of rocket 
technology froze a contract to supply cryogenic rocket booster to the Indian Space 
Research Organization (ISRO).49 This Russian shift seems to have come due to the 
reason that India had tested, in June 1993 Prithvi missile. Further, a rocket technology 
may be used to manufacture long-range nuclear capable missiles. However, in 1994, 
Russia agreed to supply Cryogenic rockets to India. 
Also in 1993, on grounds of poor safety standards France suspended the 
supply of enriched uranium for India’s reactors. However, some reports in 
43. Ibid., p. 22401.  
44. Asian Recorder: A Weekly Digest of Events, 1992, Volume XXXVIII, November 27, July 15-17, 
p. 22437.   
45. Keesing’s Record of World Events, Longman Group Washington D.C., 1993, Volume 39, No. 
12, p. 39780.  
46.  Keesing’s Record of World Events, Longman Group Washington D.C., 1993, Volume 39, No. 5, 
p. 39780. 
47. Keesing’s Record of World Events, Longman Group Washington D.C., 1993, Volume 39, No. 
7/8, p. 39598.   
48. Keesing’s Record of World Events, Longman Group Washington D.C., 1993, Volume 39, No. 9, 
p. 39641.   
49. Ibid., p. 39619.  
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January1995, suggest that this decision of France was taken after India refused to 
open its nuclear installations to check by the IAEA.50 
However, , France remained busy in armaments deal with Pakistan from 1992 
to 1998, for example in 1992, it negotiated with Pakistan a submarine deal but the 
delivery was made in 1998.51 
In 1994, towards South Asia the US made significant efforts and progress in 
nuclear disarmament and arms control. As in April1994, it is evident from the US 
Deputy Secretary, Strobe Talbott’s visit to India and Pakistan, when he focused on the 
issue of disarmament in South Asia and the prospects of India’s attainment/accession 
to the NNPT. Further, in the same month, the US “requested” India to discontinue the 
testing of the Agni Intermediate-Range Ballistic missile. In fact, India had tested this 
missile in February, the same year. As a result, India accepted the US proposal52 and 
temporarily stopped the development of Agni missile (in April).53 In March of the 
same year, the UK also held talks with India and, among other things, expressed the 
strong desire that India to follow the path of nuclear non-proliferation.54 
In late August 1994, a group of International Mediators meeting was held in 
New Delhi, sponsored by the US, in which UK also participated. Both the super 
powers appealed to India and Pakistan to stop the progress of the missile testing and 
spread of nuclear weapons. They also insisted on Pakistan and India to abide by the 
rules of Missile Technology Control Regime which forbade the export of the 
missiles.55 
India was preparing for a nuclear test in Rajasthan, the US received 
information, in 1995. The US officials privately warned India not to hold any test and 
threatened, if it did not do so than to cut off economic assistance to India. However 
India did not hold any nuclear test in that year so this information was perhaps a false 
alarm.  
50. Keesing’s Record of World Events, Cartermill Publishing, Washington D.C., 1995, Volume 41, 
No. 1, p. 40364.  
51. Keesing’s Record of World Events, Cartermill Publishing, Washington D.C., 1995, Volume 41, 
No. 9, p. 40185.  
52. Keesing’s Record of World Events, Cartermill Publishing, Washington D.C., 1995, Volume 41, 
No. 4, p. 39963.  
53. Keesing’s Record of World Events, Cartermill Publishing, Washington D.C., 1995, Volume 41, 
No. 5, p. 40010.  
54. Keesing’s Record of World Events, Washington D.C., 1995, Volume 41, No. 3, p. 39915.  
55. Keesing’s Record of World Events, Longman, Washington D.C., Volume-41, No. 10, p. 40232.  
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In February 1996, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reported that 
China had shipped 5,000 ring magnets to Pakistan in 1995, which could be used in 
nuclear weapons. Hence, the US deferred the export loans to China over these sales.56 
Nevertheless, at the same time, China insisted that “the sales amounted only 
legitimate peaceful nuclear cooperation”. Further, the US position in February was 
attacked by China in the Conference on Disarmament, stating that “the country with 
the largest and most advanced nuclear arsenals was not qualified to lecture China”.57 
In the same year, CTBT negotiations were also conducted in Geneva where 
India blocked the treaty which was strongly condemned by the Permanent Five 
members (P5). 
The United States reacted with extra ordinary anger to the Indian nuclear tests 
conducted on 11 May and 13 May 1998. Washington felt betrayed by the Indian 
government. Washington held that it was misled by senior officials of the Indian 
government into believing that India would not rock the boat and that controversial 
decision on nuclear policy would be made only after a comprehensive review of the 
nuclear policy was undertaken. With President Clinton announcing his intent to travel 
to India later in 1998 as part of a new intensive engagement of the subcontinent by the 
United States, India’s decision was seen as a political slap in the face.58 
As in 1998, both India and Pakistan conducted nuclear weapon tests. In the 
repercussion of these tests the international community made concerted efforts to 
defuse the tensions which had raised/mounted between Pakistan and India. On June 4, 
1998, in Geneva the USA, the UK, China, France and Russia met and condemned the 
nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistani and pledged to maintain pressure on 
the two countries to reverse their nuclear programmes. 
The Permanent five members at the end of the meeting issued a joint statement 
/communication in which they agreed to take a series of immediate steps in order to 
prevent the rise of tension in South Asia. These steps included an immediate stop to 
the progress of nuclear tests, a decision not to deploy nuclear weapons and an end to 
56. Ibid.  
57. Keesing’s Record of World Events, Longman, Washington D.C., Volume 42, No. 2, p. 40952.  
58  C. Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India’s New Foreign Policy, New 
         Delhi: Viking, 2003, p.90. 
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the production of fissile material.59The super powers in this joint communication 
advised India and Pakistan to follow/support immediately and unconditionally the 
CTBT and to pledge not to export nuclear weapons technology.60 
It may be argued that it was due to these efforts of the Permanent five 
members that in June, firstly Pakistan and secondly India declared a unilateral 
suspension of nuclear tests. In respect to this the US stated in June, that India and 
Pakistan’spositions were encouraging but not sufficient, further, in the same month, 
the US imposed military and economic sanctions on both India and Pakistan.61 
Moreover, in the same month of 1998, in London a Summit of G8 countries 
was held in which both the UK and China participated. The aim of the summit was to 
put pressure of several kinds on India and Pakistan to stop the progress of their 
nuclear weapons programme. Further, notably, it was also decided to implement 
economic sanctions on India and Pakistan by blocking all loans, by the G8 countries 
except humanitarian loan.62 
In January 1999, the US maintained its earlier position and repeated that both 
India and Pakistan should abstain from testing ballistic missiles to avoid increasing 
tensions and fuelling a missile arms race in South Asia. It was too due to the reason 
that the US had got the news that both India and Pakistan were planning further 
testing.63In the same month, American President Bill Clinton stated that “The US 
would step up its efforts to restrain India and Pakistan from expanding their nuclear 
weapons and missiles arms race. The US will increase its efforts to restraint the 
spread of nuclear weapons and missiles from North Korea to India and Pakistan”.64 
At the same time, the US economic sanctions were imposed against India 
without insisting on full obedience/compliance with the earlier American demand on 
signing the CTBT and banning of missile tests. US Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe 
Talbott, addressing a conference at Stanford University, stated that “it might backfire 
if the US pays heed only to a few experts who suggest strict action against India and 
Pakistan for conducting nuclear tests”. He further added that “India and Pakistan 
59. Keesing’s Record of World Events, Keesings Worldwide, Washington D.C., 1998, Volume 48, 
No. 6, pp. 42342-42343.  
60. Ibid, p. 42343.  
61. Ibid., pp. 42343-42344.  
62. Ibid., pp. 42344-42345.  
63. Data India: A Weekly Digest of India News (11/1999), January 10 – January 16, 1995, p. 154. 
64. Data India: A Weekly Digest of India News (11/1999), January 17 – January 23, 1999, p. 34.  
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exercised the nuclear option and became party to global proliferation”, but expected 
“they can, in 1999, if they so choose, move back in the direction of being part of the 
solution (i.e. CTBT) and they can do so while enhancing their own security at the 
same time”.65 
However, the sanctions against India were lifted very early and it tried to link 
them with India’s signing of CTBT. It was stated by the US in February but India 
made it clear that this small step could not be linked to its stand on the CTBT. 
However, on the four identified issues, that both sides announced a work plan for 
continuing the Indo-US dialogue on the four issues of CTBT, Fissile Material Cut-off 
Treaty (FMCT), export control regimes and defense postures. But no specific dates 
were fixed. 
The US, however, declared that ‘it has not softened its stand on nuclear non-
proliferation in South Asia saying that although there was some movement on the 
timing of India signing the CTBT no such progress has been made with Pakistan’.66 
In December 1998, a defense agreement extending bilateral defense 
cooperation by 10 years which included weapons sales to India and joint arms 
production projects with Russia was signed. This demonstrated a deviation from 
Russian arms control and disarmament measures towards South Asia. In fact, 
throughout the 1999 and also in 2000 Russia had been supplying arms to India.67 
In February 1999, China held talks with India in which, among other things. 
China also demanded that Pakistan and India should implement unconditionally the 
UN Security Council Resolution 1172 concerning the tests and sign the CTBT and 
NPT.68 
Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh visited Beijing shortly thereafter, and 
the Kargil crisis was left aside in favour of discussions on the broader bilateral 
relationship. While the official statement Beijing released on Kargil did not go so far 
as to blame Pakistan for the intrusions, the fact that China gave no overt support for 
Pakistan was perceived by India as a significant change in China's stance on the 
Kashmir issue. "All indications were that China regarded India as a major power and 
65. Ibid., p. 35.  
66. Data India, A Weekly Digest of Indian News, (11/1999), January 23 – January 29, 1999, p. 65.  
67. Data India, A Weekly Digest of Indian News, (10/1999), March 7 – March 14, New Delhi, p. 157.  
68. Data India, A Weekly Digest of Indian News, February 27 – March 4, 1999, p. 138. 
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a potentially important player in a putative multi-polar world," noted an Indian 
specialist on relations with China.69 
Taking a move/ shift towards nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia, on 
March 30, the Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, asked India and Pakistan to sign the 
NPT and CTBT.70 
In 2000 
In March 2000, US President Clinton, visited India and Pakistan and discussed 
various issues with these countries particularly the issues of Kashmir and Kargil. 
Especially, during this Clinton’s visit to India, the US focus was on the nuclear issue, 
US also agreed to further relaxations of the sanctions imposed on India, because of its 
1998 tests. India assurance not to conduct further nuclear weapon tests but made no 
commitment to sign the CTBT. Furthermore, the US tried to improve the relations 
with India which were stressed /strained because of its friendship with the Soviet 
Union during the Cold War.71 
On June 5, on the issue of nuclear security the US held talks with Pakistan in 
Washington D.C. Between the two countries these were the first such talks for 16 
months. The US insisted on Pakistan to sign the CTBT. But Pakistan repeatedly said 
that it would sign the CTBT only after achieving a national consensus on this issue.72 
In April-May 2000, 187 state parties to the 1968 NNPT met in New York, 
USA. The permanent five members also participated in this conference for the Sixth 
Review of NNPT Treaty. The significance of this conference also included a call for 
Nuclear Weapons Free Zone to be established in South Asia and criticized India and 
Pakistan for their denial/ rejection to sign the NNPT.73 
Moreover, on September 8, during Indian Prime Minister, A.B. Vajpayee’s 
visit to the USA, the US held talks with India and issued a joint statement. 
Particularly during these talks, the US noted India’s unilateral halt/ suspension on 
69 Mira Sinha Bhattacharjee, “Beyond Kargil: Changing Equations.” Institute for Peace and Conflict 
Studies, China Related Issues, No. 224, July 10, 1999. 
70.   Data India, A Weekly Digest of Indian News, (27/1999), July 5 – July 11, 1999, p. 419.  
71. Keesing’s Record of World Events, Keesing’s Worldwide, Washington D.C., 2000, Volume 46, 
No. 3, p. 43467.  
72. Ibid., p. 43624-43626.  
73. Keesing’s Record of World Events, Keesing’s Worldwide, Washington D.C., 2000, Volume 46, 
No. 5, p. 43603.  
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further nuclear testing. However, the former did not put pressure on the latter to sign 
the CTBT.74 
While China had hosted visits by Pakistani generals and may have lobbied for 
President Clinton to include Pakistan on his South Asia visit in March 2000, there is 
reason to believe that China is no longer willing to brook reckless behaviour on the 
part of Pakistan. Given Beijing's own concerns over Islamic insurgencies and trans-
border arms and drug shipments into China's western regions, there is strong reason to 
believe that China would want to avoid extending diplomatic or other support to the 
Islamic militants in the Kashmir region.”75 
As regards India and China, the security dialogue took place in Beijing, where 
Zhang Jiuhuan, Director General of the Asian Department of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, represented the Chinese side, and Rakesh Sood, the joint secretary for 
disarmament in the External Affairs Ministry, led the Indian delegation. Neither side 
relented from previous stances China said that it would continue to lead opposition to 
India's nuclear program and India expressed its continued concern that China was 
assisting Pakistan's nuclear and missile production program. Following the purity 
dialogue, the PRC ambassador to India, Zhou Gang, said through the Indian press that 
India and China should pursue a "cooperative partnership" to thwart efforts by the 
United States to "create a unipolar world." 
The border dispute and its speedy resolution served as one of two major 
themes of Indian President K.R. Narayanan’s state visit to Beijing in May 2000. 
India and Russia were not interested in relationship of arms but at joint 
development of technologies and systems and marketing those abroad under the long 
term Integrated Military Technical Cooperation Agreement of 1994. Initially meant for 
six years, this deal was extended in 1998 to 2010. Renewed defense cooperation 
covered the full spectrum from the consideration of the Admiral Gorshkov aircraft 
carrier to the development and production of the cruise missile, Brahmos. Other major 
items included the purchase and production of the Su-30, development of avionics for 
the Indian light combat aircraft, advanced air defense missile, upgradation of old MIG 
aircrafts, joint development of military and civilian transport aircrafts and multiple 
74. Keesings Record of World events, Keesings Worldwide. Washington D.C., 2000, Volume 46. 
No. 9, p. 43751.  
75 Shao Zongwei, “Nation Calls for Normalcy in Pakistan,” China Daily, 20 October 1999.] 
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launch rocket systems, to name a few. At the turn of the millennium, Indo-Russia 
defense cooperation never looked better.76 
The Russian policy on nuclear cooperation with India was based on the principle 
that India was already a nuclear weapons power and refusing it advanced technologies 
in the name of preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons made no sense. To illustrate 
this judgment, Putin visited the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre [BARC] at Trombay, 
which was the heart of Indian nuclear weapons programme. His visit to BARC was the 
first by any political leader of a nuclear weapons state, and it occurred less than two and 
half years after India proclaimed itself as a state in possession of nuclear weapons. Also, 
during Putin’s visit the two countries announced a protocol on nuclear cooperation.77 
At the end of 2002, during his visit to New Delhi Putin reaffirmed the Russian 
commitment to expand nuclear cooperation with India by selling additional nuclear 
reactors, but he said that this will have to take place “within the framework of our 
international obligation in the nuclear field.... We also believe that the rules and 
regulations of this framework require improvement. We have discussed our [nuclear] 
cooperation with India in detail. We are ready, prepared and willing to develop relations 
with India, including in the nuclear field.”78 After this announcement, India was also 
satisfied that Putin made a remarkable difference between the Indian and Pakistani 
weapons programmes and on the eve of his visit to New Delhi, Putin expressed concern 
at the menace of Pakistani weapons falling into the hands of terrorists.79While 
emphasizing the importance of the war against terrorism, Russia did not believe that 
Pakistan was directly responsible for cross-border terrorism in Kashmir and called for 
an Indo-Pakistani dialogue. In his address to the Indian Parliament, Putin said, “We 
know at present what is going on in Kashmir. We share your concern about outbreaks of 
violence there. The fact that the Kashmir issue has not been settled has been making the 
relations between Indian and Pakistan tense, worst over the last three decades. The issue 
can be resolved on a bilateral basis, on the basis of a compromise and on an 
76 C.Raja Mohan, n. 58,  p. 128-129. 
77 Ibid.,  p. 131.  
78 Ibid. , p. 131-132. 
79 Amit Baruah, “Concerns over Terrorists Acquiring Pak. Nuclear Arms Remain: Putin,” The Hindu, 
New Delhi, 1 December 2002. 
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unconditional respect for the Line of Control. Any foreign interference should be 
stopped’’.80 
There was a excellent record of Russia-India cooperation in the field of peaceful 
issue of nuclear technology has come under scanner owing to the refusal by Russia to 
keep supplying Low Enriched Uranium [LEU] fuel for Tarapur Atomic Power Station 
[TAPS].81 In December 2005, the Russian President Putin visited India with Generally 
satisfactory outcome which was considered by many in India as unfortunate that Russia 
expressed its inability to keep on supplying LEU fuel for TAPS, and to build additional 
power reactors similar to those being built at Koodankulam. According to Alexander 
Yuryevich Rumynacsev, Director of the Russian Atomic Energy Agency, the guidelines 
of Nuclear Suppliers Group [NSG] were the stumbling block. 
As we know that Russia is founding member of NSG, a multilateral arrangement 
founded in 1975, following India’s Pokhran-1 explosion in 1974. At present NSG has 
44 members and China was admitted into the Group in, as late as May 2004. In its 
formative years the rules and guidelines of NSG were not very clear, but in the April 
1992 meeting of the NSG, it was decided that as a consequence of Iraq attempting to 
develop nuclear weapons, it was necessary to strengthen the safeguards system so as to 
avoid any more new nuclear states from engaging in secret non peaceful activity. It was 
decided to adopt full scope safeguard that would be ‘triggered’ on all nuclear facilities 
of a country that wished to import nuclear technology from a state that is a member of 
the NSG “Suppliers should transfer trigger list items or related technologies to a non-
nuclear weapon state only when the receiving state has brought into force an agreement 
with the IAEA requiring the application of safeguards on all source and special 
fissionable material in its current and future peaceful activities.”82 As we know that, 
there were many ups and downs between Russia and India on defense cooperation but 
gradually the warmth in Indo-Russian relations has been maintained and sustained by 
the efforts of both the countries. 
In January 2007, in his fourth visit to India, Putin was guest at the Republic Day 
celebrations, an honour reserved for special friends. His predecessor Boris Yeltsin had 
80  Ministry of External Affairs, Address by President Vladimir Putin to the Members of the 
Parliament, Visit of the President of Russian Federation, 47-48. 
81  The Hindu, New Delhi, December 6, 2004. 
82  Subhash Kapila, “India-Russia Strategic Cooperation: Time to Move Away,” on 
http://www.saag.org/apers2/paper4r/hm.html last assessed on 16 October 2010. 
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visited India only once, in 1993. A great deal of the military equipment on display 
during the ceremonies was of Russian origin, a reminder of the strong bonds. The 
agreements forged during his trip have cemented the ties that his regime rejuvenated 
and demonstrated that Delhi’s growing ties with the US has not negatively imposed on 
Indo-Russian relations. In a joint statement after the military parade, Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh and President Putin of Russia offered to build four new reactors that 
are already under construction.83 
In 2007, India was selected by Moscow to jointly develop the fifth generation 
fighter aircraft and a multi-purpose transport aircraft. In early 2000, Putin had assured 
the Indian leadership that Russia was willing to share any cutting edge defense 
technologies that it had; this became evident in the subsequent joint development and 
production of weapons such as the Brahmos Supersonic Cruise Missile, a highly 
advanced system.84 India is fast becoming a very attractive target for arms exporters 
from the west, with the addition of US firms into the fray since 2005. India is the 
developing world’s largest arms importer, reaching $5.4 billion in 2005. Although 
Russia remains the most important supplier at nearly 80 percent, it faces an increasing 
competition in the Indian arms market and thus is trying to protect its market share. For 
instance, in 2006, Russia set up a batch storehouse and a service centre in India called 
Rosoboron Service, as a part of a joint venture which is expected to meet India’s 
significant demand for timely and continuous supply of spare parts and repair and 
maintenance of Soviet and Russian equipment.85 
The 9/11 incident in the United States in 2001 changed the whole direction of 
US foreign policy regarding South Asia. A 2012 Defense Paper issued by US 
Department of Defense lists South Asia among the major critical regions for the 
United States. The government of US is looking to enhance the security of the region 
and of its allies in the region.86  
In this “War on Terrorism” Pakistan has been the front ally of the United 
States. Pakistan relations with US become some time best to worst and from uncertain 
83  Harsh V Pant, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation, Berkeley: CA 
University of California Press, 1999, p. 197. 
84  Radyuhin, “Putin Visit: Chances for Course Correction,” The Hindu, New Delhi, January 23 
2007. 
85  Jyotsna Bakshi, “India-Russia Defense Cooperation,” Strategic Analysis, April- June, New Delhi, 
2006, p. 454. 
86  US Department of Defense Report, 2012,  p.2. 
167 
 
                                                 
Chapter  5 
to a lack of trust.  Due to regional and international security circumstances, both 
parties have been close and have signed a number of security pacts. But even than the 
United States’ tilt towards India are the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) in 
2004 and Civil-Nuclear deal of 2006. Pakistan is the front ally of the United States, 
but the United States administration signed these highly strategically, militarily and 
economically important agreements with India. Although Pakistan remained a close 
ally of the United States for last four to five decades, the US security policy has been 
tilting towards India since the government of Bill Clinton. 
As we know that the US want to counter China’s economic strategic ambitions 
in the region. US want some strong ally in South Asia. India was becoming a close 
ally of the United States, India as a rapid growing economy and its strategically 
important place in South Asia."We want to build a future in which India is 
indispensable”, said Barack Obama87 
Obama administration needs India's cooperation on several issues, 
including climate change, the war in Afghanistan and energy security.CIA 
Director Leon Panetta visited India to discuss a host of issues including common 
strategy on dealing with Islamic extremism and the Taliban. This was his first 
international visit since he assumed office in February 2009.88 Bloomberg reported 
that since 2008 Mumbai attacks, the public mood in India has been to pressure 
Pakistan more aggressively to take actions against the culprits behind the attack. 
Consequently, the Obama administration may find itself at odds with India's rigid 
stance against non-state terrorism.89 
The Times of India reported that because of increasing concerns over the 
possibility of the United States agreeing to a Pakistan-assisted scheme to put some 
"moderate" elements of Taliban in charge of governing Afghanistan, India was 
carrying out discussions with Iran and Russia, on the sidelines of the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization, to devise a strategy to "roundly defeat" the Taliban.90 
In March 2009, the Obama administration cleared the US$2.1 billion sale of 
eight P-8 Poseidons to India, the largest military deal between the two countries. The 
87  "India indispensable to a future we want to build: Obama". The Hindu, Chennai, India, November 
25, 2009.  
88 Report: U.S. CIA chief to be in India to discuss Non-State terrorism, Taliban. 
89 India’s Terror Stance Vexes Obama Amid Voter Ire at Pakistan. 
90 India, Iran, Russia null ways to take on Taliban 
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Obama administration temporarily halted work on General Electric LM2500 gas 
turbine engines which were to be fitted in Indian Navy's Shivalik class frigates. On 
March 24, 2009, the Indian Navy reported that the U.S. government had ordered GE 
to resume work on the turbine engines. In a press release by the White House, it was 
announced that Timothy J. Roemer was named the next U.S. Ambassador to India. 
The nomination of Roemer, a non-proliferation expert, led to mixed reactions from 
the South Asian experts and community advocates. Roemer has previously stated that, 
"We also must address the tension between Pakistan and India over Kashmir. For 
generations, this issue has fueled extremism and served as a central source of friction 
between two nuclear states. Resolving this dispute would allow them to focus more on 
sustainable development and less on armed conflict.” We need to harness the energy 
of the international community to resolve security issues in the (South Asia) region." 
The Pakistani government also adopted a new proposal asking the U.S. to turn over 
aerial attack drones to Islamabad to allow the Pakistani Air Force to continue anti-
militant airstrikes in the North-West Frontier Province and Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas on the Afghan border. White House Press Secretary Robert 
Gibbs declined to comment on the request.91 
On February 27, 2009, Obama gave an interview to Jim Lehrer in which he 
said, "Obviously, we haven't been thinking regionally, recognizing that Afghanistan is 
actually an Afghanistan/Pakistan problem."Later in May, the U.S in an effort to 
strengthen trust with Pakistan said they would start 'sharing drone surveillance data 
with Pakistan, says Mike Mullen (U.S General) .In late October 2009, Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton visited Pakistan. Her talks with the government there were 
aimed at getting direct, open discussions going regarding the level of Pakistan's 
efforts in fighting terrorism, al Qaeda and al Qaeda sanctuaries. Furthermore, in a 
speech in Pakistan capital Islamabad, she 'vowed' to support Pakistan military efforts 
against the militants and that the U.S would continue to support Pakistan; she also 
said 'These extremists are committed to destroying that which is dear to us, as much 
as they are committed to destroying that which is dear to you, and to all people,.....So 
this is our struggle as well, and we commend the Pakistani military for their 
91 https:en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Asian_foreign_policy_of_the_Barack_Obama_administration. 
last assed on 20 November 2015. 
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courageous fight, and we commit to stand shoulder to shoulder with the Pakistani 
people in your fight for peace and security."92 
On December 1, 2009, President Obama in a speech on a policy about 
Pakistan said 'In the past, we too often defined our relationship with Pakistan 
narrowly. Those days are over... The Pakistani people must know America will 
remain a strong supporter of Pakistan’s security and prosperity long after the guns 
have fallen silent, so that the great potential of its people can be unleashed'.93 
In October, U.S Congress approves $7.5 billion non-military aid package to 
Pakistan over the next 5 years. Then later in February in 2010 Obama sought to 
increase funds to Pakistan; these funds would 'promotes economic and political 
stability in strategically important regions where the United States has special security 
interests' Obama also sought $3.1 billion aid for Pakistan to defeat Al Qaeda in the 
2010 fiscal year. 
In February 2010, Anne W. Patterson (U.S Ambassador to Pakistan) said that 
United States is committed to partnership with Pakistan and further said “Making this 
commitment to Pakistan while the U.S. is still recovering from the effects of the 
global recession reflects the strength of our vision. Yet we have made this 
commitment, because we see the success of Pakistan, its economy, its civil society 
and its democratic institutions as important for ourselves, for this region and for the 
world.”94 
In mid-February, after the capture of Taliban No.2 leader Abdul Ghani 
Baradar in Pakistan, the White House 'hailed capture of Taliban leader'. Furthermore, 
White House press secretary Robert Gibbs said that this is a "big success for our 
mutual efforts (Pakistan and United States)in the region" and he praised Pakistan for 
the capture, saying it is a sign of increased cooperation with the U.S. in the terror 
fight. Furthermore, Capt. John Kirby, spokesman for Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has said 'We also strongly support Pakistani efforts to secure 
the border region, Kirby added, noting that Pakistan has lost soldiers in that 
effort.' Mullen, (President Barack Obama's senior military adviser) has made 
strengthening 'U.S. military relationship with Pakistan a top priority'. The U.S. and 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid. 
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Pakistan have a robust working relationship that serves the mutual interests of our 
people. 
China feel threatened by India’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, Beijing is likely 
to provide technology and hardware to Pakistan, leading to a competitive nuclear 
arms race in south asia.US is now assigning greater importance to South Asia 
especially Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Obama administration gave assistance to 
Pakistan as a reward for fighting against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. In his 
administration Pakistan expended nuclear weapons programme by using US funds to 
the military build-up against India. The deviation between India and United States 
will continue to persist on many bilateral, regional, and international issues. It was 
hard to develop convergent security and strategic interests on all major issue. The 
shifting of priorities and interests also need to be seriously taken into account by 
India, although imprudence and immaturity on the part of India’s foreign-policy 
establishment will rule the roost. As Pakistan is a critical variable in the ongoing war 
on terror in its tribal areas, US expect India to accommodate Pakistan’s internal 
security problems in order to aggravate tension with Pakistan. Moreover, India 
estimated about $100 billion to spend on defense over the next decade on its Soviet 
arsenal.95On the other hand India is also making efforts to obtain cutting-edge 
military technology from the US to advance its weapon systems. 
India and China are having clash in ambition to becoming global power, 
which create disturbance in their chances of working closely. For regional stability 
and peace, India has to formulate a strategy to counter china in expanding strategic 
intrusion around South Asia. In a timely manner, if India fails to respond to China 
strategic designs in the region, its long term strategic interests would be adversely 
affected. 
95 Emily wax’s news dispatch, The Washington post, 26 September, 2009. 
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CONCLUSION 
 Today the proliferation of nuclear weapon is one of the most pressing 
problems in the world. The first nuclear weapon test was conducted by United States 
in Alamogondo, New Mexico on 16th July 1945. And America was the first to use the 
nuclear weapon against Hiroshima & Nagasaki on 6th and 9th August 1945 
respectively. The destruction caused by atom bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and 
the development of nuclear technology increased the sense of insecurity among states. 
There has been a wide spread realization of its dangers. So the other countries moved 
towards nuclearization. America got it first. The former Soviet Union was the second 
who produced its nuclear weapon in 1949. After that Britain also developed a nuclear 
weapon in Australia (Monte Bello Island) on Oct. 3, 1952. France also conducted its 
nuclear test on 13th February, 1960. 
 China was long being humiliated by foreign invasion and imperialist bullying 
USA considered to use nuclear weapon against China on many occasions during 
Korean war. Soviet Union assisted China in their nuclear weaponization. China 
developed its first nuclear device in 1964 at Lopnor.  
 They all five contribute to make a nuclear club, and they focused on nuclear 
weapons possession (last) to five powers. The five member drafted NPT, it was 
signed by mostly every state in the world. India, Pakistan, Israel and Cuba refused to 
sign. 
 Traditional assignment was drafted to stop the proliferation of nuclear 
weapon. But the whole world witnessed the race in between the two superpowers 
namely United States and Soviet Union, it existed throughout the cold war period. 
Both the powers give emphasis on the prevention of the expression of the nuclear 
weapons as far as possible, horizontally as well as vertically. The nuclear club of five 
and the two superpowers were not allowing the horizontal proliferation by hampering 
the flow of nuclear technology even for the purely peaceful purposes. This was a 
totally discriminatory nuclear order. 
 The successful conclusion in 1968 of negotiation on the NPT was a landmark 
in the history of non-proliferation, after coming into force in 1970 with its indefinite 
extension. The member states include all five nuclear states i.e. China, France, Russia 
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Federation, USA and UK. The main objective of NPT was to stop further spread of 
nuclear weapons states, which have given up the nuclear option, to encourage 
international cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. NPT got indefinite 
extension in 1995 which strengthened the elimination of nuclear weapon. IAEA also 
helped the nations to develop nuclear energy. It also took regular inspections of civil 
nuclear facilities to verify the accuracy of documentation supplied to it, and puts 
control on the export of sensitive technology for the countries such as UK and USA 
through voluntary bodies such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Pakistan, India 
and Israel got regular visit to verify completeness and accuracy of their nuclear 
programmes. 
 CTBT came in existence, by this treaty they (USA, UK, France and Russia) 
tried to put more pressure on Israel, India and Pakistan to agree to international 
verification. There are also other treaties agreements and committees designed to 
reduce the risk of civil nuclear powers contributing to weapons proliferation. 
 After the collapse of Soviet Union the world become unipolar. The United 
States became the only superpower of the world. The end of the cold war brought 
number of arms control advocates, military officers and politicians, which argued that 
US should reduce its nuclear weapons which should be the explicit goal of the United 
States.  
 After independence of India from the British, India tried to achieve the 
objective of social politics, economic, scientific and other for their development. 
From the beginnings India has been a passionate supporter of the use of nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes because nuclear technology could be a major source of 
power generations, so it is very important for their development.  
 Every government decided on certain courses of action, every action has led to 
a reaction from others. By observing India’s National interests and to exercise 
independence in its action, Mr. Nehru adopted a policy of Non-Alignment; he was 
also the architect of Indian foreign policy. Nehru was not in favour to join any power 
bloc as it was in favour of our country to stay sovereign in nature (religiously and in 
its action). Nehru didn’t want to entangle in any alliances he wanted to be friendly 
with all states. He believed that cooperation among nations was most vital for the 
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development purposes. As an architect of non-alignment movement, Nehru followed 
it in his foreign policy.  
 Nehru was seriously concerned about the United States used of bomb on Japan 
cities of Hiroshima & Nagasaki. As we discussed above that all nations were 
threatened and they try to build the nuclear weapon as there was a fear among the 
status that atom bomb could be used against them. The origin of the nuclear 
programme had started before independence by Homi Jahangir Bhaba a young 
scientist of India came from abroad after higher studies in 1944, and he convinced the 
Tata family about the potential uses of nuclear energy. They provided assistance to 
him and in 1947, the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research was created in Bombay 
with Homi J. Bhaba as its first director. 
 There was many debates in the Lok Sabha and the proceeding of many 
conferences that reveal Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru was satisfied that the establishment 
of atomic energy could be used for peaceful purposes and for the vast advantage of 
humanity. He was the same time never in favour of nuclear weapons and worked 
continuously for nuclear disarmament though it was useless to talk with China about 
disarmament as long as China was kept out of the United Nations. In 1973 General 
Assembly India took the initiative to insist the world community’s solemn desire for 
the elimination and prohibition of atomic, hydrogen, chemical, bacterial and other 
weapons of war and nuclear destruction. 
 In 1957, the India’s first Nuclear Reactor Apsara was inaugurated was at 
Trombay, Nehru said that what clearly that whatever be the circumstance India should 
always use atomic energy for peaceful purpose only. Nehru did not consider any 
change in the foreign policy. Nehru believed that the countries which are 
economically strong and industrially developed are much more powerful than less 
developed nations rather than the weak nations have greater needs of nuclear 
technology, not for their development but also to protect them from other powerful 
states. India in Nehru era was keen to follow idealistic policy relating to diplomacy. 
But idealism without the essential past/essence of self-interests may sound fake and 
hollow. The foreign policy of any nation is complete and dynamic political course 
which must include the prevailing pattern of its national interests as well as the 
principle ideas in its conduct towards other nations.  
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 Nehru understood the value of the concept like equality, freedom and need for 
unity among nations for peaceful co-existence because Nehru struggled against the 
colonial powers. Nehru believed that it is essential for Asian countries to concentrate 
on the more immediate requirements of national reconstruction as well as stay away 
from the conflicts between the two blocks. He also argued that it would be wrong to 
assume every act of others through the prism of war.  
 Even after 1962 war despite worsening relation between the two countries 
Nehru wanted to be friend to China, he has no ill feeling against China. South Asian 
security scenario especially India’s security was threatened and altered by Chinese 
nuclear test which was conducted in 1964. Major debates started taking plane in the 
Indian Parliament on nuclear policy after the Chinese nuclear test. The political 
leaders, intellectuals and the armed forces felt the necessity of nuclear weapons for 
security reasons. 
 After the death of J.L. Nehru, Shastri become the Prime Minister of India in 
June 9, 1964. In his initial years he opposed the nuclear weapons development but in 
one of his speeches in the Lok Sabha he said that India was against the development 
of nuclear explosion, but it could be used for tunneling through mountains and other 
such purposes. The fundamental of Indian’s foreign policy has been to ensure the 
welfare and well-being of the people within the laws and the effectiveness of any 
foreign policy depends on those professional who implemented that.  
 In South Asian region, we cannot forget the role of Pakistan in that which is 
also the main reason of problem for India, since independence both have had 
conflictual relations with each other. In 1965 India and Pakistan fought war (of 22 
days) over Kashmir in that Pakistan was supported by China but it was not openly 
engaged in military actions against India. President Ayub Khan and Prime Minister 
Shastri had a meeting at Tashkant in January 1966 for negotiation to ease tensions 
between the two nations. In this meet Prime Minister Shastri suddenly died of heart 
attack. This agreement was a good effort to reduce tension between the two countries. 
To add to the misfortune another important player in the negotiation team, Homi 
Bhaba also died in 1966. 
 India did not sign the NPT. It was discriminatory in nature and because of 
India’s non-signing the treaty Pakistan also refused to sign it. India and Pakistan were 
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very much concerned about the nuclear weapon development even after a lot of 
negotiations and discussions on NPT. India conducted its nuclear test in the desert of 
Pokhran in Rajasthan and coded it a ‘smiling Buddha’, in 1974 and said that it was a 
peaceful nuclear explosion. It was a great victory for India in the field of nuclear 
security. It was obvious reaction from the side of Pakistan that they were hostile and 
considered it as a hostile action on the part India taken to establish Indian supremacy 
but India continued to describe it as a nuclear explosion test for peaceful purposes. 
 The actual aim of the treaty which was signed in between India and Soviet 
Union was cooperation in defense. Some government statements termed this as a 
treaty of peace but the real purpose of the treaty was defense and national security. 
The Indo-Pak war of 1971 in which Pakistan lost its large territory of the country, the 
state of East Pakistan which later emerged as a sovereign state of Bangladesh. This 
was the major reason for Pakistan’s nuclear weapon programme. The defeat of 
Pakistan in 1971 war became an embarrassment for its leadership in domestic politics 
and focal point of all its future politics, internal and foreign. After the nuclear test of 
1974 Pakistan submitted a proposal to the United Nation General Assembly to declare 
the South Asia a nuclear free zone because of India the only nuclear power in South 
Asia at that time, naturally did not give its acceptance to this proposal. At that time no 
state in South Asia was in position to go for nuclear programme that is why all 
countries of South Asia saw India’s nuclear explosion as a great danger for their 
security and critised India. 
 The basis of indo-Soviet Union cooperation was basically correspondence of 
interest. The basic premise of relations between them depended on the maximum as 
long as Pakistan continues to have a military relationship with the United States; the 
Soviet Union would take a more than constructive live towards India. It was felt that 
after signing the friendship treaty India with Soviet Union, India would leave the path 
of non-alignment, but India did not do so. This treaty was in the national interest of 
India because India found many problems and attacks from the side of China and 
Pakistan. It was mandatory for India to sign this treaty in order to secure its national 
interests and maintain its national intensity. Pakistan at bilateral level proposed 
reciprocal inspection of nuclear installations and voluntary restrictions on 
underground nuclear test. India referred Pakistan proposals repeatedly, that they have 
no intension of developing nuclear weapons. 
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 Mrs. Gandhi came in power in 1966, during this period Indian political system 
went through a series of disturbance with unstable intervals. Mrs. Gandhi felt unsure 
in the middle of 1970s, threatened by political developments which promoted her to 
declare a state of emergency in June 1975 and jailed a large number of opposition 
leaders. By this Mrs. Gandhi popularity got down and she lifted up the emergency in 
1979 to hold the election, and lost the power and another reason could be the adverse 
reaction of the nuclear technology supplier countries i.e. the USA and Canada which 
might have compelled Mrs. Gandhi to avoid any further test. 
 After Homi Bhaba’s death Vikram Sarabhi replaced him, on moral grounds he 
was opposed to full scale development of nuclear weapons. Mrs. Gandhi view that the 
nuclear weapon programme could weaken the country’s economy and damage its 
resources which could be utilized for more active work. But in 1970s in Rajya Sabha 
she observed that the present policy of developing our scientific and technological 
capability and expanding our programme for the peaceful use of atomic energy and 
space research is in the best overall interest of the nation. Mrs. Gandhi nuclear policy 
initially was rather uncertain. 1974 nuclear test of India was a result of finally 1971 
war with Pakistan, which propelled India as a regional power capable of affecting the 
regional balance of power independently without the interference of other powers and 
secondly, the very proximity and enormity of Chinese power left no alternative for 
India to go in for an adequate nuclear deterrent. India entered the race by absolute 
force of circumstances. India was signatory to PTBT, which required that nuclear test 
should be conducted underground.  
 In March 1977 Morarji Desai came into power in the umbrella of Janata Party; 
in his initial years he opposed the development of nuclear weapons but on the other 
hand Morarji Desai’s government followed one traditional policy of peaceful 
application of nuclear technology. He also criticized one peaceful nuclear explosion 
of 1974. Desai also said that India would be using the nuclear technology for peaceful 
purpose and not manufacture nuclear weapons. He also denied to inspect India’s 
atomic power plants he agreed if they allow us to inspect their plants. In 1979 Janta 
Party collapsed, the government headed by Mr. Charan Singh had a brief innings. 
Only for 5 months till January 1980. He introduced a qualitative change in India’s 
nuclear policy by linking Pakistan factor into the future orientation of India’s nuclear 
programme. Pakistan secret nuclear programme come to light which might be used 
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against India. Mr. Singh cleared that India does not want to join the race to make the 
bomb if Pakistan made the bomb, then we have to reconsider and would review its 
nuclear policy. 
 Mrs. Gandhi again came in power on January 30, 1980, she said that India 
would not produce the nuclear bomb but we do not give up our right to use nuclear 
energy for peaceful and development purposes. Although we are committed to 
peaceful use of nuclear energy but it would not hesitate from carrying out nuclear 
explosion, whatever is necessary in the national interest. India again went back to the 
nuclear policy of keeping the nuclear option open. She followed the dual track policy. 
 After the assassination of Mrs. Gandhi in Oct. 31, 1984 Mr. Rajiv Gandhi 
succeeded her as the Prime Minister. Mr. Gandhi made an intension clear on the 
nuclear issue by saying that it will be a point of no return in the subcontinent if 
someone goes Nuclear. The Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi responded to the question in 
the Parliament that India was preparing to meet the nuclear threat from Pakistan. India 
could develop “a suitable nuclear weapons delivery system and that the country’s 
growing nuclear self-sufficiency want that, if anyone try to twist our hands we could 
flex our muscles too. He also submitted an Action Plan to the special session on 
armament of the United Nations General Assembly. The plan called upon the 
international community to negotiate a binding commitment to general and complete 
disarmament with systematic monitoring which also has the elimination of all nuclear 
weapons in three stages over next twenty two years. It aimed at achieving the 
objective of nuclear weapon free world by the year 2010. The major contribution of 
Mr. Gandhi lays in the successful conclusion of agreement in December 1988 
between India and Pakistan pledging not to attach each other’s nuclear facilities which 
has laid down a strong foundation for any future bilateral non-proliferation 
arrangements in the region depending upon the nature, form and content of political 
relationship between the leaderships in India and Pakistan. 
 In 1989, the Government of V.P. Singh and Chandrasekhar, there was not any 
major development or change on the nuclear front. Only it continued to stress that the 
nuclear option would remain open. It was a coalition government. With the 
assassination of Rajiv Gandhi on 21 May 1991 India entered a decade of instability, 
coalition governments came and went, in the meanwhile the international scenario 
also underwent dramatic changes. 
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 In 1991 P.V. Narasimha Rao Government came in power. He was known as 
father of Indian Economic Reforms, he also brought major economic reforms. In 
meanwhile the Soviet Union also disintegrated and changed in USSR. US started 
pulling pressure on India to cap its missile programme and blacklist the India space 
Research organization and ask Russia to terminate the supply of cryogenic rocket 
engine to India, it was strong arms tactics of USA. Indian Parliament was fairly active 
on the nuclear issue. At the meantime Russia changed its traditional stand on nuclear 
weapon free zone in South Asia.  
 China conducted two underground nuclear tests in 1992. It was very difficult 
situation for India that from one side US pressurizes NPT Extension, acceptance and 
signing of CTBT, Foreign Minister of Pakistan also stated that Pakistan had the 
components to assemble one or more nuclear weapons. So it was difficult for India to 
go ahead with a comprehensive series of tests that is why Mr. Rao took an anti-
nuclear stance. This reaction of Rao was criticized and opposed by nuclear and 
defense science establishment. Indian scientists, under the Rule of Rao government 
managed to conduct a test of an air delivered nuclear device. The US pressure did not 
prevent India from developing missile system by Kalam. In Rao’s last time in office 
he consulted with opposition and put a deal for a Sukho-30 aircraft which is a nuclear 
capable aircraft. Although he was in favour of denuclearization of the world but at the 
same time he also kept India’s nuclear option open for security reason. Before the 
completion of his tenure Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao had directed APJ Abdul 
Kalam scientific advisor to the Minister at the time, to keep his team ready for nuclear 
test. On 18 August 1992 the ninth flight test of the Prithvi system was conducted Rao 
slowed the programme though, to avoid moving into development too soon, which 
was having the risk of triggering restriction on technology imports. Atal Behari 
Vajpayee was briefed in his presence on the nuke plans and so enabled a smooth 
takeover of the nuclear programme. 
 In 1996 Bharatiya Janta Party came into power under the leadership of Atal 
Bihari Vajpayee. India conducted five nuclear tests. These tests changed the position 
of India’s stance permanently. After this test India declared itself a nuclear weapon 
state. After this test India lost its faith in its neighbours and world at large which 
opened new door for controversies. India tried to clear his stand on building of the 
nuclear weapon were really for the minimum nuclear deterrence due to the presence 
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of hostile neighbor with nuclear weapon. It is also in the interest of national security 
which need to be protected that is why it becomes a necessity to have nuclear 
capability. India’s test becomes the integral part of the conversations on security in 
the subcontinent. India was always a strong advocate of nuclear disarmament but at 
the same time they justified the countries right to keep its nuclear option open. 
 After the test, the Indian Prime Minister in his speeches said that India wanted 
to be friendly with Pakistan and others countries of the subcontinent. On the other 
side Pakistan was also engaged in producing the nuclear weapon during 1990s and on 
May 28, 1998 in the reaction of India’s nuclear explosion. Pakistan also conducted 
five nuclear tests. This was the beginning of a new international order. 
 The Kargil conflict came into existence in May 1999 which created the 
atmosphere of distrust in between two countries. But after some time India’s relation 
with Pakistan was improved. Even through the problem remained stagnant due to the 
unresolved broader problem of Kashmir. On the part of India, it argues that it always 
be the victim of aggression terrorism from the side of military sponsored by Pakistan 
in our country. The India-Pakistan nuclear test has focused the attention on China’s 
role in the development of nuclear weapons in South Asia. As China has stable 
nuclear relationship with Pakistan, China regularly claimed that all nuclear 
cooperation with Pakistan is strictly for peaceful purposes only. India feels insecure to 
go for nuclear armaments because of Chinese support to Pakistan nuclear weapon 
programme and support of the US government. Pakistan connected its programme to 
Kashmir issue which continues since independence. 
 Pakistan believes that he was successful to deter a hostile India through 
nuclear threats, they believed that by holding out the threat of nuclear 
rise/development, they will be able to force the international community, particularly 
the United States, to intervene in the Kashmir dispute. The beliefs of Pakistan proved 
right as the United States has put sanctions on India after its nuclear test. The 
sanctions on India by United States are the tools of their foreign policy for bringing 
stability to South Asia. US wants that India and Pakistan stop the nuclear test, sign the 
NPT, participate in negotiations for reduction of arms race and create a agreement for 
banning exports of nuclear or missile technology which would be in the interest of the 
region.  
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 International relations keep on changing, it is not permanent. In the game of 
nuclear power USA & USSR were the main players, which one possessed huge 
stockpiles of military equipment together with nuclear arsenals. Indian leader have 
been aware of the relationship of Pakistan with the United States and China in 
acquiring nuclear technology, so India also maintained a substantial arms purchase 
relationship with Russia. Both China and United States have been one main 
supporters of its nuclear programme. Indian leaders realized the position of national 
security of India, so they could not afford to ignore the smooth supply of Russian 
weapons and spare parts. Although Russia did not impose any sanction on India, after 
the Indian nuclear test, they have no bearing regarding this issue on their bilateral 
relations with India. 
 After the destruction caused by atom bomb on Japan, the countries of the 
world become insecure and realized its danger, so they start moving towards nuclear 
non-proliferation. There were many international efforts to stop the spread of nuclear 
weapons but its success has not been achieved because some nations refused to sign. 
India also refuses to signing NPT not because of its commitment to go for nuclear 
weapons but arises from the discriminatory nature of the terms of the treaty. As per 
India’s stand on NPT it will not stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons at best, but 
it may merely prevent the spreading of weapon to non-nuclear states. India stood for 
genuine no-proliferation. India’s concept of nuclear non-proliferation was very 
different from the concept of big powers which ultimately came to adopt, nuclear 
abstinence by all countries of the world. The member nations of the nuclear club were 
unconscious to the need to eliminate nuclear weapons. 
 The presence of big powers in South Asia and their interference in the region 
likewise Pakistan was getting support from United States and China, while India is 
getting it from Russia. The status of Indian Regional power in South Asian is not only 
in terms of strategic, political and economic status, but its power status in military 
terms is also the main reason of its dispute with Pakistan. Pakistan was building up its 
military from nearly half a century by infusion of military aid and weaponry by China 
and the United States. 
 After 1998 nuclear tests of India, it was difficult for BJP government to justify 
these tests even the leaders of opposition parties. They explained that one of the 
significant challenges emerging in the neighbourhood was getting cooperation from 
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China and Pakistan in the nuclear and missile programmes which make India’s 
position unstable or dangerous. Therefore we must prepare ourselves. By the nuclear 
test of 1998 both countries introduced a new dimension to India Pakistan relations and 
the prospect of a nuclear arms race. While nuclear capabilities of India are determined 
by a wider set of objectives, Pakistan’s nuclear posture is driven entirely by its 
security fears emanating from India.  
 The Kargil conflict in between India and Pakistan began in May 1999, which 
includes the line of control near the Indian town of Kargil. The conflict began after 
Indian intelligence services discovered the appearance of Pakistan forces on the 
Indian side of the LOC.  
 United States gave his support to India and said that Pakistan would not be 
welcome in Washington unless he was willing to withdraw the troops back across the 
LOC. As Prime Minister Jilani explained that the nuclear tests increased Pakistani 
leaders willingness to challenge India in Kashmir. Pakistan wanted to attract the 
international attention on Kashmir issue and he also wanted outside diplomatic 
intervention in Kashmir by sending a message to outside world regarding the 
seriousness of the Kashmir issue as a future possibility for a nuclear war. 
 In the attack on Indian parliament in 2001, no member of parliament was 
killed, but the security personnels died in the battle with the terrorists. The 
government of India was sure that Pakistan was behind this militant group. India 
demanded the surrender of all the terrorist located in its territory and the flow of 
military penetration into Jammu and Kashmir. Another attack in 2008 by Pakistan 
militant organizations brought the question mark on the utility of India’s nuclear 
deterrence against such conventional attack. A Pakistan relation with India is 
essentially complex and complicated because of the issue of Kashmir and other minor 
disputes. Both suspicious to each other and lack of confidence Beijing pursued a 
neutral path in post Kargil war, but also played the role of an informal mediator by 
hosting separate visits from the Pakistani and Indian foreign ministers. India was 
continuously concerned about the China’s assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear and missile 
production programme. India strongly believed that Chinese sustained military build-
up will continue over the next few years and will pose a challenge to Indian military 
planners. India needs to review its defense preparedness in comparison with China. 
The real challenge for India, however, is posed by China. There was a threat from the 
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side of China in the minds of civilian and military leaders as it is a nuclear power and 
nuclear war threat becomes visible at large. 
 The Indo-US nuclear deal comes as a shock to Pakistan and China. Dispute of 
the various arguments were raised against the nuclear deal. Democrats, both in the 
House of Representatives and the senate argued against Indo-US civilian nuclear 
agreement. They argued that this deal would promote nuclear arms race in South Asia 
and provoke other countries to do the same. Despite of all opposition Indo-US nuclear 
deal was signed.  
 India’s reason behind signing the deal was the failure of its Department of 
atomic energy to produce large quantities of nuclear electricity. There was shortage of 
uranium which has been a big problem as India has been incapable to import uranium 
for its nuclear reactor since the rule of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) do not permit 
it. The NSG is a group of countries which manage international nuclear trade with a 
view to prevent its proliferation. Behind the nuclear deal with India the United States 
has its own interest by realizing the Indian position in the South Asian region in 
getting strong and wants to maintain close diplomatic relations with India. In the 
relation of India, many political parties in India opposed the deal, they were not ready 
to accept this deal because this deal would work against an independent foreign 
policy. The main opposition party BJP in Indian Parliament, argued that this deal 
would create hindrance to further nuclear test in India. This argument was false as 
nowhere in the deal, there may only be a penalty. But on the other hand, the United 
States feels if it will happens in future they will consider as to under what 
circumstances India may have been forced to conduct the tests.  
 United States recognized the emerging Asian strategic framework and wants 
to strengthen comprehensive relations with India. Both the countries have anxiety 
regarding the rising military modernization of the Chinese army. In any way, this 
affects global nuclear regime and South Asian stability. Pakistan also demands for 
increased help in nuclear energy from the United States but it was not accepted by the 
United States. China gave assurance to Pakistan in their nuclear programme. With the 
nuclear capability Pakistan is the only Islamic country which is nuclear. All these 
conditions could create a lot of problems for both India and US. 
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 India and Pakistan had many negotiations producing a huge bulk of paper year 
after year but the mistrust, fear, hatred and rivalry between them continues to rise. 
The disarmament seems line improbable and unrealistic in the case of India and 
Pakistan. Both are expanding their nuclear programme and missile technology. Still 
both are not a member of NPT and CTBT. In the United Nations conference on 
Disarmament the role of India and Pakistan has not been too constructive. The arms 
race goes on in South Asia without hindrance. 
 Indian has tried to restrict, both a conventional and a nuclear arms race in 
South Asia, as they are becoming more complex day by day. India wants to defend 
itself from the side of China and Pakistan threat. The strategic location of China and 
its intervention in South Asia and support to Pakistan is the matter of concern to the 
Indian security. China is not a south Asian country but a vital factor in the arms race n 
South Asia. India and China started taking steps to improve their relations by 
resolving their border problems. All these three countries should come together in one 
umbrella and take initiatives in order to avoid conflicts, resolve the controversial 
issues and stop the progress of the nuclear arms race in South Asia. 
 Actually China is continuously engaging in improving its military strength and 
will encourage India to do the same, which may hinder their chances of working 
closely. Sino-Indian strategic cooperation could be a stabilizing factor in the region. 
Although China is much ahead of India in nuclear and missile capabilities. India, 
therefore, will need to upgrade its missile system accordingly. India will also be 
required to formulate a long term strategy to counter China’s expanding strategic 
interruption in and around South Asia in order to ensure regional stability and peace. 
It was obvious from the past behavior of Pakistan that its policy is basically a reaction 
to India’s policy. The relations of these three countries with other nations may also 
worsen the security condition in South Asia.  
 India and Pakistan should realize the importance of their region and should not 
give a chance to other countries to take advantage of their disputes. Both are capable 
of contribution to the peace and stability of the region. They should also undertake 
positive steps towards bilateral and regional economic reconstruction. The peace 
dialogue must continue with civilian intervention to help resolve outstanding bilateral 
disputes, including Kashmir. The Kashmir issue must be solved through bilateral 
talks. The civilian people of South Asian region should take necessary initiatives in 
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the form of conferences, through writing articles and conducting seminars in order to 
create awareness among the peoples of their countries that if the arms race is 
constantly contested, it would not be in favour of national interest of either India or 
Pakistan. 
 The South Asian countries are rich in natural resources which attract the 
developed countries to these resources, the countries of the region must realize the 
importance of their region. The future of this region lies in their hands and they need 
to conduct themselves responsible in the times to come. 
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